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ABSTRACT 
 
Bigger Than Grain: Soviet-American Agricultural Exchange, 1918-1928 
 
by 
Maria Fedorova 
 
This dissertation examines the history of agricultural exchange between the United 
States and Soviet Russia from 1918 to 1928. It shows that Soviet and American agricultural 
specialists and policymakers sought solutions to the looming global farm crisis of the 1920s 
through visits, the organization of reconstruction projects, and seed exchange. In doing so, 
this work advances three arguments. First, the development of post-World War I 
agriculture, including concepts of large-scale farming, industrialization of agricultural, and 
rationalization of food production, should be understood within an international context. As 
the First World war reshaped patterns of agricultural production and showed the 
inextricable link between food and political stability, experts and policymakers from many 
countries began to search for solutions to the farm problem not only through national 
policies but also abroad. As this dissertation shows, this search would take different shapes 
and forms: from the use of international food aid programs to help domestic food 
production to the usage of another country’s space to conduct large-scale farming 
experiments. These experiences in agricultural exchange allowed its participants to acquire 
new knowledge, technologies, and expertise. 
 Second, by examining post-WWI patterns of agricultural exchange, this dissertation 
reconsiders the relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union with regard to 
 viii 
the flow of technology and expertise. Rather than considering a one-directional movement 
of American technology and expertise to Soviet Russia and perceiving the latter as a passive 
recipient, this work portrays an active multi-directional exchange. It shows that both 
countries perceived each other as research laboratories that were capable of giving solutions 
to farm problems in their respective countries. Moreover, both American and Soviet 
agricultural experts believed that this exchange would benefit the reconstruction of 
international agriculture. 
Finally, this dissertation expands the definition of “agricultural exchange.” Scholars 
have demonstrated that, historically, agricultural exchange, including the movement of 
plants, seeds, and agricultural knowledge and expertise, is not a new event. The flow of 
people and animal species brought new plant varieties and agricultural technologies to new 
places, thus, changing existing environments, economic and social structures. While these 
transfers knew no borders, since the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, they had 
become more institutionalized and regulated by the international community of scientists 
and policymakers. During this period, many national governments introduced new laws and 
regulations that controlled the import and export of agricultural commodities. What is often 
left out in this historiography is the political nature of agricultural exchange. This 
dissertation shows that participants of agricultural exchange used their experience and 
expertise that they cultivated through visits and travel to achieve more powerful positions 
with local and central state institutions. Yet, this experience came at a price. By the late 
1920s, with the shifting political climate in the Soviet Union, the participation in 
agricultural exchange became one of the tools for the ostracization of these experts from 
powerful positions. 
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1 
Introduction 
For four days in June 1919, representatives of Canada, China, France, Belgium, Great 
Britain, and the United States gathered in Beaune, France to debate the future of world 
agriculture.1 Organized parallel to the post-First World War Paris Peace Conference, the 
World Agriculture conference aspired to bring attention of the international community to 
the key role of agriculture in the “establishment and maintenance of the world’s peace.” In 
his memorandum, Kenyon Butterfield, President of the World Agriculture organization and 
President of the Massachusetts Agricultural College, claimed that international cooperation 
went beyond trade and politics. Butterfield declared: “No question before the Peace 
Conference is more fundamental to world welfare than the rural question.”2 Peace, in his 
view, was possible only if the world food problem was solved. Like many of his 
contemporaries, Butterfield argued that “a hungry nation” formed “a breeding ground for 
discontent and revolt; a hungry world means chaos.”3 To avoid chaos and political 
instability, Butterfield suggested international cooperation in agriculture that would 
promote agricultural exchange of ideas, technology, and expertise. For him, this agricultural 
                                               
1 Among the attendees were prominent agricultural policymakers and “several thousand 
soldier-students from the College of Agriculture and the Allerey Farm.” The full list of 
attendees includes H.M. Tory (President University of Alberta, Canada), Dr. Wen Pin Wei 
(Secretary of the Chinese Delegation to the Peace Conference), Paul DeVuyst (Director 
General of the Department of Agriculture, Belgium), Henri Hitier (Professor of the 
Agricultural Institute, Head of the Society of French Agriculturalists), J. Nugent Harris 
(former General Secretary of Agricultural Organizations, Society and Secretary Joint 
Committee Board of Agriculture and Ministry of Food). “The Beaune Conference,” World 
Agriculture 1, no. 2 (June 1920): 8. 
 
2 Kenyon L. Butterfield, “World Agriculture Principles,” World Agriculture 1, no. 2 
(June 1920): 9. 
 
3 Butterfield, “World Agriculture Principles,” 9. 
  
 
2 
exchange was bigger than a simple collection and interpretation of agricultural data. It was a 
politically, socially, and economically significant moment that would define world’s peace. 
Butterfield’s ideas about international agricultural cooperation resonated with postwar 
anxieties about the state of the world food supply, particularly the disruption of the farm 
sector and the signs of famine conditions in Europe. Numerous European and American 
organizations voiced concerns about the importance of farm modernization, rationalization 
of food production, and the significance of agricultural education to avoid hunger and 
famine. Among these groups were the International Institute of Agriculture (IIA), 
agricultural colleges, international agricultural unions and associations (International 
Congress of Agriculture). All of these institutions called on policymakers, scientists, 
experts, and farmers to promote international agricultural cooperation to formulate new 
principles for the disrupted post-WWI agricultural order.4 
The First World War, indeed, left a striking mark on global agricultural economy.5 In 
Europe, the war led to labor shortages in the countryside, increased the movement of 
populations from rural to urban areas, reduced agricultural production, and disrupted 
international trade. European countries directly involved in military actions, particularly 
Central and Eastern European countries, including Russia, suffered the most.6 In Russia, 
more than 12 million peasants were called into the army between 1914-1919; in Italy, 2.6 
                                               
4 Niccolo Mignemi, “David Lubin and the International Institute of Agriculture,” in 
Food and Agriculture Organization, The Story of the FAO Library: 65th Anniversary, 1952-
2017 (Rome: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, 2017): 5-22. 
 
5 Avner Offner, The First World War: An Agrarian Interpretation (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1989), 1. For a work on the U.S. experience of the postwar farm 
depression, see: James Shideler, Farm Crisis, 1919-1923 (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1957). 
 
6 Gerd Hardach, The First World War, 1914-1918 (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1981), 108-138. 
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millions of 4.8 million men employed in agriculture were drafted; 30 percent of the German 
army had been involved in agriculture prior to the war.7 This loss of agricultural labor was 
accompanied by the growing migration of remaining rural population in urban areas. 
Women and rural youth were moving to cities to find jobs in wartime industries. This 
process inevitably led to the decline of agricultural production. Historians have established 
that, by 1916-1917, European agricultural output, particularly in Central Europe and 
imperial Russia, declined by 20 percent.8 As a result, many urban and rural areas began to 
experience food shortages and even first signs of hunger by 1916. 
Food shortages during the war were further exacerbated by the collapse of international 
food trade networks. On the one hand, the Allies, except imperial Russia, quickly 
established new food trade routes that allowed them to compensate declining agricultural 
production and the lack of effective trade networks with India, Australia, and New Zealand. 
North and South American countries became major suppliers of foodstuffs, particularly 
grains. While the majority of foodstuffs were shipped from the United States, the Allies 
received grain crops from Argentina, Uruguay, and Brazil as well. Available on the 
opposite seasonal cycle from the supplies from North America, these crops helped to fill 
supply gaps in the early months of each year.9 Yet, even those supplies did not entirely 
                                                                                                                                                
 
7 Peter Gatrell, “Poor Russia, Poor Show: Mobilising a Backward Economy for War, 
1914-1917,” in Stephen Broadberry and Mark Harrison, eds., The Economics of World War 
I (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 251; Matteo Ermacora, “Rural Society,” 
in Ute Daniel et al., eds., 1914-1918-online. International Encyclopedia of the First World 
War, issued by Freie Universität Berlin, Berlin 2015-01-06, doi: 10.15463/ie1418.10530. 
 
8 Gerd Hardach, The First World War, 1914-1918 (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1981), 108-138. 
 
9 Phillip Dehne, “How Important was Latin America to the First World War?” 
Iberoamericana 14, no. 53 (2014), 161; Dehne, “The Resilience of Globalisation during hte 
First World War: The Case of Bunge & Born in Argentina,” in Christof Dejung and Niels 
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alleviate the unstable food situation in France and Britain. As farmers and consumers 
struggled with pressures and demands of the war, these governments had to introduce some 
forms of food control to ameliorate the situation.10 
 On the other hand, the Central Powers, particularly Germany, faced harsher food 
instability. In 1914 the Allies imposed the trade blockade that prevented Germany from 
getting enough food supplies for the army and its population even from neutral countries, 
including Latin America. Despite German government attempts to address these issues, the 
food crisis led to numerous uprisings and disturbances that took place during and after the 
war.11 While German state food policies might have prevented a major uprising in the last 
year of the war, the dissatisfaction with the food situation and the government inability to 
deal with the crisis of food production contributed to the unrest among soldiers, sailors and 
civilians. These processes would ultimately result in the German November Revolution of 
1918.12 
Similar wartime unrest due to food shortages led to one of the most important 
revolutionary uprisings of the twentieth century – the February Revolution of 1917 in 
                                                                                                                                                
P. Petersson, eds., The Foundations of Worldwide Economic Integration: Power, 
Institutions, and Global Markets, 1850-1930 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2013): 228-248. 
 
10 For selected works on British wartime food policies, see: Peter Dewey, British 
Agriculture in the First World War (London: Routledge, 1989); Margaret L. Barnett, British 
Food Policy in the First World War (Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1985). 
 
11 Belinda Davis, Homes Fires Burning: Food, Politics, and Everyday Life in World 
War I Berlin (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000).  
 
12 Belinda Davis, “Food and Nutrition (Germany),” in Daniel Ute et al., eds., 1914-
1918-online: International Encyclopedia of the First World War, https://encyclopedia.1914-
1918-online.net/article/food_and_nutrition_germany. 
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Russia.13 Since the beginning of the First World War, feeding the army and civilian 
population became a problem for the Russian imperial government. While, like other 
countries, the mobilization of peasant population into the army and the collapse of 
international trade adversely affected Russian agriculture, it was the issue of wartime food 
distribution that undermined domestic food economy. Due to the underdeveloped nature of 
the railway system even before the war, it could not sustain the volume of military traffic. 
Military food shipments took priority over provisions for urban centers. As cities received 
less food and food prices soared, the imperial government did little to nothing to alleviate 
food shortages among the civilian population prioritizing army needs.14 By late 1916, food 
crisis reached its apogee in largest urban centers, including Moscow and Petrograd. 
Workers, particularly female workers or the so-called soldatki, protested high food prices, 
speculation, and the inability of the government to provide urban centers with food. In their 
protests, they linked food instability to the political weakness of the imperial government 
and positioned themselves as an opposition to the official authority - the tsar whom they 
saw responsible for the subsistence crisis.15 As the unsuccessful war continued and food 
shortages worsened in early 1917, the distrust of Russian people in the relevance of the old 
imperial system was completely undermined. 
                                               
13 For selected works on food instability in Russia, see: Barbara Alpern Engel, “Not by 
Bread Alone: Subsistence Riots in Russia during World War I,” The Journal of Modern 
History 69, no. 4 (1997): 696-721; Thomas Fallows, “Politics and the War Effort in Russia: 
The Union of Zemstvos and the Organization of Food Supply, 1914-1916,” Slavic Review 
37, no. 1 (March 1978): 70-90; Lars T. Lih, Bread and Authority in Russia, 1914-1921 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990).  
 
14 Fallows, “Politics and the War Effort in Russia,” 72. 
 
15 Engel, “Not by Bread Alone,” 715-717. 
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The Provisional Government and later the Bolshevik Party that came to power in 
October 1917 inherited the food problem and the disrupted agricultural economy of the 
imperial government. While the Bolsheviks nationalized the land and gave peasants an 
opportunity to redistribute their former landlords’ (pomeshchchiks) land, early Soviet 
policies of food requisition in rural areas undermined peasants’ trust in the new regime. 
Moreover, despite the fact that Soviet Russia withdrew from the First World War after the 
Treaty of Brest-Litovsk in March 1918, the Civil War (1918-1920) further weakened the 
agricultural sector. Coupled with the drought of 1919-1920, these developments led to 
severe famine conditions in 1921-22. The Volga region that had been historically one of the 
most productive agricultural areas suffered the most. More than five million people died of 
starvation and disease during the two years of famine. To fight the consequences of the 
Volga famine, the Bolsheviks had to abandon its requisition policies and adopt the New 
Economic Policy (NEP) that allowed free trade in food and consumer goods and employed 
proportional tax on food surpluses.16 Yet, even those policies were not enough to alleviate 
hunger. In the summer of 1921, Maxim Gorky, a renowned Russian writer, appealed to the 
international community on behalf of the Russian people as the Bolshevik state struggled to 
aid the hungry.  
 These wartime and postwar food shortages had tremendous economic and 
environmental impact not only on European but also on global agriculture. With regard to 
the latter, wartime agricultural practices in North and South America left distinct ecological 
impact on farm landscapes. Due to the fact that these regions became major suppliers of 
foodstuffs to Europe, they sought to increase their profits. To do so, many farmers stopped 
                                               
16 Zhores Medvedev, Soviet Agriculture (New York: Norton, 1987), 32-39; Jonathan 
Dekel-Chen, Farming the Red Land: Jewish Agricultural Colonization and Local Soviet 
Power, 1924–1941 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005), 12-13. 
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rotating crops preferring to grow only most profitable varieties: wheat and corn. As a result, 
combined with overproduction, these practices led to excessive soil depletion.17 For 
instance, due to overproduction of wheat in Canada, average crop yields were less than half 
of their pre-war levels by 1918.18 This disturbing effects of environment raised questions 
about the rationalization of production on the farm and soil conservation during the times of 
emergency.19 
As for the economic impact of the First World War, North and South American 
agricultural markets grew rapidly as the European demand in foodstuffs increased over the 
course of the war. American consumers and farmers in the Midwest, in particular, felt 
immense pressure from the U.S. government to participate in the war effort. The former 
were encouraged by the U.S. Food Administration (USFA), a wartime food agency, to 
comply with voluntary food rationing. The USFA called on American consumers to “eat 
less” to save food for the American army and the Allies.20 The latter group (farmers) 
responded to the call of the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) and the USFA to 
produce more grain to feed Europe. This pressure from the state encouraged many 
                                                                                                                                                
 
17 Andrew P. Duffin, Plowed Under: Agriculture and Environment in the Palouse 
(Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2007), 96. 
 
18 Ermacora, “Rural Society.” 
 
19 During the Second World War, American soil conservationists would look back at the 
detrimental effect of overproduction on soil in the Midwest and Canada during the First 
World War. Duffin, Plowed Under, ch. 5. 
 
20 For more on the U.S. Food Administration, see: Helen Zoe Veit, Modern Food, 
Moral Food: Self-Control, Science, and the Rise of Modern American Eating in the Early 
Twentieth Century (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2015); William C. 
Mullendore, A History of the U.S. Food Administration, 1917-1919 (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1941). The USFA and its successor, the American Relief Administration, 
will be discussed in the first chapter that focuses on famine relief to Europe as a lens to 
examine agricultural exchange through the process of humanitarian aid. 
  
 
8 
American farmers to increase their crop acreage and introduce new agricultural machinery 
into the production process.  
While growing agricultural prices during the war benefited American farming as during 
the war and the first post-war years they enjoyed immense profits, long-term consequences 
of the increased agricultural production were much more dangerous. The first farm crisis hit 
the American agricultural market in 1920-1921, as U.S. government price guarantees on 
grain ended and European markets returned to pre-war level of food production. While 
grain prices were slowly climbing up until the mid-1920s, many American farmers in wheat 
and corn regions could not keep up with paying off wartime loans that they took to purchase 
land and machinery. The result was the farm crisis that, while not as severe as the Great 
Depression, affected American farmers in profound ways.21 
Not only did the farm crisis of the 1920s in the United States shake the economic 
foundations of farmers’ lives, but it also undermined contemporaries’ beliefs in the future 
of modern agriculture. Farmers, bankers, and policymakers – all those who were involved 
in wartime agricultural production – raised questions about the modernization and 
rationalization of agricultural production. Bankers and lenders who provided loans to 
farmers during the war held hundreds of bankrupt farms without tenants; farmers had to 
vacate their properties as they could not pay their debts or even if they stayed their 
properties turned into the state of disrepair because they did not have enough capital to 
repair them. Many blamed farmers for the farm crisis, using xenophobic language and 
                                                                                                                                                
 
21 Deborah Fitzgerald, Every Farm a Factory: The Industrial Ideal of American 
Agriculture (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003), ch. 1; William Winders, The 
Politics of Food Supply: U.S. Agricultural Policy in the World Economy (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2009); ch. 1; Theodore Saloutos, Agricultural Discontent in the Middle 
West, 1900-1939 (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1951). 
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stereotypes about illiteracy. Others argued that farms should have less farm hands. While 
others argued that farmers did not have efficient methods of production and were stuck in 
old-fashioned practices and attitudes.22 Thus, the eyes of farm leaders, the USDA, and 
policymakers in the cities as well as in the countryside locked onto possible solutions to the 
farm crisis through new approaches to agriculture. Deborah Fitzgerald characterizes this 
period as a time of soul-searching and reflection, by people with different perspectives and 
roles within and outside of agriculture.”23 Many of them, indeed, were interested in finding 
new approaches not only at home but also abroad. 
Thus, if one considers the situation of the agricultural market and state of farms and 
agricultural practices both in Europe and the United States after the First World War, it 
becomes apparent that the war significantly impacted patterns of food production and 
consumption. First, the military conflict caused food instability that lasted not only during 
the years of the war but also during the first years after the conflict. This food instability led 
many policymakers to consider the relationship of food instability and radical ideologies, 
perceived threats to liberalism and democracy. Thus, this period witnessed the birth of 
international state-sponsored humanitarianism that served as a weapon to contain food 
instability and, thus, radicalism. Next, the First World War shifted the economic power on 
the agricultural market to North America, particularly the United States, that replaced 
Russia as the dominant agricultural exporter to Europe. However, despite this shift, the 
American farm sector still experienced problems with overproduction and the use of 
                                               
22 Fitzgerald, Every Farm a Factory, 20-21. 
 
23 Fitzgerald, Every Farm a Factory, 20; Fitzgerald, “Accounting for Change: Farmers 
and the Modernizing State,” in Catherine McNicol Stock and Robert D. Johnston, eds., The 
Countryside in the Age of the Modern State: Political Histories of Rural America (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 2001): 189-212. 
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monoculture crops. With regard to Soviet Russia, its agricultural situation was the 
precarious one. As the Bolsheviks continued to ascertain their power on the territory of the 
former Russian empire during the first years after the First World War, they grappled with 
the problem of existing food supply networks and efficient food production. However, the 
Soviet experiment pushed policymakers and agricultural experts to consider new forms of 
agricultural organization and rationalization of food production. Within this context of 
shifting discourses of world food production, many agricultural policymakers, experts, and 
scientists searched for possible solutions both at home and abroad. The latter is the subject 
of this dissertation. 
A. Agricultural Exchange: Conceptualization and Historical Significance 
This dissertation examines the history of agricultural exchange between the United 
States and Soviet Russia from 1918 to 1928. It shows that Soviet and American agricultural 
specialists and policymakers sought solutions to the looming global farm crisis of the 1920s 
through visits, the organization of reconstruction projects, and seed exchange. In doing so, 
this work advances three arguments. First, the development of post-World War I 
agriculture, including concepts of large-scale farming, industrialization of agricultural, and 
rationalization of food production, should be understood within an international context. As 
the First World war reshaped patterns of agricultural production and showed the 
inextricable link between food and political stability, experts and policymakers from many 
countries began to search for solutions to the farm problem not only through national 
policies but also abroad. As this dissertation shows, this search would take different shapes 
and forms: from the use of international food aid programs to help domestic food 
production to the usage of another country’s space to conduct large-scale farming 
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experiments. These experiences in agricultural exchange allowed its participants to acquire 
new knowledge, technologies, and expertise. 
 Second, by examining post-WWI patterns of agricultural exchange, this dissertation 
reconsiders the relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union with regard to 
the flow of technology and expertise.24 Rather than considering a one-directional movement 
of American technology and expertise to Soviet Russia and perceiving the latter as a passive 
recipient, this work portrays an active multi-directional exchange. It shows that both 
countries perceived each other as research laboratories that were capable of giving solutions 
to farm problems in their respective countries.25 Moreover, both American and Soviet 
agricultural experts believed that this exchange would benefit the reconstruction of 
international agriculture. 
To analyze the multi-directional nature of the aforementioned processes, this 
dissertation employs the term “agricultural exchange” rather than “agricultural transfer.” 
The latter term carries the notion of a one-directional process and highlights fixed national 
categories which participate in the transfer – as in, the transfer of agricultural technologies 
                                               
24 Antony Sutton, Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development, 1917 to 1930 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1968); David Joravsky, “The Perpetual Province: 
‘Ever Climbing up the Climbing Wave,’” Russian Review 57, no. 1 (1998): 1-9. 
 
25 In his article “Barriers to East-West Technology Transfer: Iu. V. Lomonosov and 
Diesel Railroad Engineering in the Interwar Period,” Anthony Heywood offers a study of 
the opposite movement of technology and expertise from the Soviet Union to the United 
States in the 1920s. While his article makes an important contribution by uncovering and 
challenging historians to look beyond the transfer of American technology to the Soviet 
Union, the question of technological exchange and interactions is left beyond the scope of 
this work. Anthony Heywood, “Barriers to East-West Technology Transfer: Iu. V. 
Lomonosov and Diesel Railroad Engineering in the Interwar Period,” The Russian Review 
70, no. 3 (July 2011): 440-459. 
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between the United States and the Soviet Union.26 This conceptualization, as Benedicte 
Zimmerman and Michael Werner argue, only “reinforce[s] the [national] prejudices that” it 
seeks “to undermine.”27 In doing so, it imposes the “sender-recipient” framework that 
underscores the inequality of relationship. In contrast, by utilizing the term “exchange,” this 
dissertation seeks to overcome this methodological problem.28 Particularly, it is significant 
with regard to the U.S.-Soviet example in that for a long time the interwar relationship 
between these countries has been considered within the antagonistic “communism vs. 
capitalism” perspective. Only recently have scholars addressed the issue of crossing borders 
between communist and capitalist countries by highlighting transnational and trans-systemic 
                                               
26 The most recent critique of the concept “transfer” has been offered by the advocates 
of “histoire croisée.” See: Michael Werner and Benedicte Zimmerman, “Beyond 
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Development,” Agricultural History 40, no. 3 (1966): 187-206. 
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histories of socialist projects. 29 The idea of choosing the United States and the Soviet Union 
to explore questions of interwar agricultural exchange furthers this trend.  
Despite the dissimilarities in the American and Russian/Soviet agricultural development 
during the early twentieth century, these countries shared post-WWI concerns about 
competition on the world agricultural market, farm modernization, and the prevention of 
future famines through effective food production. Moreover, the geographical areas of these 
countries (the Midwest in the United States and the Volga region in Russia) that would be a 
subject of this dissertation are quite similar in terms of climate and soil. Both regions grew 
wheat and corn as main crops; both were susceptible to droughts; both required innovative 
dry farming methods; both focused on implementing ideas of large-scale agriculture. 
In addition to demonstrating the effectiveness of using the term “agricultural exchange” 
to understand the international dimension of interwar agriculture, this dissertation seeks to 
expand the definition of “agricultural exchange.” Scholars have demonstrated that, 
historically, agricultural exchange, including the movement of plants, seeds, and 
agricultural knowledge and expertise, is not a new event.30 The flow of people and animal 
                                               
29 On bridging the communist-capitalist divide, see: György Péteri, “Sites of 
Convergence: The USSR and Communist Eastern Europe at International Fairs Abroad and 
at Home,” Journal of Contemporary History 47, no. 1 (January 2012): 3-12; Michael 
David-Fox, “The Implications of Transnationalism,” Kritika: Explorations in Russian and 
Eurasian History 12, no. 4 (Fall 2011): 885-904; Michael David-Fox, Showcasing the Great 
Experiment: Cultural Diplomacy and Western Visitors to the Soviet Union, 1921-1941 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014); Cadra Peterson McDaniel, American Soviet 
Cultural Diplomacy: The Bolshoi Ballet’s American Premiere (Lexington Books, 2014); 
Kiril Tomoff, Virtuosi Abroad: Soviet Music and Imperial Competition During the Early 
Cold War, 1945-1948 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2015). 
 
30 Alfred Crosby, Columbian Exchange: Biological and Cultural Consequences of 1492 
(Greenwood Publishing Company, 1972); Crosby, Ecological Imperialism: The Biological 
Expansion of Europe, 900-1900 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1986). On the 
development of American agriculture from a global perspective, see: Courtney Fullilove, 
The Profit of the Earth: The Global Seeds of American Agriculture (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 2017). 
  
 
14 
species brought new plant varieties and agricultural technologies to new places, thus, 
changing existing environments, economic and social structures. While these transfers knew 
no borders, since the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, they had become more 
institutionalized and regulated by the international community of scientists and 
policymakers. During this period, many national governments introduced new laws and 
regulations that controlled the import and export of agricultural commodities.31 What is 
often left out in this historiography is the significant political nature of agricultural 
exchange. This dissertation shows that participants of agricultural exchange used their 
experience and expertise that they cultivated through visits and travel to achieve more 
powerful positions with local and central state institutions. Yet, this experience came at a 
price. By the late 1920s, with the shifting political climate in the Soviet Union, the 
participation in agricultural exchange became one of the tools for the ostracization of these 
experts from powerful positions. 
 
1. Interwar Agriculture: Historiography 
By advancing the aforementioned arguments, this dissertation aims to uncover a 
neglected international dimension to the history of post-WWI and interwar agriculture and 
to demonstrate an overlooked component of the U.S.-Soviet relations of the 1920s with 
regard to agriculture. Profound and troubling questions about the effects of the First World 
War on food production and consumption remain a historical problem worthy of 
investigation. In the recent years, historians have explored ways in which military conflicts 
                                                                                                                                                
 
31 Stéphane Castonguay, “Creating an Agricultural Order: Regional Plant Protection 
Problems and International Phytopathology, 1878-1939,” Agricultural History 84, no. 1 
(Winter 2010): 46.  
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impact patterns of food production, distribution, and consumption. Some historians have 
shown the vital importance of food in instigating wars and shaping military strategies. For 
instance, in her work The Taste of War, Lizzie Collingham demonstrates how, for Germany 
and Japan, the demand for food resources during the Second World War became one of the 
major reasons these countries invaded the Soviet Union and China respectively.32 Another 
group of historians have explored the growing role of the state and scientists during wartime 
and their involvement of formulating food policies on the home front. These processes, as 
Helen Zoe Veit shows in her work Modern Food, Moral Food, fundamentally changed 
ways consumers perceived and thought about food.33 If Veit considers these processes from 
the perspective of the state and scientists, other scholars have concentrated on the role of 
consumers and their power in shaping food policies during the war.34 Yet, another group of 
works linked the history of food instability during wartime with radicalism and 
revolutionary movements.35 This scholarship offers illuminating perspectives on how 
different actors, including the state, scientists, and consumers, debated the significance of 
food and shaped wartime food policies both on the front and at home. However, the 
                                               
32 Lizzie Collingham, The Taste of War: World War II and the Battle for Food (New 
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question of food production, in other words what happened on the farm and how wars 
affected this link of the food chain, remains beyond the scope of food historians. 
The topic of wartime and postwar agriculture has been examined extensively in 
European and American historiography, particularly by agricultural and economic 
historians.36 This scholarship pays particular attention to considering wars as both historical 
moments of continuity and discontinuity in the development of agricultural production. 
Much historiography has been devoted to the analysis of the Second World War and post-
WWII period with regard to wartime agriculture and postwar agricultural reconstruction. In 
fact, in the recent years, the interest in agricultural development in the 1940-60s has been 
growing exponentially.37 These works have demonstrated the post-WWII agricultural 
development as a contested space where ideologies, politics, and economic interests 
clashed.  
While the Second World War agriculture has received more scholarly attention, the last 
years have witnessed a renewed interest in the history of interwar agricultural development. 
For instance, historians who examine American agricultural development during the 1920s 
have explored the development of mass markets, patterns of industrialization, 
mechanization, irrigation, and social structures of farms, as well as cultural practices in the 
                                               
36 The most recent work that explores this subject is: Paul Brassley, Yves Segers, and 
Leen Van Molle, eds., War, Agriculture, and Food: Rural Europe from the 1930s to the 
1950s (London: Routledge, 2012). 
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(Cambrdige: Harvard University Press, 2010); David Engerman, The Price of Aid: The 
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interwar period.38 As for European historians, new scholarship has explored rural policies 
and attempts to modernize the farm sector and how different groups of people were engaged 
in debates about the future of modern agriculture and how they tried to solve it through 
planning and engineering models that created effective rural models of development.39  
Although much of this historiography still focuses on national histories of interwar rural 
policies, a noticeable shift towards the inclusion of global and transnational perspectives has 
recently taken place. By engaging ideas of the transnational turn scholarship and global 
history methods, agricultural historians have uncovered political and economic comparative 
and transnational stories of agriculture.40 Particularly, this approach is apparent in Tore 
Olsson’s work Agrarian Crossings that offers the methodological foundation for this 
dissertation. Agrarian Crossings deals with the notion of crossing borders and transnational 
frameworks in agricultural history. By focusing on agrarian exchange between the United 
States and Mexico in the 1930s and ‘40s, this work argues against the established 
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dichotomy of American and Mexican histories. Olsson demonstrates the convergences of 
these histories within the agricultural discourses and shows how American and Mexican 
governments sought solutions to remake their farm sectors “in the name of agrarian justice 
and agricultural productivity.” Olsson shows the entanglement of these agrarian histories. 
This work provides a methodological framework for agricultural historians to move away 
from comparative history by studying history of “interactions and exchanges.”41 Moreover, 
it offers important insights into how national rural policies and agricultural development are 
shaped through agricultural exchange. 
While Olsson’s work raises important questions about the nature of agricultural 
exchange and the nature of borders, his work primarily focuses on agricultural 
policymaking and development in the United States and Mexico in the 1930s and ‘40s. This 
dissertation, however, takes a different approach. Rather than focusing on the history of 
agricultural policies, it utilizes five analytical lenses to examine agricultural exchange 
between the United States and Soviet Russia in the 1920s. Among them are famine relief, 
seeds, tractors, agricultural schools, and travel. Each lens offers an opportunity to highlight 
important aspects of Soviet-American agricultural exchange, including the organization, 
practices, and power relations, as well as political dimensions of the exchange.  
Thus, in the last twenty years, both American and European historiography has raised 
important questions about the effects the First World War on agriculture. Yet, there remains 
a decisive gap in our understanding of the international dimension of debates that occurred 
after the war with regard to the modernization of the farm sector and to possible solutions to 
the agricultural crisis. Unlike works that consider these debates within the national 
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framework, this dissertation analyzes how solutions to domestic problems were sought 
abroad through the practices of agricultural exchange. 
 
2. U.S.-Soviet Relations in the 1920s 
To understand international agricultural exchange of the 1920s, its mechanisms and 
practices, within the framework of one dissertation project is an impossible task. To narrow 
down the historical focus, this work examines the interactions between the Soviet Union 
and the United States. When considering early Soviet-American relations, historians 
have shown productive and multi-dimensional interactions between the countries. Despite 
the fact that during the 1920s, the attempts to achieve a diplomatic recognition from the 
United States through foreign policy failed, intensive economic relationships, as well as 
cultural and intellectual exchange between two countries, existed. For instance, in Loans 
and Legitimacy, exploring the economic side of American-Soviet relations, Katherine 
Siegel shows that despite the absence of a formal diplomatic recognition, Soviets, who 
actively sought foreign investments, received them from American businessmen in a form 
of technical-aid agreements and concessions. In Siegel’s view, these contacts not only paved 
a way to a formal recognition of the Soviet Union but also demonstrated that 
relations between two countries flourished between 1917 and 1933.42   
Besides businessmen and trade representatives, American intellectuals demonstrated 
remarkable interest in the Soviet Union.43 While pre-1980s historiography argued that 
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westerners’ fascination with the Soviet Union was a product of their leftist views, a new 
generation of historians argues that it was a multi-faceted nature of communism that 
appealed to the West. In Modernization from the Other Shore, David Engerman shows that 
during 1920s, America’s Russian experts found Soviet Russia and its aspirations for 
industrialization “alluring,” as they endorsed Soviet model of modernization regardless of 
their sympathies for the Bolshevik regime. He argues, “The way Americans understood the 
process of social change shaped the way they envision their own 
nation.”44 Engerman’s work constructs an intellectual framework of American-Soviet 
foreign relations, by showing the interrelationship of international politics, knowledge 
production, and modernization ideas. Modernization from the Other Shore offers a model 
for examining American-Soviet intellectual exchange which will be used in this dissertation 
to analyze work of American agricultural experts who travelled to the Soviet during the 
Russian famine and afterwards and came back to the United States eager to apply their 
knowledge to solve American farm problems.  
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While historians have examined stories of companies, intellectuals, and workers who 
travelled to the Soviet Union, a study of American agricultural experts and their interest in 
the Soviet Union has received little scholarly attention.45 The only American historian who 
has explored this topic is Deborah Fitzgerald. Examining the transformation of American 
agriculture in the 1920s and its effects on farm families, Fitzgerald argues that during this 
period, a new industrial ideal of agriculture emerged. She emphasizes the industrial 
character of changes that happened to American farms by exploring the rise of agricultural 
expert knowledge, the emergence of large-scale farms, and a growing belief in efficiency of 
farm production. In the last chapter of her work Every Farm a Factory, Fitzgerald brings an 
international dimension to this process and examines how some American agricultural ideas 
found their application in the Soviet Union. Providing a brief overview of the early 1920s 
agricultural exchange between the United States and the Soviet Union, she pays particular 
attention to the late 1920s visits of American agriculturalists to large-scale farms. In accord 
with Engerman, Fitzgerald argues that for American agricultural experts, a visit to the 
Soviet Union was an alluring opportunity as it allowed them to expand their experiments in 
large-scale wheat farming.15  
With regard to Russian-language historiography, scholars have acknowledged the role 
of foreign agricultural expertise in the 1920s Soviet economic development.46 Some 
                                               
45 On the interwar period, see: Fitzgerald, Every Farm a Factory, ch. 6. For works on 
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historians, such as V.V. Bulatov and M.M. Zagorulko, have explored this process within the 
discourse of the early Soviet concession policies. They argue that, oftentimes, foreign 
agricultural communes were mistakenly placed in the category of concessions. This mistake 
prevented them from effectively organizing the process of agricultural reconstruction and 
establishing productive relations with local Soviet authorities. Another group of scholars, 
including Irina Suponitskaya, have examined the work of American agricultural experts as a 
part of the 1920s Soviet fascination with the West.47 Ultimately, these histories demonstrate 
the failure of many foreign agricultural concessions to achieve their goals in reconstructing 
Soviet agriculture. 
Rather than considering agricultural exchange between the United States and Soviet 
Russia as a success/failure story, this dissertation considers practices and mechanisms of 
interactions that both Soviet and American agricultural experts formed during travels, visits, 
and agricultural projects. In a way, this dissertation responds to Michael David-Fox’s 2011 
call to integrate transnational history into the Russian and Soviet field and to place Russian 
history back in the global space. In his now seminal article “The Implications of 
Transnationalism,” David-Fox emphasizes the immense potential of transnational history 
for Russian studies as, in his view, it is “still very much an unfinished scholarly revolution.” 
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By highlighting cross-national interactions, David-Fox places the analysis of 
interrelationships between Russia/the Soviet Union in a more global context. In doing so, he 
demonstrates how Soviet Russia, for instance, was viewed as “a vast playground for 
unrealized plans and fantasies.”48 This dissertation shows that Soviet agricultural experts 
also viewed the United States as a “playground” or laboratory for their vision of modern 
agriculture.49 By organizing the Russian Agricultural Bureau in New York and by travelling 
across the United States, for instance, Soviet experts observed and selected the best and 
most appropriate agricultural technologies, seeds, and other innovations that were 
appropriate for Soviet agriculture. 
 
B. Participants of Agricultural Exchange: Who are They? 
At the core of this dissertation is a series of archival collections that contain personal 
materials, notes, plans, and reflections of those who traveled back and forth between the 
United States and Soviet Russia to observe agricultural practices and experiments in the 
1920s. Rather than purely focusing on the institutional history of interwar agricultural 
exchange and taking the history of the International Institute of Agriculture, for instance, as 
a focal point, this dissertation seeks to bring up personal experiences and struggles of 
people who were involved in this process. It examines experiences through the analysis of 
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their travels, organization of reconstruction projects, and interactions with different groups, 
including authorities, experts, and peasants/farmers. 
The majority of those who participated in Soviet-American agricultural exchange were 
in some way or another involved in agriculture or were at least concerned with the problem 
of food production. Among them were scientists, policymakers, experts, social workers, 
political activists, and farmers. With regard to the latter group, multiple American-
organized agricultural communes traveled to Soviet Russia in the 1920s to aid the 
Bolshevik state with the reconstruction of agriculture.50 As these groups’ goal was to settle 
and establish permanent agricultural units in the Soviet Union, their history remains beyond 
the scope of this work. This dissertation uncovers stories of those who constantly traveled 
between the two countries crossing national boundaries multiple times in the search for 
approaches to modern agriculture. Those featured here include Harold Ware, Nikolai 
Vavilov, Nikolai Kondratiev, and Nikolai Tulaikov. The list of participants is incomplete 
but these people played an important role in fostering Soviet-American agricultural 
exchange.  
 
C. Chapter Organization 
The five chapters are organized in a chronological order that follows the story of 
agricultural exchange from its reinstatement after the First World War to its transformation 
in the late 1920s. Each chapter represents a case study that focuses on a specific aspect of 
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agricultural exchange and addresses one of the following questions: 1) How does famine 
relief foster agricultural exchange? (Chapter 1); 2) How was agricultural exchange 
practiced? (Chapters 2 and 4); 4) What can the study of agricultural exchange of technology 
tell us about the interaction of foreign expertise, local and central authorities? (Chapter 3); 
5) How could agricultural exchange function as a political instrument to gain power, on the 
one hand, and an instrument of purge, on the other hand?  
Chapter 1 focuses on contested definitions of famine relief and expands our 
understanding of famine relief by showing that famine relief alleviated not only food 
shortages but also facilitated agricultural exchange, including the shipment of technology 
and expertise. It investigates American food aid to Soviet Russia in 1921-23 by examining 
the history of the state-sponsored American Relief Administration and its privately-funded 
rivals, the Friends of Soviet Russia and the Society for the Technical Aid to Soviet Russia. 
In doing so, this chapter illuminates two diverse interpretations of what famine aid 
constituted. This chapter reveals the contested nature of famine relief and the ways we can 
understand agricultural exchange through . In addition, this chapter demonstrates that 
agricultural exchange occurs even during the turbulent times of famine because it stimulated 
agricultural exchange. 
Chapter 2 uses seeds to examine the international institutional framework that facilitated 
agricultural exchange between the countries. Specifically, it focuses on the establishment 
and development of the Russian Agricultural Agency in New York City (1921-1927). This 
agency served as an organizational link between the U.S. Department of Agriculture and 
American agricultural colleges, companies, and individuals, on the one hand, and Soviet 
agronomists and Soviet institutions, on the other hand. To examine the work of this agency, 
this chapter utilizes seeds as an analytical lens. It demonstrates how the RAA facilitated 
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purchasing, shipment, and distribution of American seeds in the Soviet Union for research 
purposes. Moreover, this chapter reveals how changing priorities in agriculture in the late 
1920s curtailed the research work of the Russian Agricultural Agency in New York. 
Chapters 3 and 4 explore the experiences of the American tractor unit in the Russian 
region of Perm (1922-23) and the Russian Reconstruction Farms in the North Caucasus 
(1925-27). In Chapter 3, I consider tractors beyond their mechanical utility, reconceiving 
them also as instruments of new ideas, policies, and cultural frictions. Chapter 4 analyzes 
the organization and implementation of Harold Ware’s Russian Reconstruction Farms 
reconstruction project as a laboratory for social and agricultural change, paying particular 
attention to the establishment of agricultural schools. It investigates the varying means by 
which progressives, urban planners, and communists as well as local Soviet administrators 
and peasants defined “modern” agricultural practices. 
Finally, Chapter 5 follows the travels of Soviet agricultural economists and scientists to 
the United States from 1921-28. It explores how Soviet agrarians used international travel 
not only to learn about modern agriculture but also to validate their expertise in the eyes of 
the Soviet state. While, initially, they were able to leverage this experience to procure 
prominent positions within the Soviet bureaucracy, in the end, their foreign experience 
shifted from a precious commodity to an offense punishable by exile and, ultimately, death.  
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I. Famine Relief: Competing Visions of American Aid to Soviet Russia, 
1921-23 
In August 1921, the Near East Relief Commission (NERC) was headed from New York 
to Transcaucasia to conduct relief work in Armenia when it was diverted north to 
investigate rumors of severe famine in the Volga region of Soviet Russia.51 Upon arrival 
their worst fears were realized. After its twenty-seven-day trip across famine-stricken 
districts of Samara, Penza, and Tsaritsyn, the NERC concluded recurring droughts between 
1919-1921, voluntary reductions of crop production by peasants, as well as the destabilizing 
effects of the First World War and the October Revolution caused the famine. Ignoring the 
detrimental impact of War Communism’s food requisition policies on the peasant 
population, the NERC praised the Bolshevik efforts to introduce new technology and 
educate peasants about modern agricultural ideas, including crop rotation and dry farming.52 
Reiterating the stereotype of the ignorant and illiterate peasant, the commission further 
applauded Soviet efforts to battle peasants’ backwardness by equipping “agricultural 
education” trains which “contained special cars for lectures, practical demonstrations of 
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agricultural machinery of modern type, and a certain amount of seed for distribution for 
experimental purposes.”53 
Recognizing the situation was beyond the scope of their organization, the NERC 
reached out to Herbert Hoover, then U.S. Secretary of Commerce and unofficial head of the 
American Relief Administration. Hoover’s pet project, the ARA was established in order to 
organize relief operations in post-war Europe. Tellingly, Hoover never responded to their 
missive. Though the ARA would go on to establish a dominant presence in the Soviet 
region, it sought to prosecute relief on its own terms. For while groups such as the Near 
East Relief Commission and the Friends of Soviet Russia sought to buttress the fledgling 
Soviet state and reconstruct Russian agriculture, the ARA was not interested in uplift. 
According to the NERC, the ARA’s exclusive focus on feeding children, sending clothing, 
and providing medicine did not “insure Russia against an immediate return of famine 
conditions” in the future. In their eyes, the “permanent rehabilitation” of Russia necessitated 
the implementation of new technologies and widespread agricultural education.54 Thus, in 
addition to the shipment of food, clothing, and medicine, the NERC sought to provide 
seeds, agricultural implements, draft animals, tractors, and improvements in 
transportation.55 
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The disparity between the mission of organizations, like the NERC and the ARA, 
provide insights not only into competing visions regarding Russian famine relief, but into 
larger debates about humanitarianism and famine relief from the post-World War I period 
onward. The First World War was a watershed moment in the rise of a new network of 
international humanitarian organizations that sought to develop systematic responses to the 
unprecedented social and economic crises caused by the war. In different parts of the world, 
millions of war victims, including veterans, disabled soldiers, starving refugees, and 
homeless children required assistance from these new agencies.56 Yet, many organizational 
questions about types of relief, distribution networks, roles of relief workers, among others, 
became points of discussion and open confrontation ensued among different organizations. 
Motivated by economic, ideological, and political ideas, these groups shaped diverse visions 
of famine relief that continue to frustrate humanitarian efforts to this day.   
 In contrast to previous historiography that has evaluated Russian relief in terms of 
quantifiable successes and failures, this chapter focuses on how competing visions for relief 
played out on a transnational stage. While scholars have noted the ulterior motives of the 
ARA, they have erred in dismissing the efforts of so-called “radical” relief organizations as 
inconsequential.57 In highlighting this disparity of vision and the ARA’s attempts to 
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undermine its “radical” rivals in consequence, the motivations of the ARA come into 
sharper focus. For the ARA, the Russian famine was an opportunity to ameliorate 
America’s own agricultural crisis. Subsidizing relief efforts to the Volga region would be a 
boon for American farmers facing a post-war grain surplus while concomitantly providing 
the U.S. with the means to undermine the nascent Soviet state through a display of power 
and opulence. In this light, the ARA’s insistence on limiting the scope of Russian famine 
relief as well as regulating, or even restricting the participation of smaller independent 
humanitarian organizations, functioned as an expedient means to accomplish these ends. 
Thus, the ARA’s policies amount to a weaponization of humanitarian aid, deployed in an 
attempt to both preserve American hegemony on the world grain market and undermine 
communism.  
More than merely an examination of the ARA and its motives, this chapter explores the 
insistence of “radical” relief organizations on technological and educational aid in their 
attempt to reconstruct Russian agriculture. In particular, it focuses on the movement of 
peoples, ideas, and technology that occurred in spite of the ARA’s tactics, both in terms of 
public defamation and in denying access to proprietary transportation and distribution 
channels. The perseverance of “radical” relief organizations was instrumental in opening 
channels for future exchange after 1923 as will be discussed in the following chapters. In 
doing so, it also contributes to existing scholarship on foreign labor migration from the 
United States to the Soviet Union during the early 1920s. Previous scholarship has 
predominantly focused on the migration of American industrial labor to the region and its 
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economic, social, and cultural impact on Soviet Russia.58 Agricultural migration, in the 
meantime, has received comparatively less attention. The works that do address it have 
interpreted it within a framework of administrative organization or success versus failure, 
highlighting the disappointment American agricultural immigrants expressed with their 
Soviet experiences.59 In contrast, this chapter focuses on their role as experts and 
demonstrates that their migration contributed to the exchange of agricultural knowledge and 
technology between the Soviet Union and the United States.  
 
A. World War I, Food, and Humanitarianism 
During the First World War, food production, distribution, and consumption shifted 
dramatically from a concern of national economies to an international issue. At the 
beginning of the war, Russia had enough grain to feed its population and, therefore, did not 
prioritize questions of food supply. Yet, this situation changed in 1916 with a series of 
military defeats that forced continuous retreats that shifted the front eastward. The 
subsequent loss of Poland, Western Ukraine, and the Baltic region robbed the empire of the 
most well developed grain-producing areas. Furthermore, the underdeveloped transportation 
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network caused food shortages in industrial areas, such as Moscow and St. Petersburg. To 
make things worse, although food prices began to rise in 1916, the government refused to 
raise “the procurement prices for agricultural products” making peasants reluctant to sell 
their grain. As a result, by the end of 1916, Russia, the world’s leading grain exporter pre-
World War I, found itself faced with food shortages that led to major disturbances and 
strikes relating to food that eventually led to the February revolution.60 
In 1917, then U.S. Food Administration director Herbert Hoover, or as the press labeled 
him “world food dictator,” declared, food had “assumed a larger place in the economics, the 
statesmanship and the strategy of warfare.” During wartime, Hoover had helmed the U.S. 
Food Administration (USFA), representing the largest food relief effort in the world to date. 
To achieve this feat, the USFA had to mobilize Americans to voluntarily regulate their food 
consumption to fuel the war effort and feed European Allies. Through the USFA more than 
seven billion dollars worth of foodstuffs and medical equipment were shipped to European 
nations. This aid was instrumental in ameliorating food shortages experienced due to the 
destruction of European agricultural sectors and the disruption of food imports from their 
colonies. The United States profited immensely from Europe’s food insecurity and the 
allied war effort owed its victory to that exchange. For, as the First World War revealed, 
victory on the battlefield depended as much on who could better regulate food production, 
distribution, and consumption as it did on the strength of armies and the technologies they 
employed.61 
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 From its inception in August 1917, the USFA promoted the idea of an integral 
connection between food conservation and the preservation of the capitalist democracy that 
buttressed the free world. In one of its first bulletins, the USFA proclaimed that food would 
be “the deciding factor” in winning the war. The bulletin argued, by complying with 
voluntary food regulations Americans could fuel the allied war effort and, thus, make “the 
world safe for democracy.” Eating less meat, sugar, and wheat meant more than merely 
consuming less calories or even winning the war. Voluntary food conservation was a 
manifestation of democratic consciousness that relied on individual efforts by everyday 
Americans exercising self-control and self-sacrifice to overcome regimes that relied on 
compulsion and governmental authority. It was the epitome of everything that democratic 
capitalism purportedly stood for. Through a wide network of women’s clubs, lectures, 
demonstrations, and public meetings, the USFA delivered this message to every American 
household. While individual conservation was important, the primary aim of these 
campaigns was to shape an American citizenry that perceived personal sacrifice as an 
obligation towards the preservation of democracy both at home and abroad.62  
Despite the fact that the USFA was a temporary wartime agency, it actively prepared the 
American public for the postwar mission of continuing international food aid. In his speech 
“Fighting with Food,” delivered in May 1918, USFA administrator Ray Wilbur argued that 
food conservation was “a remarkable thing in the democratic history of the world.”63 
Moreover, he declared that the “coming of peace” would not “solve the food problem.” In 
addition to providing food to the Allies after the war, the USFA planned to feed the 
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vanquished enemies, demonstrating the superiority of its ideology and peoples.64 
Positioning America as the breadbasket of the world, the USFA, as well as the Department 
of Agriculture, encouraged American farmers to maintain wartime production levels in the 
postwar period of European reconstruction. Such pronouncements were not revolutionary. 
The legacy of agricultural exports and American democracy can be traced back to Thomas 
Jefferson’s republican notions of an empire of liberty. Yet, while Jefferson envisioned an 
agricultural nation as a means to engender self-sufficiency and to avoid foreign 
entanglements, the USFA focused on America’s obligation to the free world. The USFA 
declared that as the “greatest food-producing country” and the “big brother of the world,” 
the United States “assumed tremendous responsibilities.”65   
The USFA also warned the American public about the dangers of revolutions and their 
threat to world democracy. In his speeches, Wilbur explained that food instability 
constituted the major cause of the March and October Revolutions in Russia. He 
emphasized the irresponsibility of the Kerensky regime to feed its own people, which, in 
turn, led to the fall of the Provisional Government. Wilbur stated, “Russia collapsed, not 
because of the Germans on her borders; but the failure to organize and feed her own 
citizenship. Russia had a large army, and it went to pieces, and its government went to 
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pieces, because the food problem went to pieces.”66 Thus, Wilbur’s perspective, efficient 
food production and distribution were at the center of a democracy’s political stability.  
Wilbur’s rhetoric also showcased how October Revolution served as an excellent worst-
case-scenario of what might happen in Europe and eventually in the United States if 
Americans failed to provide adequate food aid to its Allies. In his appeal to Spokane Food 
Administrators in May 1918, Wilbur warned his listeners that even the long-established 
democratic tradition would not survive under the threat of hunger. Hungry people, he 
declared, “fight only for food. Revolutions are born in breadlines.”67 “Whether it is 
Petrograd, Moscow, New York, Chicago, Seattle or Spokane,” he continued, “it makes no 
difference under starvation conditions. Men gather together and they tear down the 
government.”68 As a result, Wilbur concluded, Russian people fell victim to the promises of 
the Bolsheviks and submitted to their communist ideas out of shear desperation. In his view, 
European countries and even the United States were not that far away from a similar 
scenario. Wilbur predicted, “another eight months like that, and this country as we know, 
disappears; our democracy goes and liberty vanishes.”69  
In its postwar mission, the USFA enlisted the USDA in its efforts to increase 
agricultural production. According to the Farmer’s Review, the USDA asked farmers “to 
                                               
66 Wilbur, Address at Conference of County Food Committee of Ohio in Senate 
Chamber, Columbus, December 3, 1917 in FA Papers, Box 7, Folder 16. 
 
67 Wilbur, “Fighting with Food,” Speech delivered to the County Food Administrators, 
State of Washington, May 8, 1918 at Spokane, WA, in FA Papers, Box 7, Folder 21, page 
10. 
 
68 Wilbur, “Fighting with Food,” 10. 
 
69 Ray Wilbur, “Food in the War Today,” American Federationist, 25, no. 8 (September 
1918): 794. 
 
  
 
36 
make three blades of grass grow where one grew before.”70 Farmers responded in kind, as 
the 1917 harvest was almost 25% more than 1916. Clarence Ousley, the Assistant Secretary 
of Agriculture in 1917, argued that this responsibility to increase crop production was “the 
greatest privilege and the greatest task any man or any class of men have ever known.” The 
war effort, Ousley continued, rested on the shoulders of the American farmer and his ability 
to “sustain the fighting forces.” It was up to the American farmer, Ousley concluded, to 
decide whether the forces of “autocracy or democracy” would win in the world war, as the 
war would be won in “the fields, gardens, orchards, pastures, and hog lots of the American 
farmer.”71 
The majority of American farmers supported the war effort and eagerly embraced their 
new role. But it was not exactly a selfless enterprise. Fixed prices on some agricultural 
commodities and continuous government orders boosted agricultural production and lined 
farmers’ pockets, encouraging them to increase acreage, take credit, and buy new 
machinery. When, in January 1918, the leading agricultural magazine Wallace’s Farmer 
declared its uncompromising support of the war effort, the majority of its readers approved 
this position sending hundreds of supportive letters and telegrams. 72 As one American 
agriculturalist noted, the American farmer took on the responsibility of being the only 
supplier of foods as “revolution-torn Russia [could not] do what she ha[d] done in the 
past.”73 
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For American farmers, however, fear about the possible return of Russia to the 
European grain market dampened enthusiasm. According to J. Ralph Pickell, a Chicago 
grain trader who toured Europe in 1919, American farmers had to be aware of the coming 
competition.74 In January 1920, Wallace’s Farmer noted that Russia was recovering from 
the revolution and the Civil War and would soon increase its agricultural production. As 
long as Russia was “down and out,” editors warned, “the American wheat farmer should 
continue to make a fair profit.” But “as soon as Russia recovers there is every prospect that 
the American wheat farmer” would face “a period of unusual[ly] hard times.”75  
Anxiety about the return of Russia to the world grain market had no real foundation in 
reality. World War I and the Civil War had a tremendously detrimental affect on the 
Russian agricultural sector. Further, coupled with Bolshevik requisition policies, several 
years of drought in the Volga region—the major grain-producing area—brought a 
devastating famine to Russia. More than six million people died of starvation and diseases 
caused by hunger. More people would have perished if not for the American food aid, sent 
by the American Relief Administration (ARA), the successor of the U.S. Food 
Administration. As the ARA was presided over by the former members of the USFA, the 
rhetoric of food instability and revolutions carried over within food aid policies in Europe 
and Soviet Russia. 
 
B. Bolshevism “can be stopped by food”: The American Relief Administration, 
Postwar Relief, and Agricultural Interests 
At war’s end, the American Relief Administration (ARA), led by Herbert Hoover, 
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continued the USFA’s work by shipping American food aid to postwar Europe. Established 
by Congress in February 1919, Hoover unofficially presided over the ARA during his 
tenure as Secretary of Commerce. By raising $200 million through official and private 
donations, the ARA projected it could feed over 250 million in Post-War Europe.76 In doing 
so, it became one of the most important instruments of American foreign policy in Europe. 
The inability of many European states to feed their populations increased people’s 
dissatisfaction with current political regimes. Food shortages had sparked riots in many 
cities across Europe and made American policymakers anxious about the spread of radical 
ideas such as communism in postwar Europe.77 Not only was it responsible for sating the 
revolutionary appetites of starving Europeans, but it was also charged with preventing the 
spread of Bolshevism in the process. In his 1919 address to Congress, Woodrow Wilson 
declared that Bolshevism was “steadily advancing westward” and though it could “not be 
stopped by force,” Wilson assured the American public, “it can be stopped by food.”78  
From June to September 1919, American newspapers were flooded with reports about 
food riots in Berlin, Hamburg, Munich, and other German cities.79 Troubling news about 
German food protests were exacerbated by speculations that these disturbances would lead 
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to a larger communist revolution. In June 1919, when the Communist party and the 
Spartacists took over Hamburg city hall, American reporters declared that the communists 
utilized “food riots as an excuse for their attempt to gain control.”80 Three months later, 
when food protests broke out in Westphalia, the American media again linked this turmoil 
to opportunities for communists to spark a “revolution… under the leadership of Russian 
Bolsheviki.”81 While the Communist Party failed to gain power in Germany, in March 
1919, communists, under the leadership of Bela Kun, established the Hungarian Soviet 
Republic.  
Bela Kun’s revolution sent shockwaves through France, Britain, Italy, and the United 
States, whom immediately recognized its potential danger to European democracy. While 
the French, British, and Italians demanded military intervention; the United States 
suggested placing a blockade on ARA food relief efforts as long as communists were in 
power there. To do so was effectively weaponizing humanitarian aid. Despite some 
hesitance, Hoover accepted the blockade as a necessary evil, hoping that restricting aid 
would exacerbate tensions between Kun’s party and the countryside. When Kun was 
overthrown the some members of the ARA were quick to take credit. In his 1921 article 
“Stemming the Bolshevik Tide,” Captain T.T.C. Gregory, the head of the ARA in Central 
Europe, boasted that the organization gave a “significant check” to Bolshevism in Hungary 
“a handful of Americans, employing only economic weapons, brought down the 
government of Bela Kun, and put a sudden end to the dreams of Lenin for immediate 
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European domination.”82  
While the organization eventually walked back Gregory’s remarks, issuing a public 
statement that it did not “wholly agree” with his assessment, it was clear that the blockade, 
alongside allied involvement and the invasion of the Romanian army, had accomplished 
what it set out to achieve. Coupled with Bela Kun’s poor farm policy, the ARA’s 
weaponization of humanitarian relief further escalated tension between Hungarian Soviet 
Republic and its hinterlands. Though USFA administrator Ray Wilbur stated a few years 
earlier, “revolutions are formed in breadlines,” Hoover and the ARA demonstrated they 
could be quashed there as well. For, this time, it was the Bolsheviks who fell victim to the 
might of a hungry citizenry.83 
 
 
C. American Agricultural Overproduction and the Search for New Relief 
Opportunities 
The ARA policies and food relief in Europe led to sizable growth in the agricultural 
sector of the American economy. During wartime, the United States began its domination 
international commerce, as its exports to the French and British had increased from $40 
million in 1914 to nearly $2 billion a year by the end of the war. After cornering European 
markets, American private banks and the federal government loaned European Allies $3.3 
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billion in postwar aid on top of the nearly $7 billion lent during war-time.84 The sector of 
the U.S. economy that profited most from European relief during and after the war was 
American agriculture. During the war and the immediate postwar period, American farmers 
enjoyed the golden age of agriculture, as a sizable portion of that $3.3 billion went to 
purchasing agricultural products that would have otherwise amounted to unprofitable 
surpluses. The 1919 Yearbook of Agriculture showed a crop price index averaging about 32 
percent above 1866-1908 prices. While farm prices dipped in 1915, in 1916 they recovered, 
increasing almost 60 percent over the period of 1914-1920.85 However, despite this safety 
valve for American agricultural surpluses, overproduction was rampant and demand could 
not keep pace.  
By 1920, American agriculture found itself in a financially difficult position. The 
decreasing European demand for American agricultural products threatened to undo the 
financial gains American farmers had made in the immediate postwar period. In late 1920, 
the U.S. government ended its policy of price guarantees on agricultural commodities and 
let the market dictate values. By November 1920, wheat prices had dropped by 33 percent 
from 1919. By July 1921, prices had fallen 85 percent below pre-war levels.86 This freefall 
in prices meant that farmers who purchased land, machinery, livestock, and fertilizers at 
highly inflated prices during the war could not pay their debts. Taxes also emerged as a 
significant burden for American farmers as they were heavily based on land ownership 
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rather than merely income.87 Lamenting the state of American agriculture, the Secretary of 
Agriculture, Henry C. Wallace, warned that the farm crisis was the result of rampant 
overproduction brought on by the government’s insistence “a hungry world waiting to be 
fed” would provide a sufficiently “strong demand for all they could produce.”88  
Rather than accept the financial fallout of a decline in production, the American 
government sought to ameliorate the plight of its farmers by finding new markets for 
agricultural surpluses. As European agriculture had gradually recovered by 1921, news of 
famine in the Volga region offered new hope. In providing food aid to Soviet Russia, the 
ARA could achieve two important goals. First, the ARA food aid to Russia provided a 
temporary answer to the American farm crisis. By shipping agricultural surplus to Soviet 
Russia, the ARA gave American farmers additional time to adjust to the postwar economic 
climate. In doing so, American food aid to Russia managed to tone down rising radical 
voices on American farms. Second, said aid would function as a demonstration of the 
superiority of the capitalist system and its ability to feed not only its own people but the 
hungry world as well. It was a theme that played out in a number of propagandist avenues, 
including ARA posters distributed in Russia that depicted impoverished, undernourished, 
and destitute Russian peasants dwarfed in its foreground against the backdrop of a Titanic-
esque American freighter carrying food aid looming off shore. The artist’s use contrast, 
depicting the strength of American industrial power and the weakness of the Bolshevik 
regime, was starkly apparent. 
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What is more, American interest in cornering the Russian market preceded news of the 
famine. In January 1921, the Committee on Foreign Affairs discussed the opportunities that 
the Russian market presented. A.W. Kliefoth, a regional economist on Russia at the Foreign 
Trade Adviser’s Office of the State Department, reported that “Russia represents a gigantic 
economic vacuum” and that the opportunities for the United States there were 
“unparalleled.” “The upbuilding of the industries of Russia,” he continued, “will not only be 
a great humanitarian work, but will render a patriotic service to the United States.” 
Comparing the present Soviet Russia with the “development of our own great West,” 
Kliefoth saw incredible opportunities for American products and companies.89 
Farm lobbyists, who witnessed rapidly deteriorating status of American agriculture, 
could not agree more with Kliefoth’s recommendations. As James R. Howard, the President 
of the American Farm Bureau Federation, and Gray Silver organized what we today call the 
Farm Bloc in early 1921. Their lobbying efforts were directed to relieving agricultural 
depression through the increase of farmers’ purchasing power and finding outlets for 
accumulated agricultural surpluses. In November 1921, after word of the famine had 
become widespread, James Howard declared in his address that, while the American farmer 
was burdened by 670 million bushels of surplus corn, “central Russia is experiencing the 
worst famine of her history. It would help the American farmer, American industry and 
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American shipping if 20,000,000 bushels of this surplus needed for European relief could 
be immediately purchased by our Government.”90 
The pressure of the Farm Bloc, the dire state of American agriculture, the fear of losing 
the Russian market to rival and recovering European capitalist economies, and the ARA’s 
successful experience in Western Europe gave President Harding the leverage he needed to 
appeal to Congress to appropriate funds for the Russian relief. On December 5, 1921, 
President Harding asked U.S. senators to provide the ARA with “10,000,000 bushels of 
corn and 1,000,000 bushels of seed grain.”91 Following Harding’s message, Joseph W. 
Fordney, Congressman from Michigan, an active agricultural lobbyist, introduced the bill to 
the Committee on Foreign Affairs. Unsurprisingly, the strongest support of this bill came 
from Hoover. He assured U.S. senators that by sending famine relief, the United States 
would help American farmers ship surplus “food supplies” that were “without a market in 
any quarter of the globe.” Hoover stated of the present surplus, “we are … feeding milk to 
our hogs; burning corn under our boilers. From an economic point of view there is no loss 
to America in exporting those foodstuffs for relief purposes.”92 
Representing the interests of American midwestern farmers, Ralph Snyder, the president 
of the Kansas Farm Bureau Federation, agreed with Hoover and testified that farmers, in 
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particular corn producers, wholeheartedly supported the idea of the Russian relief.93 In 
accord with Snyder, Carl Vrooman, a former Secretary of Agriculture under Woodrow 
Wilson, emphasized that the corn surplus was “a liability, not an asset” because there was 
“no domestic demand.”94 To find a market for the nation’s corn surplus, according to 
Vrooman, benefited not only farmers but also “the whole country and the businessmen 
alike.”95 However, not all farm interests were content with the emphasis placed on corn 
exports to Russia. The flagship of the northwestern farm magazines, The Northwestern 
Miller, published a harsh critique of the measure. While applauding the “apparently 
generous act,” the editor, William C. Edgar, criticized the bill for sending corn rather than 
wheat to Soviet Russia. Experienced in organizing famine relief for Russia in 1891, Edgar 
argued that sending corn was a poor solution.96 Not only was corn unsuitable for 
undernourished people, but also the Russians did not have necessary equipment to grind it 
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and knowledge of how to prepare it.97 Instead of corn, Edgar insisted that the ARA should 
ship wheat that was also in surplus on the American market. Yet, his voice was not strong 
enough to undermine the power of the corn lobby.  
Proponents of Soviet recognition evoked other criticisms of the Russian famine relief 
bill. For instance, William Edgar Borah emphasized that while he did not oppose the bill, he 
voted for it because he did not have “the heart to refuse it.” An avid proponent of Soviet 
recognition, Borah condemned how the Allies and the United States treated Russia. He 
argued that “recognition of the Russian de facto Government would in itself tend to 
stabilize conditions in that country and keep its people from starvation.” For Borah, the 
food relief measure was a temporary solution to the Soviet famine and agricultural 
depression in the United States.98 These criticisms aside, the U.S. House overwhelmingly 
passed the bill by a vote 181 to 71 on December 20, 1921. What is more, Congress doubled 
the initial requisition sought from $10,000,000 to $20,000,000 and ordered the ARA to 
expand its work in Soviet Russia.99 Three days later, on December 23, Harding signed the 
legislation - an early Christmas present from capitalist Americans to communist Russians.100 
 
D. Bread or Iron?: Critiques of the ARA and the “Radical Relief”’ Concept of 
Technical Aid 
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To say that the ARA’s food relief program did not go smoothly would be an 
understatement. In addition to dealing with delayed shipments, the inadequate Russian 
railroad system, it was also forced to deal with uncooperative Soviet authorities. What has 
been less reported are the criticisms the ARA received domestically and abroad. First, 
despite the efforts of the Farm Bloc to satisfy farmers with government purchases of crops 
for relief purposes, some farm groups perceived the ARA food aid to Russia as not 
extensive enough to help the American farmer. Individuals like Director Benjamin Marsh of 
the Farmers’ National Council pressed the federal government to reinstitute wartime price 
regulations: a request that Hoover strongly opposed.101  Finally, supported by various pro-
communist organizations, what Hoover dubbed as the “radical relief” movement criticized 
the ARA for its shortsightedness, self-interestedness, and anti-communist position. These 
groups advocated more extensive forms of relief that included agricultural machinery, 
education, and experts to reconstruct Russian agriculture. Thus, the ARA had to formulate 
its mission, policies, and actions taking into consideration not only the Russian situation but 
also radical opposition it faced at home.  
While Hoover and the ARA were battling the expectations of American farmers, 
multiple independent relief organizations sprang up across the United States to help fight 
the Russian famine. Among them were ethnically-oriented groups, such as the Volga Relief 
Society for Germans and the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee; religious 
organizations such as the National Lutheran Council and the Russian Church Relief 
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Corporation; representatives from the labor movement, such as the Amalgamated Clothing 
Workers of America, the United Cloth Hat and Cap Makers of North America, and the 
International Ladies’ Garment Workers’ Union); as well as nonpartisan organizations such 
as the American Committee for Russian Famine Relief, the Russian Non-Partisan Famine 
Relief Committee; and, finally, pro-Soviet organizations such as the American Committee 
for the Relief of Russian Children, the Friends of Soviet Russia, the American Federated 
Russian Famine Relief Committee, and the Soviet Russia Medical Relief Committee.102 The 
number and diversity of these groups and their missions put immense pressure on the ARA 
to effectively organize and control the relief effort to Russia. Viewing these organizations 
as potential threats, capable of disrupting the ARA food aid to Russia and undermining its 
authority in the eyes of the American public, the ARA openly derided them in the press, 
declaring them “radical.” 
In light of this opposition, these groups faced two choices: to relinquish their autonomy 
and, possibly, compromise their beliefs in order to collaborate with the ARA or draw its ire 
by retaining their independence. As the ARA was the largest relief organization in Europe 
at that time, its contacts, distribution centers, and contracts with shipping companies meant 
it could provide aid to famine-stricken regions faster and more efficiently. This was enough 
to entice a number of independent organizations to look past ideological differences. 
Prominent among them, was the Volga Relief Society (VSR). In letters to the organizers of 
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the VSR, John Miller, the VSR representative in Portland, Oregon, was among the early 
advocates for joining forces with the ARA, noting the organization would receive favorable 
rates on supplies through the ARA’s contacts, as well as having access to the organization’s 
“transportation privileges.”103 
Yet, collaboration with the ARA came at a price. To join the ARA independent 
organization had to raise a certain amount of funds before it would be allowed to send 
representatives to Russia. In the case of the VSR, the society had to raise $15,000. The 
ARA also enforced other restrictions, including what types of foods could be sent and 
requiring that all potential representatives be vetted by the ARA before they could travel to 
the region.104 In addition to administrative requirements, the ARA enforced specific 
ideological principles that smaller relief organizations had to comply with. When some 
independent relief groups, like the Near East Relief Commission, expressed a desire to 
expand the ARA mission, including collaborating with the Soviet government, Hoover 
flatly refused, insisting that their efforts had to be offered as an act of “charity.” 105  
For Hoover, the emphasis on “charity” was particularly significant. First and foremost, 
it determined the temporality and mission guidelines of the ARA operations in Russia. 
Outwardly, the ARA purported it sent relief only to avert humanitarian disaster. Inwardly, 
by refusing to send agricultural machinery and experts, it did little to protect Russian 
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peasants from future famines. ARA understood that reconstructing Russian agriculture 
would only buttress the Soviet regime and help an old rival on the grain market back to its 
feet. What was more, anything beyond “charity” was effectively collaborating with a 
communist state and would only serve to legitimize the Soviet government and its 
communist ideology. These outcomes were unacceptable for Secretary of Commerce 
Hoover, whose anti-communist ideology and economic vision for American agriculture 
were well known both in the United States and worldwide.106  
While some independent relief organizations complied with the ARA requirements, 
sending only food, clothing, and medicine to Russian famine victims, other private groups 
insisted on a broader scope of relief. Some, like the Russian Non-Partisan Famine Relief 
Committee, utilized the Russian Red Cross to circumvent ARA involvement. Represented 
by the Russian intellectuals who fled the Soviet regime, the Committee worked to unite all 
“Russian elements of the United States” to help fight famine and reconstruct Russian 
agriculture. The committee also took issue with the ARA’s refused to ship personal parcels 
to the Volga region, as many Russians in America expressed interest in sending care 
packages to friends and relatives in the region. To this end, the Committee promised to 
utilize its connections with the Russian Red Cross in order to “organize gathering and 
shipment of parcels to Russia.”107 
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Groups that chose to work through other relief channels came under severe attack from 
the ARA. Among them was the American Committee for Russian Famine Relief organized 
by a Chicago journalist, Walter Liggett, in early 1922. During its first weeks, Liggett’s 
Committee secured the support of prominent politicians, including fourteen governors, and 
clergy, as well as establishing offices in twenty midwestern states.108 When the question of 
relief distribution came up, Liggett chose to ship food through the Russian Red Cross 
(RRC), arguing that the RRC had “units in every part of Russia” and could “place the 
supplies in the hands of the people” in need.109 Liggett’s decision to use the RRC brought 
the ire of the ARA. The ARA publicly defamed Liggett for associating with communists, 
asserting that he had misled American politicians, clergymen, and ordinary citizens into 
bolstering the Soviet state rather than feeding hungry Russians.110 
Hoover attempted to downplay the role that anticommunism played in the ARA’s 
restrictive policies. In one of his letters to Liggett, Hoover declared: “I feel that aid by 
Americans should be distributed by well-known American organizations in Russia as a 
matter of national pride.”111 Moreover, he explained that the work of the RRC on American 
soil and the distribution of American food by the Russians undermined the position of the 
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ARA and its food aid policy. In his letters to Liggett, Hoover claimed it did not matter 
whether it was Soviet Russia or Great Britain that organized relief on American soil—he 
was critical of any foreign group or government that operated on American soil.112 Given 
the rhetoric employed by the ARA and its predecessor, the Food Administration, it is 
difficult to accept Hoover’s claims at face value. Regardless, the term “radical relief” 
became a convenient label that resonated with the American public and allowed the ARA to 
further undermine the work of small private relief groups. 
While the Liggett Committee and the Russian Non-Partisan Famine Relief Committee 
fell under the umbrella of “radical relief” due to their alleged connection with communists, 
the Friends of Soviet Russia (FSR) was outspoken in its support of the Communist Party of 
America and the Bolsheviks in Russia. The FSR propagated its own brand of Russian 
famine relief. Established in August 1921, the FSR was one of the friendship societies that 
belonged to the International Workers’ Famine Relief Committee (IWFRC).113 In the 
United States, it served as an umbrella organization for over two hundred pro-communist 
groups, in particular, the Society for Technical Aid to Soviet Russia, the Famine Scout 
Group, the American Labor Alliance, and the Soviet Russian Medical Relief Society. 
According to the magazine Humanité, the organization had branches “in nearly all the 
towns in the United States.”114 Through advertisements in pro-communist and left-leaning 
magazines and newspapers, as well as through meetings and conferences, the FSR raised 
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money to buy food, medical supplies, and clothing to Russia. By February 1922, the 
organization had raised $300,000 for famine relief, noting that these funds came from 
citizens across the United States.115 
In contrast to the ARA that envisioned the Russian relief as a short-term solution to the 
famine and an opportunity for U.S. agricultural interests, the FSR focused on long-term 
efforts to end the famine by developing Soviet agriculture and organizing Soviet 
farmworkers. In the words of the IWFRC’s official history, friendship societies, including 
the FSR in New York, did not offer only “philanthropic” charity that included only the 
shipment of food, clothing, and medicine. Rather, their famine relief was a manifestation of 
“class solidarity.”116 In one of its appeals to American workers to participate in an 
international tool drive, the FSR declared that the “relief should consist not alone of bread, 
but also of tools and machinery to enable the Russian workers and peasants to help 
themselves and prevent future famines.”117 In doing so, the ideas of famine relief, the 
importance of technology and expert knowledge, as well as the desire to save communism 
combined into a single program.  
Encouraging American workers, farmers, and agricultural experts to demonstrate their 
solidarity with the Soviets, the FSR collaborated with the Society for the Technical Aid to 
Soviet Russia (STASR). Established in June 1921, the STASR was an American-based 
Soviet agency set to cooperate with the Soviet Department of Industrial Migration: part of 
the New Economic Policy to facilitate foreign immigration to Soviet Russia. The Soviet 
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plan rested on the idea of bringing North Americans to Soviet Russia, luring them with the 
prospects of agricultural or industrial opportunities at various levels.118Within six months of 
its establishment, the STASR opened seventy-five branches across the United States and 
Canada. By early 1922, its membership reached six thousand regular members, primarily 
made up of Slavs, Jews, and Finns from the former Russian Empire.119 Ludwig Martens, a 
founder of the STASR and Head of the unofficial Soviet embassy in the United States, may 
have exaggerated when he claimed that the “number of workers organized in such societies 
in America is not less than ten thousand.”120 Nevertheless, it was clear the society’s message 
was gaining traction outside of the scope of the ARA. Counting on these members 
participation, it hoped to organize two hundred agricultural communes and send them to 
reconstruct the Soviet countryside.121 
Despite the fact that the STASR welcomed any and all membership, it paid particular 
attention to attracting former citizens of the Russian empire. In his letter to the STASR, 
Aleskandr Eiduk, a Soviet representative of the Council of People’s Commissars, stated that 
one of the key goals for American agricultural communes was to “introduce peasants and 
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the population, as a whole, modern methods of agriculture.”122 To do so more effectively 
and not relying on translators, the STASR gave preference to Russian-speaking immigrants. 
The STASR believed their fluency and knowledge of the Russian reality, alongside their 
expertise in American agricultural technology acquired during their stay in the United 
States, made them the most “suitable persons” for agricultural work in Russia.123 Lenin 
himself approved this policy, knowing that non-Russians would not fully realize what they 
were getting themselves into. In response to the organizational meeting of the Society of 
Technical Aid in July 1921, Lenin warned the group that it “must bear in mind the 
hardships existing in Russia” and caution future re-immigrants about “the difficulties in 
connection to the food supply problem, and other obstacles which would have to be 
faced.”124  
There was also an issue of finances. These members had to be able to support 
themselves financially during the first years, yet they could not be so wealthy as the STASR 
feared that there was “a danger” of them “becoming kulaks.”125 As a result, the STASR 
actively recruited  the estimated three million former citizens of the Russian Empire who 
had immigrated to North America before the October Revolution to return to their 
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homeland to help starving fellow Russians.126 During the first eighteen months of its work, 
the STASR sent approximately 600 people to Soviet Russia as members of organized 
agricultural communes. Besides their skills and knowledge, they brought agricultural 
machinery worth of more than $500,000.127 
In order to ensure these individuals were properly equipped to educate their fellow 
workers in Russia, in 1922 the STASR announced the opening of the Russian Institute of 
Technology in New York City. Receiving support from the American Fund for Public 
Service (Garland Fund), a philanthropic organization that funded multiple left-wing projects 
from 1922 to 1941, the Society rented a five-story building which was large enough to 
house tractors, farm machinery, and other instruments for educational purposes. With 
regard to its mission, the Russian Institute of Technology announced that it would “teach 
the theory and practice of the modern science of agriculture” and “help those desirous to 
acquire and use modern agricultural knowledge in as short a time as possible.”128 As a 
result, the Russian Institute of Technology became the clearing house for suitable and non-
suitable agricultural relief workers. Not every member of the STASR could enroll into a 
three-month program. Only those who were “sufficiently trained to undertake Institution 
studies” could attend. Others had to begin at a preparatory school attached to the New York 
Branch of the STASR. With regard to non-members, the STASR was willing to enroll them 
only if there were vacancies.129  
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Within its walls, the Russian Institute of Technology offered two types of technological 
programs. The shortened version was designed for those who sought to join agricultural 
communes and who were leaving for Soviet Russia within a short period of time. The 
second option offered a three-month program that included six core courses: Bases of 
Agriculture, Tractors, Agricultural Implements, Agricultural Structures and Roads, Practical 
Physics, and Elements of Chemistry. For instance, the “Bases of Agriculture” and 
“Elements of Chemistry” courses focused on the fundamental interactions of of biology, 
botany, and chemistry. Students learned about soils, draining and irrigation of land, seeds 
and the systems of agriculture, as well as about plants and fertilizers.  
In addition to theoretical courses, students took courses where that facilitated hands-on 
experience with agricultural machinery. Within the framework of the “Tractors” and 
“Agricultural Implements” courses, students learned how to operate tractors, plows, and 
harrows, as well as sowing, reaping, and threshing machines. Moreover, they were taught 
how to troubleshoot, perform maintenance and repairs, as well as install new parts. Lastly, 
the Russian Institute of Technology offered a course on “Agricultural Structures and Roads” 
that the Institute described as a course “of special importance” due to the infrastructural 
deficiencies that plagued “Russia’s present reconstruction problem.”130 All in all, the six 
courses offered comprehensive preparation for future specialists, giving them a well-
rounded set of technical skills and basic knowledge about agriculture. Short descriptions of 
these courses reveal that the STASR and the Russian Institute of Technology in NYC took 
the technical preparation of re-immigrants seriously. 
It remains unclear how many students went through the Russian Institute of Technology 
program in NYC before they went to Soviet Russia. STASR archival records indicate that it 
                                               
130 “Farming School to Aid Soviet Russia,” Soviet Russia, October 15, 1922. 
  
 
58 
established similar schools, though of a smaller size, in other cities in the United States.131 
What is more important was that the STASR created this special program to equip future 
agricultural immigrants with an up-to-date set of skills and knowledge of modern farming. 
In doing so, it sought to establish control over the quality of agricultural expertise that 
would be transferred to the Soviet Union. Moreover, the school’s standard of a suitable 
expert reveals much about the agricultural exchange between Soviet Russia and the United 
States at this time.  
To Lenin and the STASR, the ideal expert represented a hybrid of Western and Eastern 
ideas, experiences, and knowledge. Their travel to Soviet Russia and eventual return to the 
United States represents the beginnings of a decade of agricultural and technological 
exchange. For despite the ARA’s best attempts to regulate relief, these organizations, in 
cooperation with the Soviet state, began the arduous task of reconstructing Russian 
agriculture. This is not to say their efforts succeeded, for despite being the largest nation in 
the world, Russia still relies heavily on food imports to this day. What can be gleaned from 
this experience, however, is the centrality of technological and educational exchange to 
period reconstruction efforts: evidenced both by the ARA’s refusal to indulge it and the 
insistence of its inclusion by so-called “radical” relief organizations.  
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II. The Seeds of Scientific Soviet-American Agricultural Exchange, 1921-
1926 
 An article in the July 13, 1922 issue of Pravda called on its readership to rethink the 
place of seeds in Soviet agricultural modernization. “It is essential to perceive seeds,” the 
correspondent claimed, “as one of those instruments [orudii] that, depending on its quality, 
would either make a significant step towards modern agriculture or stop its 
development.”132 The quality of seeds, according to the author, depended on the quality of 
work conducted at agricultural experiment stations. Perceiving seeds as a valuable 
technology that could propel Soviet agriculture into the modern era, Soviet state officials 
and agricultural scientists sought to create favorable conditions for the development of seed 
science and cultivation in the Soviet Union. In pursuing these goals, the People’s 
Commissariat of Agriculture (Narkomzem) and Soviet scientists modeled their efforts after 
the rapid development of American seed science since the late-nineteenth century.  
This chapter examines seed exchange through the Russian Agricultural Agency in New 
York City between Soviet Russia and the United States from 1921 to 1925.133 It argues that 
Soviet agricultural scientists and state officials viewed seeds as one of the key agricultural 
technologies in alleviating the desperate conditions of the Volga famine (1921-23) and, 
more important, in modernizing the Soviet countryside. Established in 1921 by world-
famous geneticist Nikolai Vavilov and funded by the Narkomzem, the Russian Agricultural 
Agency in New York sent seeds, plants, and agricultural literature from the United States to 
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Soviet Russia. Additionally, it facilitated Soviet agrarians’ travels to the United States 
where Soviet scientists hoped to acquire up-to-date knowledge about modern agricultural 
organization and technologies. Finally, the Bureau facilitated the exchange of seeds and 
plants not only between American and Soviet scientists, but also with scientists from South 
America, Africa, and the Middle East. In doing so, the Russian Agricultural Bureau 
engaged Soviet agricultural scientists in global professional networks where they became 
participants in an international dialogue about the future of plant breeding and the 
development of modern agriculture.  
While historians have addressed the desire of the Soviet state to improve agriculture by 
importing agricultural technology from the West in the 1920s, much of their focus has been 
devoted to the role of “tractorization” in the Soviet countryside.134 The history of seeds and 
seed exchange, however, has received little attention. What has been addressed largely 
focuses on two issues; the role of leading Soviet botanists and geneticists, such as Vavilov, 
in developing the field of genetics and botany and the establishment and development of 
plant breeding within local experiment stations in Soviet Russia. In contrast to previous 
scholarship, this work places the history of seeds within a transnational framework. It raises 
the question of how seeds connected Soviet Russia to the global scientific community. 
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Grounded in the history of science and technology, this work reconsiders the role of seeds 
and regards transnational seed exchange between the Soviet Union and the United States, as 
well as other countries, as an important component of the agricultural modernization of 
Soviet Russia in the 1920s.  
Recently, historians have shown the significance of agricultural science in 
modernization efforts of the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century.135 Particularly, they 
illuminate the transfer of plants across regions, institutions, and cultures through colonial 
expansion, collection, and preservation.136 Several scholars of Russian/Soviet history have 
applied these concepts when examining the movement of scientific ideas within 
transnational frameworks.137 These studies show the impact of Russian and Soviet science, 
in particular soil science and ecology, on the development of international knowledge.138 In 
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addition, Russian historians, such as Olga Elina, have paid particular attention to networks 
of experiment stations from their establishment in the late-nineteenth century to the loss of 
their autonomy at the hands of central authority during the 1920s.139 Relying on her work as 
a foundation, I expand beyond these local networks to establish the transnational 
significance of the work conducted within these stations. 
 This chapter begins by focusing on the origins of Russian-American seed and plant 
exchange, exploring its institutional organization before the 1917 revolution. Next, it 
examines early attempts by Soviet officials at Narkomzem and scientists within their own 
laboratories and academic institutions to organize industrial seed production based on 
scientific principles. Particularly, it focuses on the establishment of the State Seed Union 
(Gossemkul’tura), the Bureau of Applied Botany in Petrograd, and the role of the Volga 
famine in stimulating research of drought resistant crops. The third section demonstrates the 
establishment of the Russian Agricultural Agency in New York City, its goals, and the 
organization of Soviet-American seed exchange. Finally, the chapter closes with an 
examination of attempts by Soviet experiment stations and peasants to cultivate American 
corn in drought-prone regions. While these efforts had failed by 1925, Soviet experiments 
in corn breeding and cultivation continued well into the post-WWII era, most notably 
within Nikita Khrushchev’s corn campaigns of the 1960s.  
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A. Seed and Plant Exchange: Pre-1917 
From the mid-nineteenth to the early-twentieth century, the development of agricultural 
science and plant breeding in the Russian empire was in the hands of local agricultural 
organizations, educational institutions, and administrations (zemstvos). Pressed by other 
financial concerns, the Russian imperial government showed little interest in financing the 
scientific aspirations of local agronomists to solve farm problems.140 As a result, local 
institutions assumed responsibility for the production, organization, and promotion of  
agricultural knowledge and policy. Without adequate state support, they were forced to 
establish connections between their own experiment stations and foreign research centers. 
Together these geographically peripheral organizations defined the overall direction of 
agricultural science institutionalization in the Russian Empire.141  
During the 1910s, local agricultural societies and zemstvos sought to establish an 
institutional network for the development of plant breeding by organizing professional 
conferences and meetings. The first All-Russian Conference on Crop Breeding and Seed 
Culture, held by the Khar’kov Agricultural Society, was held in 1911 and played a key role 
in identifying the framework and agenda for agricultural scientists and plant breeders. In 
just a few years, attendance swelled to more than 250 delegates. Among them were 
prominent scientists and policymakers: Aleksander Krivoshein (Minister of Agriculture), 
Robert Regel (Head of the Bureau of Applied Botany of MA and Nikolay Vavilov’s 
advisor), renowned professors of agriculture, Aleksandr Chelintsev, Dmitry Pryanishnikov 
and Dinonysiy Rudzinskiy. The major accomplishment of the conference was in the 
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delegates’ attempts to outline the goals for the development of the field: training future 
plant breeders, creating a network of experiment stations, publishing specialized periodical 
magazines, setting up the Russian Plant Breeding Society, and organizing regular 
professional conferences.142  
The efforts of local agricultural societies, experts, and zemstvos paid off. By the mid-
1910s, efforts in plant breeding were rapidly developing in southern and southeastern parts 
of the Russian Empire (today’s Ukraine), the Central black soil region (the Volga region), 
and western parts of the Empire (today’s Baltic states).143 During this time twelve plant 
breeding stations and thirty experiment stations were established. Moreover, plant breeding 
lecture courses were introduced at most colleges, while conferences and associations 
allowed members to communicate and develop inter-regional ties to other organizations.144 
Thus, these steps towards the local and national institutionalization of plant breeding and 
seed science laid the foundation for the articulation of demands for the development of 
Russian agricultural science and the turn towards embracing foreign experience. 
Beyond strengthening the network of the Russian imperial agricultural scientists, local 
agricultural societies kept a close eye on foreign developments in plant breeding. During the 
early twentieth century, several local agricultural societies proposed to establish 
professional contacts with foreign experiment stations, including those within the United 
States. For instance, in August 1905, representatives of the Agricultural Society of South 
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Russia (ASSR) in Odessa discussed a proposal, made by Fyodor Kryshtofovich at the 
Ministry of Agriculture, to open an office in the United States. As an avid supporter of the 
American system of agricultural development, Kryshtofovich, according to his own 
testimony, instructed peasants in modern agricultural methods during the summer months 
by way of “introducing American machinery, American methods, American seed, and so 
on.”145 For some years, Kryshtofovich tried to persuade the Russian imperial government to 
organize a foreign representative body but had no luck. Local organizations, however, were 
receptive to his ideas, leading to the establishment of the Minneapolis bureau of the 
Yekaterinoslav zemstvo in 1908.  
Using the Minneapolis-based agricultural agency as an example to demonstrate the 
potential of foreign connections for the development of Russian agriculture, Kryshtovofish 
continued to push his agenda in St. Petersburg. While at first his proposals were rejected 
due to a lack of funding, in 1909, the Ministry of Agriculture eventually allocated 15,000 
rubles to organize an official Agricultural Agency in the United States.146 The Ministry 
considered this agency to be an important step in furthering its activity with regard to 
“measures for the development and improvement of various branches of agriculture.” Yet, 
even if it was significant for the Ministry, organizing a foreign agency was lower than other 
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budgeted items on the Ministry’s list of priorities. By comparison, mereley the maintenance 
of the Imperial Agricultural Museum received more funds (18,000 rubles).147 Despite this, 
the project went forward.  
The news that Russian agriculturalists intended to establish a central agency in America 
spread quickly in the United States.148 For example, in October 1908, the California Fruit 
Grower newspaper reported that Russia expressed interest in American farming methods 
and said agency would work closely with the U.S. Department of Agriculture in order to 
learn more about American “experiment stations, irrigation, the grain trade, and the 
settlement of new lands in the West.”149 Beyond the agency’s interest in dry farming, 
irrigation, and mechanization, it emphasized the importance of plant breeding and seed 
science in the United States.  
The takeaways from the American experience were telling. In its 1913 report, the 
Agency stated that Americans were never satisfied with the inherent properties of plants. 
Rather, it was indicative of American ingenuity and the nation’s immense resources that 
better strains and hybrids were constantly being researched and developed. Despite what 
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they perceived as a more advanced program utilizing superior funding and resources, the 
agency noted American interest in one aspect of Russian agriculture.150  
American agronomists, according to the Agency’s report, highly valued Russian seeds. 
Experiment stations across the Midwest (Kansas, Nebraska, Colorado, Wyoming, South 
Dakota, Minnesota, and Wisconsin) conducted experiments with Russian wheat and oat 
varietals. Among them were Kherson oats and wheat varieties of what the Mennonites 
referred to as “Turkey” red winter wheat.151 Brought by the Mennonites in the second half 
of the nineteenth century when they migrated from the Russian empire to the United States, 
American agronomists believed these strains possessed valuable characteristics that could 
improve Midwestern wheat production.152 For instance, Russian red “Turkey” wheat could 
produce satisfactory yields under a wide range of environmental conditions.153 It is not 
surprising then that from the late nineteenth century to 1944, Russian “Turkey” wheat 
remained at the center of American wheat breeding, serving as a parent for multiple hybrid 
strains including those utilized in South Asia during the Green Revolution. 
With regard to the work of plant breeding, the Agency encouraged Russian agronomists 
and plant breeders to familiarize themselves with the accomplishments of their American 
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colleagues. While plant breeder Luther Burbank and his experiments in California were 
widely known in Russia, the work of Niels Hansen, or the “Burbank of South Dakota” as 
the Agency eventually referred to him, was less familiar. The selection work that Hansen 
conducted in South Dakota would end up being far more significant for Russian agriculture, 
as South Dakota’s climate and environment was closer to that of Russian agricultural 
regions: a fact that led to South Dakota being dubbed the American Siberia.154 Hansen, for 
his part, was quite familiar with the Russian environment. Having studied in Iowa State 
College under the supervision of Charles Bessey and Joseph L. Budd, two agronomists who 
had frequently visited Russia, Hansen perceived Russia as the “Promised Land” in terms of 
its agricultural possibilities.155 Sent by the USDA in 1897, Hansen conducted a four-month 
trip in Russia, traveling more than 2,000 miles from St. Petersburg to China in search of 
fodder plants that would grow in colder and drier regions of the United States.156 Prior to 
his return to the United States, he shipped five carloads of seeds, grasses, and grains from 
Russia, Turkestan, Siberia, China, and Transcaucasia to the USDA. David Fairchild, an 
American botanist who had just been appointed as the head of the USDA Division of Seed 
and Plant Introduction, received Hansen’s shipments and was overwhelmed with the variety 
of Russian seeds. Sent in individual small packets to experimenters, Hansen’s cold-resistant 
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seeds and plants became an obsession among American agriculturalists.157 One of the plants 
that he brought back was the so-called Cossack alfalfa that quickly replaced the ordinary 
North American variety as it proved more resistant to drought and cold. By 1908, the 
Russian empire exported alfalfa seed from Turkestan to North and South America at a rate 
of 9,600,000 pounds annually.158 
The interest of American agricultural experts and plant breeders in Russian seeds played 
into the hands of the Russian agricultural mission in the United States. As American 
experiment stations had more financial resources for research and plant breeding, the 
Agency hoped that it could acquire better breeds of red winter wheat developed by 
American stations. Its 1913 report echoed this hope, that “all this selection work on 
agricultural, garden, and fruit plants is capable of giving valuable breeds for many Russian 
areas, as well as invaluable material for the work of our experiment stations.”159 In 
declaring this, the agency’s research of American and former Russian seeds revealed not 
only the intent to learn from American colleagues but also viewed American experiment 
stations as laboratories whose research capabilities could be utilized to improve Russian 
seeds and then ship them back to Russia.  
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Due to a lack of extant source material, the circumstances regarding the demise of the 
Russian Agricultural Agency in the United States are difficult to discern. But, most likely, 
the disruption caused by First World War and the 1917 revolutions put a stop to its work. 
Despite this interruption in the Agency’s work, the exchange would resume few years after 
the revolution. Yet, it would happen on new terms and through new institutions. The change 
in the regime brought new organizational and institutional changes to the plant breeding 
science and development of plant breeding technologies.  
 
B. The Early Days of the Bolshevik Regime: Plant Breeding, Institutionalization, and 
the Famine, 1917-1922 
The October Revolution transformed the development of seed and plant breeding 
practices throughout the region. While the Russian imperial regime left the responsibility 
for the development of agriculture to local societies and zemstvos, the Bolshevik state 
undertook a different approach. For the first time, the Russian, and now Soviet, state took 
on the role of the patron for the agricultural sciences and seed programs, in particular. 
While the Bolsheviks planned to utilize the existing network of established experiment 
stations, they would do so from a position of institutional control.160  
The first step in this regard was made in 1919. The People’s Commissariat of 
Agriculture (Narkomzem), the Supreme Soviet of the National Economy (VSNKh) and the 
Council of Labor and Defense (STO) together with agricultural scientists began to discuss 
strategies to establish the system of mass seed and plant breeding as an important part of the 
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strategy for agricultural modernization.161 While these top-down initiatives were raised on 
different levels of the new Bolshevik state, it took two years to launch the first state project 
on the mass production of seeds. These first reports and discussions also led to the 
revitalization of plans to utilize foreign knowledge and expertise. The same year, the 
Sel’skosovet and Glavsovkhoz listened to the report on the organization of plant breeding 
abroad and possibilities for cooperation between the Soviets and the United States.162  
With the beginning of the New Economic Policy (1921-1928) that promoted the system 
of cooperation, khozraschet, and state financial assistance, the Narkomzem finally approved 
the establishment of a state-funded seed breeding organization. Developed by Pyotr 
Lisitsyn, a Russian plant-breeder, the State Seed Union (Gosudarstvennaia semennaia 
kul’turai) organized a network of state seed nurseries on premises of large-scale state farms. 
There, agricultural scientists conducted plant breeding experiments to produce improved 
plant varieties on the industrial scale. Improved varieties (elita) were mass produced and 
then distributed to seed cooperatives who would were to distribute them amongst the 
peasants. This project amounted to the first attempt of the Soviet state and plant breeders to 
the industrial approach to plant breeding and seed production. Moreover, the significance of 
the Gossemkul’tura lay in its emphasis towards the development of seed technologies that 
embraced the entire process of seed production: from breeding to drying and cleaning.163  
Despite its establishment, not all institutions of the new Soviet state immediately 
recognized the importance of the project. During its early years, the Gossemkul’tura had a 
hard time obtaining funds to organize its work. For instance, in the fall of 1922, the inter-
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departmental conference refused to include the Gossemkul’tura estimates in the budget. 
Instead, it proposed the organization request a loan from the State Bank. In the end, the 
Gossemkul’tura received a loan that was two times less than the required sum. These 
circumstances frustrated Lenin, who wrote to the Financial Committee, among others, in 
November 1922, that the Gossemkultura represented a matter of “great state importance.” 
Further, Lenin demanded that the interdepartmental conference “satisfy” the needs of the 
institution, as he had been persuaded that the “improvement of plant varieties [based] on the 
American model is integral to increasing agricultural productivity.”164 Lenin’s support was 
based on his understanding of the successes of American agriculture, what he believed to be 
an optimal system for the reproduction of high-grade seeds. 165  
While the Narkomzem and its Gossemkul’tura project played a significant role in 
fostering the establishment and development of seed science and plant breeding, parallel 
scientific endeavors took place in academic institutions. Though shaken by the war and the 
revolutions, the pre-revolutionary network of academic plant-breeding institutions had 
survived relatively intact. In fact, many plant breeders met the new regime with renewed 
energy and inspiration.166 Among the academic organizations that had survived the 
turbulent revolutionary times was the Bureau of Applied Botany in Petrograd. Established 
in 1894, the Bureau of Applied Botany sought to describe, preserve, and utilize botanical 
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knowledge in the interest of plant production.167 The bureau’s laboratories and experiment 
stations conducted research in genetics, cytology, taxonomy, and other disciplines of plant 
science.168 By the 1910s and ‘20s, the Bureau transformed into a world-famous center for 
crop diversity studies, attracting specialists from the Russian empire and the Soviet Union, 
as well as from abroad.169 In doing so, it became the center for seed exchange between the 
Soviet Union and foreign countries, including the United States. 
Undoubtedly, seed exchange between the two countries was not possible without the 
leadership and charisma of the Bureau’s Head and eminent botanical geneticist, Nikolai 
Vavilov.170 Beyond his outstanding contribution to the fields of genetics and botany, 
particularly his work on homologous series of variation, Vavilov was a master of navigating 
Soviet bureaucracy and finding powerful patrons within the state to promote his research. 
His international plans for the Bureau were ambitious. In his 1920 letter to G.S. Zaitsev, 
Vavilov stated:  
  
Plans are numerous. I would like the Department to be a 
necessary institution, as useful to everybody as possible. 
I’d like to gather the varietal diversity from all over the 
world, bring it to order, turn the Department into the 
treasury of all crops and other floras… The outcome is 
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uncertain, especially considering the surrounding hunger 
and cold.171 
 
Vavilov’s comment on hunger conditions in Soviet Russia referred to the systemic 
problem in agriculture at the time. That the work of Vavilov’s Bureau and the development 
of state programs in plant breeding and seed science (Gossemkul’tura) took place during 
one of the worst famines in Soviet history is of critical significance. After the October 
Revolution, the early Bolshevik state inherited food supply problems and the turbulence in 
rural areas with regard to land redistribution. While the regime nationalized the land which 
allowed peasants to officially redistribute pomeshchiks’ property, Bolsheviks’ food 
requisition policies that took place after the October Revolution and during the Civil War 
significantly undermined peasant trust in the new regime. More important, war communism 
policies disrupted agricultural production that, coupled with the drought in the Volga basin 
in 1919-1920, caused famine conditions between 1919-1922. The mortality was almost 
incomprehensible, as more than five million people perished in just three years.  
 The grave nature of the famine and its effect on the Soviet countryside had a 
tremendous impact on plant breeding and seed science. Both state officials and Soviet 
agronomists recognized the importance of finding solutions to environmental problems that 
peasants and emerging state farms were facing. It was well-established that the Volga 
region suffered from irregular rainfall, frequent droughts, and soil erosion. These factors 
not only caused degradation of the soil, but it also factored into the unpredictability of the 
farm season. According to the climate data for the eighteenth-twentieth centuries, the 
number of drought years had increased from 34 in the eighteenth century to 49 in the 
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twentieth.172 Even before famine had struck, the region presented many challenges to 
agricultural modernization. 
What began from a desire to improve agricultural production and efficiency quickly 
metamorphosed into a dire need to feed an increasingly vulnerable population. As such, the 
famine of 1921-23 further stimulated the development of agricultural sciences with regard 
to dry farming and pushed scientists and experts to develop ideas about the cultivation of 
crops, including red winter wheat, corn and others drought-resistant varieties. In the end, it 
was Vavilov and his Bureau of Applied Botany that would make the biggest imprint on seed 
exchange between the United States and the Soviet Union through the organization and 
work of the Russian Agricultural Bureau in New York City. 
 
C. Soviet-American Seed Exchange: The Russian Agricultural Agency in New York City, 
1921-24 
In August 1921, Vavilov traveled to the United States to present his research on 
homologous series in variation at the International Phytopathological Congress in New 
York.173 Beyond merely sharing his work, Vavilov had more ambitious plans for his 
American trip. Prior to his departure, the Council of Labor and Defense (STO) proclaimed 
the absolute necessity to send Vavilov and Artur Iachevskii, a Russian mycologist and 
phytopathologist, abroad to learn more about modern agriculture. Providing them with more 
than 200,000 rubles, the STO hoped that Vavilov and Iachevskii would travel extensively 
                                               
172 A.I. Shabaev and Iu.F. Kurdiukov, “Razvitie i modernizatsiia system zemledelia na 
iugo-vostoke Evropeiskoi chasti Rossii,” Zemledelie no. 4 (2010): 15.  
173 Vavilov, Petrogradsky period, vol. 1, page 19; Loskutov, Vavilov and His Institute, 
18. It should be mentioned that Vavilov visited European countries as well. The discussion 
of his European tour is beyond the scope of this project and will be most likely developed in 
a book manuscript. 
  
 
76 
and purchase agricultural literature as well as technologies for Soviet agricultural 
experiment stations.174 During the four-month trip that took them across midwestern states 
all the way to California, Vavilov and Iachevskii were able to expand their knowledge of 
American agriculture and establish professional and personal contacts that would be 
essential for agricultural exchange between the countries.175 Yet, the most significant result 
of this trip was Vavilov’s decision to organize the American Division of the Petrograd 
Department of Applied Botany and Plant Breeding (RAA).176 
The Russian Agricultural Agency (RAA) became an international center for agricultural 
knowledge and technology exchange between the United States and Soviet Russia from 
1921 to 1927. While the idea for its establishment belonged to Vavilov who sought to 
organize the exchange on the institutional level, his initiative could not have been realized 
without the help and ambition of Dmitrii Borodin. Borodin, a Russian entomologist, 
immigrated to the United States in 1918 and managed to establish close relationships with 
                                                                                                                                                
 
174 “Postanovlenie Soveta truda i oborony,” 1921, no date, the full text is quoted in E.V. 
Truskinov, Russkoe sel’skokhoziastvennoe presdstavitel’stvo v Amerike (v svete perepiski 
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175 Vavilov met with USDA officials, particularly W.A. Orton, who later supplied him 
with scientific literature. Moreover, during his trip, he met with Thomas Morgan, an 
American evolutionary biologist, who then worked at Columbia University. Finally, while 
travelling in California, Vavilov met Luther Burbank, a world-famous horticulturalist. 
Loskutov, Vavilov and his Institute, 19.  
 
176 The Division would be reorganized in 1924 when the Narkomzem would absorb it 
and rename it into the Russian Agricultural Bureau in New York City. It would exist until 
1927. For the purposes of this paper, I will use the name that Borodin used in his 
correspondence: the Russian Agricultural Agency (RAA). 
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leading American agricultural scientists in three years.177 Borodin’s networking skills and 
his desire to promote what he called the “transplantation” of American plants to Soviet 
Russia made him a perfect candidate for the directorship of the RAA. 
In their Plan for the Seed introduction of Plants from the United States to Soviet Russia, 
Vavilov and Borodin outlined seven goals. It is worth mentioning that these goals 
corresponded with the priorities set by the Bureau of Applied Botany in Petrograd as 
Vavilov perceived the organization to be a direct link to foreign knowledge, technologies, 
and expertise. The RAA goals included: 1) the introduction of the “New World” seeds; 2) 
the systematic investigation of flora in the United States, Canada, and South America from 
the perspective of applied botany; 3) sending literature on agriculture, botany, and genetics 
to Soviet Russia; 4) the establishment of relationships with American agricultural 
organizations, experiment stations, and scientists; 5) assisting Soviet scientists who would 
be sent to the United States to conduct research; 6) shipping museum collections, herbaria 
to Soviet Russia; and 7) purchasing and shipping seeds for Soviet experiment stations and 
other organizations.178  
To accomplish the aforementioned goals, the RAA had to rely on the financial support 
and patronage of the People’s Commissariat of Agriculture.179 Presided by N.N. Osinsky 
(1921-22) and later Alexander Smirnov (1923-28) who actively supported international 
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connections within the field of agriculture, the Narkomzem found Vavilov and Borodin’s 
project to be a promising venture. After his return to Soviet Russia from the United States, 
Vavilov received multiple invitations from different departments of the Narkomzem and 
other scientific institutions to report on his travels. These reports offered Vavilov an 
opportunity to promote the RAA project.180 After lobbying the RAA in front of Narkomzem 
officials, the Narkomzem provided Vavilov with 26,000 golden rubles, a much bigger sum 
than Vavilov and Borodin hoped for when they founded the agency. In his letter to Borodin, 
Vavilov wrote that “this sum was comparingly big, much bigger than the one we proposed 
in New York, and this extra money will be enough for your trips to Alaska, Canada, Peru, 
Chile, and Moscow. In short, you are the luckiest man of the mortals.” Yet, Vavilov warned 
Borodin that he could not guarantee that the Narkomzem would finance the Bureau for 
1923. He explained that “the financial position in Russia is desperate, and it might be that 
starting June-July, a large part of state institutions will be liquidated.”181 This unstable 
financial situation would continue to trouble the work of the Agency throughout its 
existence. 
As RAA budgetary issues were resolved, Borodin who stayed in New York eagerly 
delved into organizing the work of the Agency. His first and foremost mission was not 
concerned with scientific matters, however. As Volga famine conditions worsened in early 
1922 and the necessity of seed shipments increased, Borodin appealed to the American 
Relief Administration (ARA) offering its expertise on seed shipments. The ARA that sent 
food relief both to Europe and Soviet Russia responded by inviting Borodin to consult the 
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administration on what seeds Russia needed. Despite Borodin’s recommendations and 
attempts to influence ARA decisions, the ARA did not leave him much room for action. For 
instance, Borodin recommended that they ARA should ship wheat varieties from the 
Northwest (Durum, Marquis and North Manitoba) and corn from Wisconsin, Montana, 
North and South Dakota (Northwestern, Minnesota 13, Minnesota 23, Brown County, and 
Leaming). He explained that these varieties would grow best in southern regions of Soviet 
Russia, North Caucasus and the Volga region. Yet, according to Borodin, he met some 
resistance from ARA representatives with regard to seed purchases. Despite Borodin’s 
recommendations and insistence on including specifications of purchased seeds into the 
shipment logs, the ARA bought all corn seeds in Minneapolis without offering proper 
control over the seed material shipped to Soviet Russia. This misunderstanding stemmed 
from the different goals that the Russian Agricultural Agency and the ARA. While, as an 
agricultural scientist, Borodin was interested in proper practices of plant breeding and 
agricultural experimentation, the ARA focused on delivering corn from American farm 
regions that suffered from post-World War I overproduction.182 
While Borodin’s work with the ARA was not so successful, the Russian Agricultural 
Agency found other channels for shipping and introducing American seeds in Soviet 
agriculture. Borodin managed to establish close relationships with the Friends of Soviet 
Russia (FSR), a pro-communist group that facilitated agricultural immigration to Soviet 
Russia during the famine. According to Borodin, the Agency consulted foreign agricultural 
communes that headed to different regions of Soviet Russia to settle and promote new 
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agricultural technologies. Among the Russian regions that these colonies headed to were 
Perm, Odessa, and Don. According to Borodin, these agricultural immigrants needed help 
in choosing compatible plant varieties for these areas.183 For him, then, these groups 
represented a unique opportunity to “introduce American types” of grains and to become 
nurseries for American crop varieties. In addition, Borodin claimed that the Bureau took an 
active part in facilitating commune members’ agricultural education. To do so, Borodin 
made an agreement with Albert Johnson, Head of the Institute of Applied Agriculture, 
Farmingdale, Long Island, NY, and a former Director of the Near East Relief, to accept 
students who would work in Soviet Russia upon graduation. According to Borodin’s 
sources, seven people were accepted to the Institute and after several months of education, 
five of them left for Russia, while two of them entered graduate school.184 
Beyond its initiatives with regard to alleviating the Volga famine, the Russian 
Agricultural Agency never lost sight of its central mission: to ship seeds and plant samples 
to Soviet Russia. To engage and develop seed exchange, Vavilov and Borodin utilized their 
professional connections with multiple agricultural colleges and USDA officials. During his 
four-month trip in the United States, Vavilov made arrangements with American 
experiment stations to send him seeds and plant samples through the RAA. Upon his return 
to Soviet Russia, he continued to correspond with his new acquaintances, reminding them 
about these arrangements. For instance, in October 1921, Vavilov sent numerous letters to 
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directors of experiment stations asking them to send samples of seeds for crop, garden, and 
decorative cultivation. He explained that the Russian interest in American seeds lay not only 
in seeds themselves but also in the plant breeding work that American botanists and 
agricultural scientists had done since the beginning of the twentieth century. In his letters, 
Vavilov often mentioned the work of Hansen, Fairchild, Meyer, Bolley: those scientists 
who extensively traveled in pre-revolutionary Russia collecting seeds and plants to 
experiment with them on midwestern prairies. He sought to get seeds that these scientists 
had worked with to assess the result of their work. 
Vavilov and Borodin highly valued the work of American experiment stations. Not only 
were these institutions rapidly developing with regard to plant breeding and seed science, 
but also U.S. experiment stations had established a wide network of professional contacts 
with foreign experiment stations. The RAA sought to utilize this network to its own 
devices. Together with Borodin, Vavilov regarded the RAA as a link between Soviet Russia 
and South American, Asian, and Middle Eastern agricultural expertise. In one of his letters 
to Borodin in 1922, Vavilov asked him to appeal to South American, Japanese, Egyptian, 
Sudanese, and Indian experiment stations and ask them to send the Central Experiment 
Station in Petrograd some rice samples.185 In another letter in the spring of 1923, Vavilov 
appealed to Borodin with a request to obtain seeds from Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, Sudan, 
Spain, and Greece. Particularly, Vavilov recommended that Borodin should use both his 
professional contacts and some seeds companies that traded with those regions.186 In doing 
so, the RAA had transformed from an institution that supervised the agricultural exchange 
                                                                                                                                                
 
185 Letter from Vavilov to Borodin, August 13, 1922, in Vavilov’s letters, vol. 1, page 
42. 
 
186 Letter from Vavilov to Borodin, March 2, 1923, 71. 
  
 
82 
between the U.S. and the Soviet Union into an organization that cultivated global 
connections with other regions. 
Seed exchange, however, was not one-directional in that not only the Soviet Union 
received seeds from other countries. In return for seed and plant samples acquired from the 
United States or other regions, the RAA promised that the Central Experiment Station in 
Petrograd would send results of its own experimental work. In late 1921 and 1922, Borodin 
flooded the Petrograd Bureau with requests of American experiment stations to send 
Russian seeds. In April 1922, Vavilov promised that his Petrograd Bureau would start 
fulfilling requests as quickly as possible. However, he noted that he was not able to address 
all the requests. According to him, some American agricultural experiment stations could 
not understand the post-revolutionary Soviet situation in science and its funding. Instead of 
requesting several grams of seeds, they asked for bushels of samples. The Bureau was 
unable to fulfill these requests. In his letter to Borodin, Vavilov lamented that he could not 
even afford sending telegrams due to the lack of money and funds in the institution. To 
avoid the miscommunication, Vavilov cautioned Borodin to warn their American 
colleagues about “our difficulties and not to throw around any promises that we are not able 
to fulfill due to our current situation.”187 Despite these financial problems, the Petrograd 
Bureau managed to send small seed shipments to the United States. 
In addition to financial issues, shipping presented one of the most serious problems for 
seed exchange between the U.S. and Soviet Russia. While post-war shipping channels 
between the countries had been restored, internal Soviet shipping networks were still in a 
disarray after the October Revolution and the Civil War. For instance, in late 1921, Borodin 
shipped multiple containers with seeds and literature to the Petrograd Bureau. In his letter 
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dated April 1922, Vavilov informed Borodin that he received only sixteen containers and 
was trying to locate others. Two containers were finally delivered to Moscow, and other 
two were sent to Petrozavodsk. To make matters worse, Vavilov experienced difficulties in 
getting these containers back. All these delays in shipments caused damage to seeds and 
plant samples. Many samples did not survive prolonged travels. Others arrived too late for 
the planting season and had to be used only during the next season. Some of them did not 
grow at all. In June 1923, Vavilov reported to Borodin that one quarter of 10,000 seed 
samples that he sent from the United States did not grow.188  
Notwithstanding these difficulties, numerous varieties of American seeds reached Soviet 
agricultural experiment stations. As the RAA established and maintained business contacts 
with multiple experiment stations and seed breeding companies, seeds and plant samples 
from New York City, Minnesota, North and South Dakota were shipped to the Central 
Experiment Station in Petrograd. According to Borodin’s inventory, only in 1923, he sent 
more than 8,000 seed samples.189 Among those seeds were corn, sorghum, oats, beans, soy, 
peanuts, and sweet potatoes. While the list of shipped seeds was lengthy and Soviet 
experiment stations received a wide variety of seeds and plant samples, the Soviet side 
expressed particular interest in drought-resistant plant varieties, especially corn. 
 
D. American Corn in the Soviet Steppes: RAA Corn Shipments and the 1920s Corn 
Campaign 
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The first and foremost goal of the Russian Agricultural Agency was to introduce 
American seeds with regard to their economic significance to Soviet agriculture. In its 
original plan, the Agency outlined five categories of seeds ranked from the most desirable 
to the less desirable. The first category included the introduction of grains, fodder crops, 
and special plants; the second one – vegetables; the third one – garden and fruit plants; the 
fourth one – medicinal plants; and the final one – decorative plants. The plant that, 
according to the Agency, had to be introduced “immediately” and “fully” (“vo vsei 
vozmozhnoi polnote”) was corn.  
The RAA focus on corn was not accidental. Since the beginning of the Volga famine in 
1921, Soviet state officials expressed immense interest in the cultivation of corn in regions 
that were prone to droughts.190 In October 1921, Vladimir Lenin suggested that the All-
Russian Committee to Aid the Hungry (Komissiia pomoshchi golodaiushchim) should form 
a committee that would analyze the potential value of corn and its cultivation in 
southeastern regions of the Soviet Union, particularly Ukraine and the Volga region. 
According to the results of the committee’s survey, the cultivation of corn was “not only 
desirable but also necessary.”191 The Committee decided that the Samara, Saratov, 
Markstadt, Tsaritsin, Stavropol, Ural, and part of Astrkhan’ guberniias were the most 
suitable areas for planting corn. Further, the Committee notified the Narkomzem that the 
Commissariat had to launch the corn campaign immediately. Moreover, the committee 
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recommended that the Narkomzem would assist and teach local experiment stations how to 
plant, cultivate, and harvest corn.192 
The state corn initiative was further buttressed by scientific findings of Soviet 
agronomists. One of the leading agrarians and promoters of agricultural experimental work, 
Nikolai Tulaikov, argued that corn should replace wheat in some dry-farming regions. In 
his brochure on corn, Tulaikov argued that corn, as well as potato and sunflower, was able 
to use rainfall in the second half of the summer to continue growing and providing more 
feed for animals during drought years.193 Tulaikov’s arguments found warm reception 
among plant breeders and Soviet state officials as they sought to find solutions to 
preventing future famines in the regions that were prone to droughts. Thus, when it was 
time to import corn varieties for Soviet breeding experiments, the United States offered a 
unique market. 
In the United States, the RAA used its wide network of professional and commercial 
connections to obtain corn. Agricultural colleges and experiment stations became the 
primary suppliers of corn seeds. Yet, in addition to working with experiment stations, the 
RAA succeeded in receiving corn seeds from several Native American reservations. After 
Borodin contacted the Department of Interior, he established contacts with reservations in 
North Dakota, Wisconsin, Arizona, Florida, and New Mexico. In his words, corn varieties 
that these reservations shipped to the RAA were “rare” and “extremely precious.”194 
Further, the RAA worked closely with several American seed companies. Among them 
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were S.D. Woodruff & Sons (CT), Northrup King & Co. (MN), Arizona Seed and Flora 
Co. (AZ), and Funk Bros. Co. (IL). The latter became one of the leaders in promoting 
scientific research in corn breeding. 
Established in 1901, Funk Brothers differed from other seed companies. Unlike their 
competitors, it stressed the importance of plant breeding research and integrated most recent 
scientific trends into its breeding practices. In its public addresses, advertisements, and 
interviews, owners of the company emphasized their commitment to the scientific 
investigation of corn production. Moreover, Funk Brothers employed professional 
agronomists and even established a laboratory to conduct its own experiments. For instance, 
in 1917, Funk Brothers hired Purdue agronomist J.R. Holbert and acquired USDA support 
for his research of corn disease.195 The company’s ultimate goal was to improve corn 
performance through breeding. “Bred for vigor and freedom from disease,” Funk Brothers’ 
advertisements proclaimed to entice farmers to purchase their corn seeds.196 
Of the multiple corn varieties bred by Funk Brothers, the RAA purchased those strains 
that were suitable for drought-prone regions. Among them were 90-days dent, Iowa Silver 
Mine, Gold Standard Leaming, Funk’s 329, and Reid’s yellow dent. The choice of Funk’s 
329 and Iowa Silve Mine was of particular interest. First, Funk’s 329 strain was the first 
variety ever established by controlled cross pollination of two families: 90-Day and Yellow 
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Dent. It outyielded its parent strains by twenty bushels per acre and matured much earlier 
than other varieties.197 With regard to Iowa Silver Mine, this strain showed remarkable 
drought-resisting properties and large yields. Thus, it was not surprising that the Russian 
Agricultural Agency purchased these strains of corn in large qualities.198  
Over the course of three years (1922-1924), the Russian Agricultural Agency sent more 
than a thousand varieties of corn to Soviet Russia for experimental work. The Central 
Experiment Station in Petrograd that received these shipments kept some seeds for its own 
experiments and shipped the rest to Soviet experiment stations, including the ones in the 
Volga region and Ukraine.199 Volga experiment stations embraced this challenged with 
enthusiasm, as their research on corn had been developing since the 1910s. For instance, the 
Bezenchuk experiment station in Samara that was presided over by Nikolai Tulaikov played 
an important role both in researching and promoting corn cultivation in other regions. In 
1922, Tulaikov organized a committee to introduce the cultivation of corn in the Samara 
guberniya.200 
Overall, the introduction of corn in the Volga region and Ukraine grew substantially 
over the next several years.201 While in 1923, corn was planted on 1,700 thousands of 
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desyatins; in 1924, this number grew to 1,870; in 1925 – 2,750. Such a vast growth of corn 
cultivation was explained by the profitability of corn and its high yields. Yet, by 1924 and 
early 1925, Soviet agricultural economists and state officials faced first problems with corn 
production. First and foremost, more than one third of annual corn crop was produced for 
export. To compete with the United States and Argentina, the Soviet Union had to export 
the best quality corn. Yet, due to several rainy years, a lot of corn was damaged, as Soviet 
corn growers did not have technologies and technological knowledge to store and dry 
corn.202 While in the end, the Ukrainian State Trading Organization (Gostorg) allocated 
funds to purchase twenty drying machines from the United States, twenty machines could 
not sustain industrial corn production.203 In addition to technological issues, Soviet farmers 
complained about the poor quality of corn seed that they received from abroad; local 
agricultural administrations lacked the infrastructure to efficiently export corn and had not 
established mechanisms for using corn as fodder.204 All in all, by 1927, central Soviet 
newspapers were flooded with unfavorable articles on the perspectives of corn production 
and the failure of local bureaucracies to develop effective mechanisms for corn distribution. 
 
*** 
From 1924 to 1926, research-based seed exchange conducted through the Russian 
Agricultural Agency shifted towards a more commercial enterprise. In 1924, the People’s 
Commissariat of Agriculture (Narkomzem) took control of the Russian Agricultural 
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Agency. Nikolai Vavilov, then Head of the All-Union Institute of Applied Botanics, 
continued to work with the RAA and Borodin but lost any authority to control the direction 
of RAA activities in the United States. In contrast to Vavilov who emphasized the role of 
the agency as the link between American and Soviet plant breeding research, the new RAA 
focused on commercial aspects of seed exchange. Borodin, who celebrated the expansion of 
this commercial activity at first, was soon discouraged. The Amtorg (Amtorg Trading 
Corporation), a Soviet organization that was responsible for trade with the United States, 
gradually assumed responsibilities for purchasing American seeds. In early 1925, Borodin 
expressed first concerns about the power of the Amtorg and predicted the future of the RAA 
when he stated that "the Amtorg would soon swallow us up.” On August 5, 1926, Borodin 
sent his last letter to Vavilov, informing him that the battle with the Amtorg was lost. The 
Amtorg assumed all responsibilities for directing American seed purchases for Soviet 
agriculture.205 
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III. Tractors and Expertise: The American Tractor Unit and the 
Agricultural Reconstruction of Soviet Russia, 1921-1923 
The October Revolution inspired a wave of foreign migration to Soviet Russia. In the 
early 1920s, some Americans immigrated to Soviet Russia in search of an ideological 
refuge, better pay, and out of solidarity with its revolutionary ideals. Among this number, 
some answered the call of the Soviet authorities to help the newly formed state in its quest 
for industrial and agricultural reconstruction.206 Inspired by the rhetoric of the October 
Revolution and the new opportunities for agricultural experiments offered by the Soviet 
state, these Americans traveled to aid the Bolsheviks in reforming the Soviet countryside. In 
turn, the Soviet state, beset  with a farm crisis, peasant resistance, and the Volga famine in 
the early 1920s, accepted this help and encouraged the influx of foreign specialists, hoping 
that foreigners would provide valuable expertise in modern agriculture and technological 
assistance. Among these ventures was that of Harold Ware, whose spring 1922 initiative 
sought to bring a tractor unit to Soviet Russia in order to assist agricultural reconstruction. 
In late 1921, Ware, an agrarian organizer of the Communist Party of America, formed 
an American tractor unit to help modernize the Soviet countryside. Disturbed by portends of 
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a worldwide agricultural depression in both the United States and Soviet Russia, Ware 
perceived an opportunity not only to aid the Soviets but also to test new ideas about farm 
organization, agricultural education, and the implementation of technology.207 He insisted 
that Russian “climate conditions” and the “types of crops” that the Russians cultivated were 
similar to those found in America. Consequentially, “Americans, their methods and 
machinery,” Ware reasoned, would “be best equipped to assist with [Soviet Russia’s] 
agricultural reconstruction.”208 Funded by the Friends of Soviet Russia, an international pro-
communist relief organization, eleven members of the unit, including Ware and his wife 
Clarissa, six North Dakota farmers, a tractor mechanic, a doctor, and an interpreter, traveled 
thousands miles into an “abandoned” sovkhoz near Toikino village, in the Perm gubernia. 
In addition to smaller agricultural equipment and spare parts, the unit carried twenty J.I 
Case and one Fordson tractors, effectively twenty-one times the amount of tractors imported 
to Soviet Russia in the previous year.209 For Ware, as well as for Soviet state officials 
involved in the negotiations, these tractors provided not only a solution to the Soviet farm 
crisis, but also their introduction to the countryside would be integral to the development of 
modern agriculture. 
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While Ware’s plans for the introduction of modern farming in the Toikino sovkhoz 
were short-lived, leaving the Perm gubernia after one farming season, the story of the 
American tractor unit opens a window into a larger history of the circulation of ideas about 
technology, power, modernization, and science during the early Soviet period.210 During 
those short summer months of 1922, the Toikino sovkhoz became the locale for the 
dissemination of technological know-how, ideas about farm organization, and discussions 
about the ownership of technology and the leadership in the process of agricultural 
reconstruction. Over the course of several months, multiple representatives of state 
agencies, local administrations, scientific institutions, and peasants from nearby and 
faraway villages witnessed the work of the unit. Yet, it was not a simple act of transferring 
technological knowledge and expertise. Each institution and actor carried their own view of 
the future development of the region’s and Soviet agriculture, in general, and contributed to 
these debates as well as to the eventual dismantling of the unit’s work.211  
In interweaving the history of technology, agriculture, science, and political history, this 
chapter demosntrates that the introduction of farm modernization and mechanization in 
Soviet Russia during the early 1920s was a complex process, defying a binary narrative of 
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“success” or “failure.” The history of the American tractor unit reveals that the Soviet state 
was not prepared to effectively manage foreign technical aid, highlighting its naive reliance 
on the managing abilities of local institutions. Further, it illuminates the reluctance of local 
agricultural specialists (agronomists) to blindly accept American technological assistance. 
Rather than being passive acceptors of foreign aid, these specialists had a great deal of their 
own agency within the scientific structure of the new Soviet state in that they openly 
questioned the American expertise and sought to take leading positions in the agricultural 
reconstruction. Finally, the article reveals how the local context, in this case, the rural 
region of the Southern Urals, affected the tractor unit’s perceptions of technology and 
methods of its implementation.212 While Ware believed in the Soviet experiment, promoting 
it extensively in the United States, his work in Toikino village and his report for the future 
development of the region relied on an American model of the farm organization. His 
misunderstanding of the Soviet reality and his insistence on the dominance of American 
experts in agricultural reconstruction further contributed to the gap between the unit and 
local institutions. In the end, peasants resisted the introduction of new technology and the 
interference of foreign and Soviet experts into the traditional agricultural practices by, 
among other things, breaking tractors and stealing fuel. As a result other agents, such as the 
central state, local institutions, Americans, and agricultural specialists, were forced to 
negotiate the implementation of technology and, even more important, the power over that 
technology with local populations during the early 1920s.  
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A. The Russian Countryside, Technology, and the New Soviet State, 1914-1921 
Before the First World War, Russian agriculture faced major challenges in the 
countryside and on the world market. Despite the increase in crop yields from 1895 to 1913, 
peasants struggled to produce enough to hold Russia’s dominant position on the European 
grain market and to compete with emerging grain exporters, such as Canada, the United 
States, and Argentina. As grain export constituted over seventy percent of Russia’s foreign 
trade, the Ministry of Agriculture and local land committees (zemstvos), as well as the new 
generation of agricultural specialists, sought to find solutions to the modernization of 
peasant farms. The communal system of agriculture, three-field fallow system of farming, 
and the use of outdated technology were among the most prescient issues that officials 
identified. While the Pyotr Stolypin reforms, which combatted the commune and promoted 
the development of large-scale individual farming, as well as the introduction of modest 
agricultural knowledge and technology, had some success, by the eve of the First World 
War, eighty-two percent of the population still lived in communes in rural areas, largely 
ploughed with wooden plows, had only heard rumors of mechanized farming, and rarely 
received any agronomic aid from the state.213 
After the 1917 October Revolution, the early Bolshevik state inherited the previous 
regime’s food supply problems, further exacerbated by the disruption of the First World 
War. Then there was the matter of land redistribution. While the regime nationalized the 
countryside, allowing peasants to officially redistribute the pomeshchiks’ property, 
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Bolshevik food requisition policies that took place after the October Revolution and during 
the Civil War significantly undermined peasant trust in the new regime. More important, 
war communism policies undermined agricultural production that, coupled with the drought 
in the Volga basin in 1919-1920, led to severe famine conditions between 1919-1922. In 
response to these policies, mass demonstrations not only among peasants but among 
workers in 1920-21 caused the new regime to abandon war communism strategies and to 
accept the New Economic Policy which legalized free trade in food and consumer goods 
and employed proportional tax on food surpluses.214 
While these policies revived agricultural production to some extent and provided 
enough supply to feed an urban population diminished by the Civil War, peasants, 
according to the Bolsheviks, still did not produce enough grain to launch any form of 
industrialization.215 To encourage agricultural production, the Bolsheviks envisioned 
cooperative development and the implementation of farm mechanization.216 As for the 
latter, the Bolsheviks perceived technology and related expertise as the primary solution to 
the modernization of Soviet agriculture.217 Technology, they believed, would break the 
communal living pattern and allow the village to turn into more productive units, such as 
collective farms.218 As a result, not only would technology increase farm productivity, but 
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also it would change the lives of Russian peasants by transforming them from backward 
manual laborers to highly qualified workers. Through this social and technological 
transformation, the Soviet state believed it would be able to create an exemplary model of 
socialist agriculture that could be transferred to other countries around the world.219  
Inspired by this futuristic vision of modern socialist agriculture, the Bolsheviks turned 
to foreign agricultural expertise to acquire the most up-to-date agricultural knowledge and 
technology. While they encouraged European agricultural companies and experts to 
participate in the reconstruction of the Russian countryside as well, the Bolsheviks viewed 
American advancements in agriculture as avant-garde in the post-WWI rural economics. 
“Americanism,” the product of merging Taylorism and Fordism in the minds of Bolshevik 
ideologues, signified modernity, efficiency, and progress.220 As a result, since the early days 
of the regime, V.I. Lenin encouraged Russian tractor engineers to purchase limited numbers 
of American tractors and use them for research and the eventual establishment of the 
Russian tractor industry.221  
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For Lenin, tractors, particularly American ones, were more than merely machines. They 
signified the solution to bridging the gap between Soviet workers and peasants. At the VIII 
Plenum of RKP(b) in March 1919, Lenin proclaimed that the central goal of the party was 
to win trust of the Russian peasant through technical aid, particularly tractors.222 “If we can 
get 100,000 first-class tractors, provide fuel, and hire mechanics,” Lenin addressed party 
members, the “peasant would say: ‘I’m for kommunia (i.e. communism).’”223 Moreover, 
this “trust” between workers and peasants, according to Lenin, would prove to be an 
essential component for the successful industrialization of the country, as increasing 
agricultural production would ensure well-fed workers who would actively participate in the 
industrialization process. To this end, obtaining agricultural machinery, in particular 
tractors, was a critical step in the Bolshevik vision or agricultural reconstruction and the 
building of a united socialist front.  
Getting tractors into the countryside, according to Lenin, could happen only through 
two channels: either producing Soviet tractors, which Lenin acknowledged, was a dream at 
that point, or importing them from abroad.224 In the summer of 1921, incapable of fighting 
the famine of 1921 in the Volga area, the Soviets were forced to ask the international 
community for food relief. In addition to accepting food relief from the American Relief 
Administration and multiple international organizations, the Soviet authorities perceived the 
famine of 1921 as an opportunity to encourage more agricultural immigration from the 
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United States. Through pro-communist relief organizations based in the United States, such 
as the Friends of Soviet Russia (FSR), the Soviet government sought to attract American 
agricultural experts to rebuild the Soviet countryside by introducing tractors and educating 
peasants about modern agricultural methods. In turn, American pro-communist agricultural 
experts, such as Harold Ware and his American tractor unit, sought to gain knowledge 
about large-scale agriculture, innovative methods of agricultural reconstruction and 
education.225 
 
B. Harold Ware: American Agrarian Organizer and “Western Pioneer” in Russia 
In May 1922, the Friends of Soviet Russia sent its first tractor unit under the supervision 
of fellow communist and future New Dealer, Harold Ware. Ware (1889-1935), the son of 
well-known labor activist and socialist organizer, Ella Reeve Bloor, was considered to be 
one of the foremost experts on agriculture within the Communist Party of America.226 He 
graduated from the Pennsylvania Agricultural College and worked on multiple farms, 
gaining valuable experience in the field. In 1913, Ware was among the first farmers in the 
Downington area (PA) who introduced tractors to his Jolly Waters Farm. After selling the 
farm three years later, Ware worked in a shipyard where he got involved into the labor 
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movement. During the later years of the First World War, he joined the Worker’s Party of 
America (the antecedent of the CPA) and delved into the world of American rural 
politics.227  
Yet, it was the October Revolution that was pivotal for the development of Ware’s ideas 
about agricultural modernization, the farm crisis, and the gap between the city and the farm. 
After the revolution, Ware, according to his mother, was convinced that Russian “peasants 
received an opportunity to solve their problems once and for all, and that their experience 
will have a great importance to us in America.”228 This perception would guide Ware’s 
agricultural projects in Russia in that he sought not only to reconstruct the Russian 
countryside but also to learn more about educating peasants both about new methods of 
agriculture and about communism and class struggle.   
One year prior to his departure to Russia, Ware traveled as an undercover “stiff” with 
“five dollars in his pocket” across the United States, recording “American agricultural 
problems.”229 The CPA sent Ware on this trip after Lenin’s appeal to American communists 
to send him materials about the farm situation in the United States. Lenin bluntly inquired, 
“Have you no farmers in America?”230 As a result of Lenin’s appeal and CPA’s directives, 
Ware traveled from May to October 1921, moving with other migrant workers all over the 
United States. He went from planting of “fuzzy cotton seeds in the South” during spring to 
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the “cultivation of the fruit orchards of the Pacific coast” to “burned fields of Montana and 
the great harvests of golden grain” in the Dakotas and Kansas.231 There, in Montana and the 
Dakotas, Ware met members of the Nonpartisan League that, according to one historian, 
“rattled the foundations of American politics in the 1910s and 1920s” by engaging western 
farmers into “electoral politics.”232 Some of the Nonpartisan League members would later 
join Ware in his Russian agricultural ventures. 
In his reports to the CPA, Ware echoed Lenin’s concerns about the gap between farmers 
and workers and emphasized the urgency of organizing farm workers to close this gap. In 
his November 1921 report “American Agricultural Problems,” Ware portrayed destitution, 
physical and “spiritual starvation” of American farmers whose dreams about “economic 
independence” were crushed by the creeping postwar agricultural depression.233 He argued 
that even the most advanced agricultural technology could not help American farmers to 
deal with the crisis. For Ware, technology represented a double-edged sword in that it led to 
both improvements in agricultural production and the “exploit[ation]” of farmers. In his 
later reports, Ware stated that “young American farmers” were “disappointed” in the 
American farm policy and “imperialistic conditions” that they worked in. These conditions, 
he contended, made farmers use newest machines and “forced them individually to combine 
with the more organized urban industries.” To Ware, this was the moment where the CPA 
had to interfere by organizing farmers, insisting it should reorganize the centralized 
Agrarian Bureau so it could respond to the needs of farm workers who had been dismissed 
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by the Party as “counterrevolutionary forces.”234 By contrast, Ware considered “the 
producers of food” to be integral undermining capitalist exploitation. In his mind, “the 
critical battles” on the socialist front would “be for Food.”235  
Ware’s 1921 report to the CPA on the agricultural situation in the United States 
eventually reached Lenin. During her meeting with Lenin in the spring of 1921, Ware’s 
mother and prominent socialist organizer, Ella Bloor, reminded Lenin that the report was 
“the work of one of [her] sons.”236 Lenin acknowledged and highly praised Ware’s work.237 
For him, the transformation of Soviet agriculture, in particular, its technological 
modernization based on American ideas, was of utmost importance. In one of his letters, 
Lenin wrote that he dreamt that the Russian peasantry would soon move from the outdated 
methods of agriculture to the “horse of the big machine industry.”238 As a result, when the 
FSR informed Soviet authorities that Harold Ware was going to organize a tractor unit to 
Russia, they readily accepted, as they were already familiar with him and his agricultural 
work. All that was left was to secure sufficient funding. 
While traveling across the United States and recording his observations on the American 
agricultural situation, Ware got acquainted with Lincoln Steffens, an American journalist, 
who had just returned from Russia and was touring the United States with lectures 
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associated with the Friends of Soviet Russia and their relief projects.239 According to the 
reminiscences of an American farmer Philipp Smith, Lincoln Steffens collected $70,000 
during his tours and was going to give this money to fund food aid to Russia. However, 
Ware proposed another plan. He appealed to Steffens and the FSR to use this money to 
finance his group of Americans farmers and technicians who would travel to Russia 
equipped with agricultural machinery to cultivate land.240 In early 1922, the FSR agreed and 
facilitated the trip of Ware’s tractor unit to Russia. 
 
 
 
C. The American Vision for the Future of the “Abandoned” Sovkhoz, May-November 
1922 
On May 10, 1922, Harold Ware and his unit left the United States for a long trip to 
Russia.241 Occupying twenty train cars, the Ware unit carried $50,000 worth of tractors, 
agricultural equipment, and spare parts, as well as other necessities to organize agricultural 
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work in Soviet Russia. Familiar with the devastating effects of the Volga famine, Ware 
hoped that the tractor unit would receive land for its operation in the Volga region. Not only 
was it a famine-stricken area that required agricultural reconstruction, but also the Volga 
region had the best land for tractors and had lots of geographic similarities with areas in 
Montana and South Dakota.242 However, when the tractor unit arrived in Moscow in June 
1922, the Soviet authorities informed Ware that the unit was assigned 14,000 acres in 
Toikino, the Sarapulsky uezd, within the Perm guberniya.243 Such an unexpected turn of 
events appeared to be only one of the first obstacles that Ware’s unit encountered during its 
work in Russia. 
Harold Ware did not expect to travel to Perm, almost a thousand miles to the east of 
Moscow. Situated in the European part of Russia, near the Ural Mountains, the Perm 
guberniya had long, cold, and snowy winters with short and warm summers and clay soils 
suitable for growing rye. In contrast to the Volga region, the Toikino area was not as fertile 
and suitable for growing wheat. In spite of Ware’s protests, the Soviets insisted that his unit 
had to establish its operations in an “abandoned sovkhoz” near the Toikino village 
surrounded by “typical Russian village roads” and unsteady bridges that could not carry 
tractors. Moreover, according to Ware, the land itself had not been used for a long time, 
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ranging from four to ten years.244 It was hilly and full of Kolchak’s trenches. All in all, 
when the group finally arrived to the Vereshchagino station, forty-five miles away from 
Toikino, on July 1, Ware knew that the land was not suitable for the tasks that the tractor 
unit intended to accomplish.245  
Despite this first disappointment, the American tractor unit, according to local 
newspapers, victoriously entered the Vereshchagino village on July 8, gathering more than 
2,000 peasants from surrounding areas to witness the arrival of Americans and their 
tractors. For Ware, local administrators, and peasants, this moment was the first place from 
which ideas about agricultural technology would disseminate further. According to local 
newspapers, peasants gathered around the train platform where “proud, powerful” tractors 
were standing. These “outlandish machines,” the newspaper reported, were met with mixed 
feelings of “disbelief” and fascination. While some peasants declared the superiority of the 
traditional plow, others mocked bystanders: “Look, know-it-all! Your wooden plow is for 
picking; and this is the power!” Others perceived tractors as another way of state torment 
and lamented that authorities would “torture the people again with this monster train 
[paravozina].” Even the kulaks whispered: “Look, merikanets [the American] wants to 
work with disregard to Christian ways. Now the bread will smell like gas.”246 In this way, 
peasants perceived their outdated plows not only as a tool for cultivating land, but also as a 
religious symbol of traditional ways which the Soviets and foreigners sought to modernize. 
                                               
244 Ware, “Soobshchenie direktora pervogo amerikanskogo soiuza traktorov H.M. Ware 
o sovkhoze,” no earlier than September 1922 (PermGANI f. 557, op. 3, d. 68, l. 2). 
 
245 Quoted in: Olga Ivanova, “Sociokulturnaya adaptazia inostrantsev v Sovetskoi Rossii 
v 1920-1930-e god” (Ph.D., Rossiiskii Institut Kultorologii, 2007), 85; Makarenko, Mirovoy 
Proletariat – Strane Sovetov, 207-8. 
 
246 Kas’ian, “Putevye nabroski,” Zvezda, 13 August 1922. 
 
  
 
105 
Thus, this general feeling of suspicion mixed with delight prevailed among peasants as the 
tractor unit moved from Vereshchagino to Toikino. 
Local administrators cheerfully welcomed the arrival of the tractor unit. Local 
communist organizers expressed their gratitude and promised in a conventional communist 
style to aid the unit to “restore agriculture in free Soviet Russia.”247 More importantly, for 
them, the work of the American tractor unit and its introduction of mechanization into 
Russian agriculture signified more than just an innovative way to cultivate the land. It was a 
political move by the party demonstrating peasants that the Bolsheviks cared about the 
Russian village. This strategy echoed Lenin’s rhetoric about winning the peasant’s trust to 
ensure the success of industrialization. 
As for Ware and his unit, they understood the importance of counteracting these 
feelings to ensure the success of the tractor project. In his appeal to Russian peasants, Ware 
assured the local population that the American group did not come to exploit them with 
tractors. On the contrary, Americans, he proclaimed, came to reconstruct Russian 
agriculture by bringing technology and new farm methods to the Russian countryside. 
Additionally, Ware emphasized that every tractor was the gift of American workers to 
Russian peasants and proudly showed a wooden plate nailed to every tractor “The gift of 
American workers to Russian workers.” Hence, not only did tractors symbolize progress in 
Ware’s speech, but also they represented the charitable nature of the American operation 
and their role as instructors for the Russian peasant.248  
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To fulfill its teaching mission, the American tractor unit employed tractor 
demonstrations and tractor courses. As for the former, on August 6, 1922, Ware’s unit 
gathered more than 3,000 peasants to demonstrate the work of American agricultural 
machinery.249 According to the local newspaper report, some peasants traveled more than 
twenty miles to see the Americans and their machines. Ware himself confirmed in his 
interview to Anna Louise Strong that peasants “came from miles around to see us.”250 To 
show the radical difference between a tractor and a horse, Ware made one peasant “plough 
with his horse and another with one of our tractors alongside him.” A local newspaper 
reporter later noted that the more the crowd looked at the “striking work of tractors,” the 
more it “pitied” the work of “our wooden plough” dragged by an “exhausted horse.”251 
Moreover, Ware showed that tractors could be operated not only by men but also by 
women. In his reminiscences, he noted that “one of the things that made them talk for days 
was when we had a woman [Clarissa Ware] run a tractor.”252 A woman operating a tractor 
shocked the villagers. According to one account, the locals called Clarissa Ware “Supolen’” 
which the local dialect defined as “neither a man nor a woman.”253 Therefore, the American 
                                               
249 It is hard to judge the actual number of peasants who came or were forced to come to 
the demonstration because the report of the demonstration was published in a communist 
newspaper which could have exaggerated the number. “Eto otsenil Lenin,” 14, quoted in 
Makarenko, Mirovoy Proletariat – Strane Sovetov, 208. 
 
250 Strong, “North Dakota in the Urals,” 91. 
 
251 “Eto otsenil Lenin,” 14, quoted in Makarenko, Mirovoy Proletariat – Strane Sovetov, 
209. 
 
252 Strong, “North Dakota in the Urals,” 91. 
 
253 Interview with Pelageya Stepanovna Degtyaryeva, December 2005, quoted in 
Svetlana Fedotova and Egor Garaev, “’Merikantsy’ v Permskoy gubernii,” Kompan’on 
Magazine, no. 5 (September 2006): 47. 
 
  
 
107 
tractor unit challenged the perception of farm work and the use of technology as a purely 
masculine task. 
With regard to tractor courses, the American tractor unit educational courses for Russian 
peasants and workers who were willing to learn how to use tractors. Ware insisted that “a 
peasant who learned how to work a tractor” would never be satisfied with his present state. 
In Ware’s view, the peasant with tractor skills would become “the center of propaganda 
among his own villagers.” As this peasant, Ware continued, would propagate the methods 
of large-scale agriculture, he would facilitate the future establishment of collective farms.254 
More than forty Russian peasants joined Ware’s tractor courses. When the representative of 
the CPA, J.G. Andreychin, inspected the tractor unit, he reported that “Russian workers 
rode tractors and appeared to be hardworking and intelligent laborers.” They worked, 
Andreychin continued, for “12-14 hours,” despite “poor nutrition and intolerable living 
conditions.” Their enthusiasm, Andreychin concluded, was so apparent that a “week before 
the beginning of the seeding campaign, the Russians declared their willingness to work 
fourteen hours a day, to the great amusement of Americans.”255  
In the eyes of the Americans, the Russian peasant went through an individual 
transformation kindled by the introduction of American tractors into his/her life. This 
transformation appears quite often in the narratives that the Ware unit shared with the 
American public.256 When Clarissa Ware reported about the trip of the tractor unit to 
Toikino, she represented American farmers within the discourse of the American frontier 
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where Americans were portrayed as “pioneers.” Utilizing this romanticized rhetoric of 
discovery, exploration, and an encounter with native people (i.e. Russian peasants), Clarissa 
Ware depicted the backwardness of the Russian peasantry and the intellectual and 
technological superiority of the Americans.257 Even Harold Ware himself used the language 
of underdevelopment in the descriptions of his first encounters with the Russian rural life. 
For instance, when Ware discussed his unit’s arrival to Vereschagino, he portrayed the 
naiveté of peasants with “their little hand hoes” trying to cut ruts which “they thought our 
tractors could not negotiate.” On the other hand, Ware presented his unit as a powerful 
example of American technology when he discussed how American tractors easily “cut 
down the ruts” and crowned “the road as [they] went.” Thus, American narratives begin 
with the imagination of the backwardness of Russian peasants before their “contact” with 
American farmers.258 
Yet, the “contact” with Americans and their technology, according to the Ware unit, 
changed the image of Russian peasants: from “ignorant and illiterate,” according to one of 
the unit’s members, to hard-working and able laborers.259 “He’s going to get ahead,” one of 
the unit’s members claimed. Americans perceived themselves as that link that transformed 
and or gave birth to a new peasant who was “able to reconstruct Russian agriculture in the 
near future.” By presenting the abilities of Russian peasants to transform from their 
backwardness to intelligence, the unit members hinted that intelligence was not enough. 
They pointed to American farmers who were “most intelligent, skilled farmers in the world, 
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with the best machinery.” Thus, there was another ingredient for the recipe of successful 
agricultural reconstruction. The state and its policies mattered, Ware argued. Ware 
described the benefits that the socialist state gave to Russian peasants and contrasted them 
with corporations and the middlemen that contributed to the destitute of American farmers. 
By portraying this transformation of the Russian peasant, the Ware unit tried to make their 
readers think about the state of American agriculture and issues within American state farm 
policies.260 
The importance of introducing technology to the Russian countryside was a major 
theme in the observations written by foreign journalists for American readers in the Soviet 
Russia magazine. For instance, A.C. Freeman who visited Toikino in the summer of 1922 
emphasized that the introduction of tractors and the demonstration of their potential was 
“unquestionably” the best way to reconstruct Russian agriculture and to overcome “the 
narrow individualistic psychology” of “the stupidest and most conservative of the 
muzhiks.”261 Further, Freeman shared Ware’s mission in that the introduction of technology 
would not only reconstruct the Russian countryside but would also help “prevent famine” in 
the future. Both Freeman and Ware hoped that this experience would stimulate peasants to 
form collective communes for agricultural work. In his article, Freeman pointed out that 
Ware’s work kindled “the formation of two new agricultural communes and saved the 
existence of another which was on the point of dissolution.”262 Thus, in his words, the 
introduction of tractors was even more important as it stimulated new forms of agricultural 
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organization – collective farming. This idea went hand in hand with Soviet authorities’ 
perspective on the development of agriculture in the early 1920s. 
As the farm season was getting to the end in 1922, the question of who would continue 
to mechanize agriculture in the Toikino village became a point of discussion. Before his 
departure from the Perm guberniya, Harold Ware published a report in which he clearly 
articulated that Americans should take charge in the technological side of sovkhoz’s 
operations. Similar to other Americans who came to organize reconstruction projects in 
Soviet Russia, Ware came to what he saw as the socialist country sharing radicalism and 
belief in the Soviet experiment. Yet, he understood that, to accomplish his goals of turning 
the Toikino sovkhoz into an exemplary collective farm that would “give foundation for the 
gradual development of smaller [collective] farms,” and a “scientific center” that would 
educate “the backward mass of peasants,” the American way of organization was 
paramount.263  
Ware’s vision of the future of the Toikino enterprise was intertwined with the insistence 
of the correct implementation of agricultural technology, particularly tractors. He believed 
that American specialists who, in his words, were the only “experienced instructors,” had to 
supervise the mechanization of the Toikino agriculture.264  According to his estimates, the 
four American farmers whom he brought with him in 1922 was not enough to complete the 
instruction, and, thus, he planned to bring “no less than twenty-five” American specialists to 
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Toikino in 1923.265 In his report, Ware declared: “I can’t help but insist on the necessity of 
these people.” “The first operations of new machinery and methods and the future education 
of the Russians,” he added, “will require the work of American specialists during at least 
two productive seasons. The whole plan is based on the use of American machinery and the 
transfer of American experience to the Russians.”266 Ware did not trust local agronomists 
arguing that the “majority of Russian students from the Moscow Agricultural Institute 
rejected the collective way of agriculture.” In addition, he distrusted Russian workers who, 
in his view, “pretended to be qualified” but largely resisted the introduction of American 
agricultural methods.267 Therefore, the only way to ensure success of the whole enterprise 
was to Americanize the technological side of the operation until the Russians were fully 
converted into the American way of farm mechanization. In his proposal, Ware left the 
latter point quite vague, not specifying when Americans would leave Toikino. 
But Ware’s hopes for the successful future of the Toikino sovkhoz met several 
obstacles. First, as Ware financially relied on the Friends of Soviet Russia, his aspirations 
for a new import of tractors, smaller agricultural machinery, and seeds were crushed by the 
decreasing amount of funds raised by these organizations.268 By the beginning of 1923, the 
American public was less and less eager to contribute to the Volga famine relief because of 
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the news that Soviet Russia started exporting grain.269 As a result, the FSR was not able to 
further support the unit’s work. Yet, more important were Harold Ware’s strained 
relationships with the local administration and local agronomists that darkened the future 
development of the sovkhoz. 
 
D. Soviet Visions of Agricultural Reconstruction: Agronomists, Provincial Committees, 
and the Central State on the American Tractor Unit 
During the American unit’s operations in the summer of 1922, multiple parties visited 
the Toikino sovkhoz transforming it into a space for the circulation of ideas about the future 
of farm organization and, more importantly, about the power over the future agricultural 
development. Besides peasants, the sovkhoz administration, and the Americans themselves, 
central state representatives (the People’s Commissariat of Agriculture), officials from 
provincial and county committees, “scientific agronomists” (uchenyi agronom) from the 
Ural Oblast’ Experiment Station, university professors, local agronomists, and even 
representatives of the uezd GPU traveled to the Toikino village to witness the work of 
Ware’s unit. One observer quipped that “there were too many visitors but not enough 
managers.”270  
Visits to the Toikino sovkhoz stimulated the circulation of information as it flowed 
through official reports sent by central to provincial institutions and back, as well as 
through personal correspondence among local officials who sought to control the unit’s 
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activity in the Perm guberniya (fig. 1). Such an active and convoluted process of 
interactions among all parties set up the competing discourse of narratives about the future 
of farm organization. For provincial authorities and local agronomists, the question was as 
much about how to implement tractors into peasants’ agricultural practices as about how to 
control those who introduced technology into the countryside. These debates over power in 
the agricultural reconstruction appeared in diverse contexts: local agronomists’ criticisms of 
the American unit’s work to provincial administrators’ claims about the lack of communist 
ideology in the unit.  
 
Figure 1. The network of American tractor unit’s interactions with the central state, local administrative 
institutions, agricultural specialists, and peasants, July-October 1922 
Since the Stolypin reforms which put emphasis on funding the development of 
agronomical help and the establishment of experiment stations in regions, the Perm 
guberniya became one of the most developed areas with regard to agronomical help. In 
1914, it was divided 57 agronomic plots and planned to expand its number to 70 by the 
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beginning of the 1920s.271 The Perm guberniya land service (zemskaya sluzhba) consisted of 
170 agricultural employees, including 56 agronomists, 43 agricultural instructors and 
technicians, 71 lower agricultural personnel. The majority of agronomists had secondary 
agricultural education (58.1%) and higher agricultural education (41.1%).272 Yet, by the 
early 1920s, local agronomists lacked funding from federal and local institutions and 
struggled to establish their authority among local peasants. As a result, the arrival of 
Americans and their neglect to consult with a Russian agronomist about agricultural works 
in the area troubled local specialists.  
While the agricultural specialists shared Ware’s intentions of building a new sovkhoz 
according to rational principles of farm organization, they criticized the American tractor 
unit for its misunderstanding of the peculiar Russian conditions, including the 
infrastructure, crops, and the qualities of the land. For instance, in his report to Aleksandr 
Bannikov, vice-deputy of the Perm Provincial Executive Committee, local agronomist I.I. 
Rakin criticized Ware for poor economic calculations with regard to the infrastructure of 
the sovkhoz. For him, the infrastructure was one of the keys for the successful 
mechanization and ultimate modernization of the sovkhoz. Rakin sided with the sovkhoz 
administration that argued that the unit did not understand the landscape of the village and 
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should have chosen a different place for living and working facilities.273 Moreover, the 
American tractor unit received criticisms for the improper use of tractors. One observer 
noted that Americans were not familiar with the peculiarities of the land and plowed too 
deep that, in the case of bad weather conditions, might have resulted in the loss of the 
harvest.274 As a result, local agronomist unanimously agreed that the Americans lacked 
“proper agricultural knowledge” and that they needed a local Russian agronomist on 
stuff.275 
The American tractor unit, in fact, was not the only one that fell under the criticism of 
local agronomists. Agricultural specialists also complained about the sovkhoz 
administration and its poor planting practices. In his report, Rakin quips that the absence of 
an agronomist in the sovkhoz caused a “agronomic kur’yoz [curiousity]” when during the 
spring time (before Ware’s arrival), the sovkhoz thought it planted ten desyatins of turnip. 
Instead, summer rape grew but could not ripen because of the late planting.276 Moreover, 
Rakin disapproved of sovkhoz’s “uneven” planting of the area with crops.277 Thus, similar 
to his solution to the American unit’s mistakes, Rakin concluded that these agricultural 
“mishaps” could be solved only if the sovkhoz hired a local agricultural specialist with 
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proper skills of agricultural planning, knowledge of the land and crops. 278 Such remarks 
pointed to the Russian agronomists’ skepticism not only towards foreign expertise but also 
towards local administration that they perceived to be underqualified to conduct proper 
farm modernization. As a result, the Toikino sovkhoz became the discourse for negotiating 
the power over agricultural practices among the unit, the sovkhoz administration, and local 
agronomists.  
Beyond the perceived lack of agricultural knowledge on the part of both the Americans 
and the sovkhoz administration, local agronomists criticized both groups for perpetuating 
the “antagonistic” relationship which prevented the successful development of any farm 
planning. The conflict stemmed from the broken distribution of power in rural areas after 
the October revolution. Despite the Provincial Land Committee’s attempts to organize a 
sovkhoz in Toikino in 1920, the project was closed due to continuous crop failures and the 
lack of infrastructure. In the spring of 1922, a few months before Ware’s arrival, the 
sovkhoz was given to the management of the Kizel Mines which were 250 miles away from 
Toikino. That spring, sovkhoz workers, under the direction of the Kizel Mines and with the 
help of their funding, cultivated and planted more than 400 desyatins (1,000 acres). Upon 
Ware’s arrival, the local Mezhrabpom (the Workers’ International Relief) tried to negotiate 
with the Perm Land Committee to give Ware several thousand desyatins where the unit 
could work. Because the Provincial Land Committee did not have such a big plot of land, it 
gave the land of the sovkhoz that was currently managed by the Kizel Mines. Thus, the 
Mezhrabpom had to make a contract with the Kizel Mines to unite the management of the 
sovkhoz under the direction of the sovkhoz manager (Chinin), but the tractor unit, 
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according to I.K. Popov, head of the Perm Provincial Land Committee, was “autonomous, 
reported to the Mezhrabpom and worked per zavsovkhoz’s [head of the sovkhoz] request.” 
Even this directive demonstrates the confusing situation about the management of the 
sovkhoz, where the American tractor unit and the sovkhoz administration shared power 
over the land.279 
In addition to the conflict of powers in Toikino, Perm provincial and Okhansk county 
committees struggled to establish control over the work of the American tractor unit. While 
Ware advocated for the unit’s independence, provincial authorities were worried that the 
tractor unit did not have the communist leadership. In a letter to Mikhail P. Turkin, Vice 
Secretary of the Perm Provincial Committee, Pavel Tiunov, Executive Secretary of the 
Okhansk County Committee, lamented that, based on several meetings with the unit, an 
“organic link” between the unit, central and provincial authorities “did not exist.” “The 
center sent [the tractor unit],” he added, “calmed down or, more precisely, relied on local 
authorities. But they [county committees] do not pay much attention to [the unit] or think 
that somebody does something, and manage.”280 This dissatisfaction with the central state’s 
policy occurred partly due to the pressure that Lenin exercised upon Pyotr Obrosov, head of 
the Perm Provincial Executive Committee. On October 10, 1922, Lenin sent a letter to 
Obrosov in which he disparaged provincial authorities for understanding the fuel problems 
that the tractor unit experienced and failing to propose any solutions. “I urge you” to 
support the tractor unit, Lenin claimed, and “to help them with the fulfillment of their 
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suggestions on the rational use of tractors, buying fuel, organization of a workshop, 
building houses etc.” “American agricultural groups’ help is the most wanted and needed. 
Our major goal,” he continued, was to “facilitate the fulfillment of their beginnings with 
minimal delays.”281 Yet, provincial and county authorities could not do much as the 
transportation network to the region was still under reconstruction and, thus, the unit could 
not get as much fuel as it needed for tractors.  
Feeling the pressure of the central state, provincial and county authorities, as well as 
agricultural specialists, offered competing visions of the future of agricultural 
reconstruction of the Toikino sovkhoz in the fall of 1922. County authorities saw the 
solution to this crisis of authority in establishing direct control over the American tractor 
unit by organizing “a soviet agency that is responsible for the technical and practical work 
of the unit.”282 Others, including provincial representatives, perceived the independence of 
Ware’s work and his vision of agricultural reconstruction as paramount for the success of 
the Toikino sovkhoz. They argued that the conflict between the local administration and the 
Kizel mines had to be resolved by turning the Toikino sovkhoz into a state-owned farm and 
that the sovkhoz administration had to follow Ware’s plans of turning Toikino into an 
exemplary tractor base (MTS) and a scientific center. Moreover, according to this group, 
provincial authorities planned to provide a “full-time representative” to supervise and report 
to the provincial committee and to Narkomzem.283 Yet, the third group saw the key to the 
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effective agricultural reconstruction in Toikino in eliminating the conflict between the 
tractor unit, the sovkhoz administration, and the Kizel mines, hiring a Russian agronomist, 
and establishing a plan for the sovkhoz’s development.284 In turn, Ware himself argued that 
the sovkhoz should be “given an opportunity of independent existence as a tractor base and 
a scientific center,” as well as the base for workshop [MTS].285  
While provincial and county institutions, as well as agricultural scientists, competed for 
their authority over the unit, the central state, including the All-Russian Central Executive 
Committee and Lenin himself, had a bigger fish to fry. For him, the perceived success of 
the American tractor unit work in Toikino was paramount for demonstrating the successful 
integration of technology into the countryside. To this end, in October 1922, after the 
Soviet press praised the achievements of American agricultural communes, Lenin sent a 
telegram to the Friends of Soviet Russia, congratulating the organization with the success of 
the Ware agricultural unit.286 He declared that “despite gigantic difficulties,” the Ware 
tractor unit achieved “exceptional results.” Recognizing the importance of American 
agricultural communes, Lenin appealed to the All-Russian Central Executive Committee 
(VTsIK) to publicly acknowledge the work of the FSR and the contribution of American 
agricultural groups. In his appeal to the VTsIK, he stated that the Soviet authorities should 
facilitate the work of the FSR because these groups brought American technology to Soviet 
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Russia which was of “great significance” to Russian agriculture.287 The next month the All-
Russian Central Executive Committee declared the Toikino agricultural commune to be a 
“model farm estate” for the rest of Russia.288 While Lenin was aware of all the difficulties 
that the American tractor unit was facing, he recognized the importance of demonstrating 
the success of the tractor unit and the superiority of its machinery in cultivating the Soviet 
land. 
Little did Lenin and other groups know that the American tractor unit would soon leave 
Toikino and never come back. Yet, the departure of Americans did not end the discussion 
about the future of technological modernization of the countryside. When the unit left the 
sovkhoz, American tractors and other agricultural equipment stayed there. This issue raised 
a question for provincial and even central authorities, as well as for the sovkhoz 
administration about what to do with tractors. Undoubtedly, these tractors, even those that 
were broken, represented a precious commodity. Some groups proposed to transfer these 
tractors from Toikino. Yet, on December 11, 1922, the Ural Bureau of the Central 
Committee of the RKP(b) got involved in this debate and decided that the transfer was 
“premature.”289 Ultimately, on January 6, 1923, the Committee of the Mezhrabpom (the 
Russian section) decided to shut down the tractor base in the Toikino sovkhoz.290 Historical 
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sources offer little information on what happened to the Toikino sovkhoz later in the 1920s 
and where American tractors were transferred.  
 
*** 
 The history of the American tractor unit and its role in the agricultural 
reconstruction of the Toikino sovkhoz provides a micro-historical view on the circulation of 
ideas about technology, power, and methods of agricultural reconstruction that went beyond 
the geographical borders of the Southern Urals. Instead of focusing on foreigners’ failures 
or successes in teaching peasants modern agricultural methods in a particular village, the 
chapter combines micro-history and a global perspective on the circulation of ideas to 
reveal a complex network of groups that negotiated every step of the introduction of 
technology and ideas about farm modernization. From the central state to provincial and 
county institutions, from local agricultural experts and local peasants to the American unit 
members – all these actors took a significant role in debating the future of the Soviet 
agricultural reconstruction. As a result of these interactions, ideas about technology and 
farm modernization appeared to be in constant flux.  
To trace these changes means to follow ideas and their bearers, including humans and 
non-humans, that constantly crossed national and administrative borders. Harold Ware, for 
instance, left Toikino in 1922 only to come back with new and more ambitious, as well as 
“constructive,” plans for the agricultural reconstruction of Soviet Russia. For him, the 
Toikino experience lay the foundation for the future agricultural projects that he would 
conduct in the Soviet Union from 1923 to 1929. When organizing later projects, Ware 
would invite leading American agricultural economists and planners, such as Benton 
MacKaye and Milburn Wilson among others, to research and develop detailed plans for his 
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work in Russia. By doing so, Ware would challenge these American experts to envision a 
different, Soviet, version of large-scale agriculture. As a whole, the analysis of the 
circulation of ideas, bodies, and technologies complicates our understanding of a one-way 
technological transfer and makes us reconsider traditional historical interpretations by 
focusing on the entangled nature of ideas, bodies, and technologies. 
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IV. Experimental Ground: Harold Ware and the Russian Reconstruction 
Farms, 1925-27 
 On a “little boat,” sailing from New York City to Liepāja, Latvia, in the early days 
of July 1925, an energetic man in his mid-thirties was telling his fellow passengers about 
the new Russian Farm project that he, together with his team, was about to launch. The 
agricultural unit, the man relayed, was traveling to Soviet Russia to organize the 
reconstruction of Russian agriculture. Among those present, Anna Porter wrote of the 
exchange in her Moscow Diary. Porter wrote that the project was “not a colonization 
scheme,” but rather, an “experiment of agricultural production on an industrial basis.” 
Further, she noted the man “hoped that this experiment may reflect back and teach our own 
farmers the value of industrial production” and the merits of collective organization.291 The 
man’s name was Harold Ware, and he was leading another “selected group of well-trained 
Americans” to establish the Russian Reconstruction Farms in the hope of revolutionizing 
farming, not just for Soviet Russia, but in line with his socialist vision for the future of 
American agriculture as well.292 More than merely a means to increase grain production, 
Ware returned to the Soviet countryside only a few years after his Toikino project to 
cultivate a new agrarian worker, utilizing an approach that focused more on education as a 
means to achieve that end. 
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Organized in 1925, the Russian Reconstruction Farms, Inc., operated 15,000 acres of 
Soviet land in the Tersky district of southeastern Russia.293 When Ware’s associates 
proposed this plan to Soviet officials at the International Peasant Conference in October 
1923, they promised to equip the farm with the most up-to-date agricultural machinery, to 
establish a farm school, and to provide “constructive” agricultural relief according to the 
latest “scientific methods.” The Soviets readily accepted. As the New Economic Policy 
(NEP) was now in full swing, Soviet state officials perceived foreign agricultural 
communes and concessions as a welcome and essential contribution to the reconstruction of 
the Soviet countryside.294 As for the Americans themselves, the Russian Reconstruction 
Farms were not merely a charitable project. Organized by members of the Workers’ Party 
of America and other progressives, this venture represented a “laboratory” to experiment 
with large-scale farming, to find solution to future famines, to test socialist theories, and to 
try out new educational ideas.  
The RRF has received little attention beyond historical works on Soviet foreign 
concessions. What is more, this scholarship has focused on the prevalence of foreign 
investment into Soviet industrial rather than agricultural sectors, as well as demonstrating 
the failure of the Soviet state to organize a coherent concession policy.295 While there have 
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been several historical studies on foreign agricultural projects that utilized the Russian 
Reconstruction Farms to demonstrate American attempts to organize model farms in the 
Soviet Union, they have not investigated the RRF as a “laboratory” for the development and 
exchange of agricultural knowledge and expertise between the Soviet Union and the United 
States during the 1920s.296  
This chapter examines the Russian Reconstruction Farms and its mission to transform 
the geographical space of Maslov Kut into a farm “laboratory” where ideas about the future 
of agricultural modernization were developed and contested by various actors.297 In doing 
so, the RRF was an experimental ground for testing ideas not only about large-scale 
production but also farm training. Further, this chapter shows the intentions of the RRF in 
                                                                                                                                                
Vladimir Bulatov, and Ekaterina Furman, “Inostrannii kapital i trudovie resursy v Nizhnem 
Povolzh’e v 1920-1930-e gg.,” Vestnik Volgogradskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta 4, 
no. 3 (2004): 26-; E.G. Shiriaeva, “Legitimatsia i stanovlenie selskokhoziastvennoi 
kontsesii v ekonomicheskoi praktike severo-kavkazskogo regiona v 1920-kh godakh,” 
Vestnik Stavropolskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta, no. 71 (2010): 62-68; S.V. 
Zhuravlev, “Malen’kie liudi” i “bol’shaia istoriia.” Inostrantsy moskovskogo 
Elektrozavoda v sovetskom obshchestve 1920-1930-kh gg. (Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2000); 
Taisia Iudina, “Sotsialno-trudovie konflikty na kontsessionnykh predpriatiakh SSSR v 
1920-e gg.,” Novyi istoricheskii vestnik, no. 19 (2009): 45-53; M.M. Zagorulko and V.V. 
Bulatov, “’Nekapitalisticheskie’ inostrannie kontsesii v SSSR,” Vestnik Volgogradskogo 
gosudarstvennogo universiteta 4, no. 1 (2012): 51-58; O.Iu. Red’kina, 
Selskokhoziaistvennie religioznie trudovye kollektivy v 1917-1930-e gody: na materialakh 
evropeiskoi chasti RSFSR (Volgograd: Izdatelstvo VolGU, 2004). 
 
296 Jonathan Dekel-Chen, “An Unlikely Triangle: Philanthropists, Commissars, and 
American Statesmanship Meet in Soviet Crimea, 1922-1937,” Diplomatic History 27, no. 3 
(June 2003): 366 (pp. 353-376); Deborah Fitzgerald, “Blinded by Technology: American 
Agriculture in the Soviet Countryside, 1928-1932,” Agricultural History 70, no. 3 (1996): 
459-486; Deborah Fitzgerald, Every Farm a Factory: The Industrial Ideal in American 
Agriculture (Yale University Press, 2010). In her work, Fitzgerald mentions that “there is 
very little written on Russian Reconstruction Farms.” Footnote 5 in Fitzgerald, Every Farm 
a Factory, 230. 
 
297 Henri Lefebvre, The Production of Space, trans. D. Nicholson-Smith (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1991); David Harvey, Justice, Nature and the Geography of Difference (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1996); J.E. Malpas, Place and Experience: A Philosophical Topography 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). 
  
 
126 
making this space a global site for agrarian socialist experiments. The ultimate hope of 
those who participated in this exchange was that these experiments could be replicated 
beyond the Soviet Union.298 Finally, by examining the educational plan of the RRF, this 
chapter also shows how plans, agricultural knowledge, and notions of locality were co-
produced through processes of exchange.299  
 
A. Farming for Solutions: The American Farm Problem and the Path to the Russian 
Reconstruction Farms, 1923 
Upon his return to the United States from his project with the Toikino tractor unit in 
early 1923, Harold Ware resumed his work as an Agrarian Organizer for the Workers’ Party 
of America (WPA). He came away from this experience in Toikino assured that educating 
farmers in order to narrow the ideological divide between them and urban labor was key to 
solving the American agrarian problem. In a four-page proposal for the WPA, Ware offered 
a hybrid solution. For his “fundamental remedies” for the U.S. farm problem included the 
transformation of the “working farmer” into a landowner, liberating them from banks while 
nodding to the American cultural value of land ownership, and organizing them into “farm 
labor unions,” structurally similar to those of the city. In addition, Ware proposed to create 
farm organizations that would put farmers in charge of production, distribution, and 
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marketing, as well as credit operations. To accomplish this goal, Ware sought to establish 
the United Farmers Educational League as a central organization. While Ware received 
support of his initiatives from farmers he met traveling across rural America in 1923, the 
WPA ultimately rejected his proposal.300 
Undaunted by the WPA’s rejection, in August 1923, Ware informed its Central 
Committee that he planned to resign from his post in order to launch a new agricultural 
project in Russia.301 Dissatisfied with the inability to realize his vision in the U.S., Ware felt 
that the desperate situation of the Soviet countryside would provide an opportunity for such 
a venture. While drafting his a proposal for his new “Russian Farm Project,” Ware lamented 
the WPA did not have anyone who was motivated to assist him with “Agrarian Party work.” 
As such, he believed that his decision to leave the Party and return to Soviet Russia would 
pay off.302 
In October 1923, Harold Ware returned to Moscow with preliminary ideas about the 
new project that would later be name the Russian Reconstruction Farms. Having arrived, he 
immediately set himself the task of assisting with the organization of the First International 
Peasant Conference in which 158 delegates from around the world would participate later 
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that month.303 This conference marked the establishment of the Red Peasant International 
(Krestintern) and its governing body, the International Peasant Council.304 The Council 
brought together leaders of left-wing agrarian parties and peasant associations from Europe, 
Asia, and America. Among his fellow delegates were two American representatives: W.H. 
Green and Otto Anstrom, the latter having previously worked with Ware in Toikino.305   
Ware’s interest in the Peasant conference in Moscow was two-fold. First, he shared 
ideas proclaimed by Tomasz Dombal, an influential Polish communist and the leading 
spokesman at the conference, who argued that the agrarian question was the weakest part of 
communist parties’ agenda. In accord with Dombal, Ware believed the future of socialism 
necessitated finding the right form of cooperation between workers and peasants/farmers.306 
Second, in his correspondence with the Central Committee of the WPA, Ware indicated his 
intention to pitch the Russian Farm project to Soviet authorities in attendance. In the end, 
both Ware and Green “were given credentials in Moscow to make a survey in the Ukraine” 
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for potential farmland for their project. At the conclusion of the conference, Ware and 
Green traveled to Ukraine where they spent “two weeks looking over lands suitable to this 
project.” To ensure against any unforeseen difficulties and or misunderstandings, they also 
met with Soviet officials in the Department of Agriculture of the Ukraine.307 
For the Soviets, Ware’s plan to establish a large-scale agricultural enterprise was a 
welcome venture. As a part of the New Economic Policy (1921-1927), the new Soviet state 
sought to reconstruct and develop its economy by attracting foreign investment. While the 
concession policy led to heated debates among some Bolsheviks who viewed it as a 
compromise with capitalism, the dire need for economic reconstruction, modernization of 
technologies, and the attraction of qualified workers prevailed over ideological concerns. 
After the Soviets announced the beginning of the foreign concession policy, many foreign 
investors jumped at the opportunity to invest into the most profitable industries, such as 
timber, gold, oil, metalworking, and railway construction. Soviet state officials, however, 
desired foreign investment into agricultural enterprises above all.308  
Since 1923, the People’s Commissariat of Agriculture (Narkomzem) and the Main 
Concession Committee (GKK) worked tirelessly to attract foreign capital to the Soviet 
countryside. After surveying available lands, Soviet authorities determined the Don district 
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of Ukraine, the Volga region, and the North Caucasus area near Piatigorsk would be best 
suited for foreign agricultural ventures. According to the Soviet authorities, the North 
Caucasus, in particular, were in dire need of intervention with regard to agricultural 
reconstruction. As a result, during 1923-1924, the Soviets signed contracts with three 
foreign concessions in the North Caucasus: the Friedrich Krupp of Essen company, a seed-
growing concession to Deutsche-Russische Saatbau A-G (Drusag), and the Prikumskoe 
Russian-American Association (the Soviet title for Ware’s Russian Reconstruction 
Farms).309  
Yet, before signing the contract with the Americans, a heated debate ensued between 
Soviet central and regional authorities in September 1924. The Soviet authorities at 
Narkomzem had a keen interest in the American agricultural project. In accord with the 
Narkomzem, the Regional Executive Committee of the Southeastern Region (Krai) 
supported the initiative, commenting favorably on Harold Ware’s previous experiments in 
the Toikino village.310 The Regional Land Administration of the Southeastern Region, on 
the other hand, openly criticized the investment of the American capital into the area. Being 
suspicious of foreign capital and disinterested in ceding any authority to the Americans, it 
argued that the Russian Reconstruction Farms threatened the future of communism in the 
village. That central officials insisted that the RRF be established in a sovkhoz in Maslov 
Kut, an area already thriving under regional administration, further irked local and regional 
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officials. Moreover, they asserted the RRF sought to use this “powerful sovkhoz” to set up a 
motor-tractor station (MTS) in which Ware and his associates would seemingly profit from 
selling American tractors to other nearby sovkhozes.311  
Ultimately, the authority of the central government won out and a compromise was 
reached. In ruling in favor of Ware’s project, the administration assured local and regional 
officials that the Americans would only bring as many tractors as were necessary to operate 
in the region, and Ware’s group agreed to provide sufficient capital to rehabilitate the 
Southeastern Agricultural Trust (IuVSeltrest) in return for the land concession.312 Though 
ultimately agreeing to these terms, the opposition of local and regional authorities to the 
RRF did not dissipate. This ongoing tension between them and the RRF would determine 
the character of relationships between the Americans and local institutions for the 
foreseeable future. 
In November 1924, the Soviet central authorities in the Narkomzem finalized the RRF 
concession in Maslov Kut. In his letter to the Main Concession Committee, Alexander 
Smirnov, Head of the Narkomzem, assured that the work of the RRF would have the utmost 
positive affect on the development of local agriculture, including bringing much-needed 
agricultural equipment and capital (200,000 rubles).313 The concession consisted of 15,000 
acres to establish an “exemplary farm founded on the mechanization of agriculture and 
                                               
311 Letter from Odintsov to [unknown]. September 9, 1924. RGAE, f. 478, op. 2, d. 928, 
19. Odintsov was the Head of the Regional Land Administration (Kraizemupravlenie). 
 
312 “Protokol Soveshchaniia po predlozheniiu gruppy amerikantsev o sovmestnoi rabote 
s Iuvseltrestom gruppy sovkhozov Prikumskogo raiona,” September 30, 1924, RGAE, f. 
478, op. 2, d. 928, l. 40-41. 
 
313 “Pismo narkoma zemledeliia RSFSR A.P. Smirnova v Glavkontsesskom pri 
Sovnarkome SSSR ob organizatsii Prikumskogo russko-amerikanskogo tovarishchestva,” 
November 5, 1924, RGAE, f. 478, op. 2, d. 928, l. 9-9 ob. 
  
 
132 
rational utilization of all… lands.”314 In addition, the Narkomzem openly encouraged the 
RRF to turn the area into an agricultural educational training base for future farm workers 
and agricultural scientists.315  
These negotiations with the Soviets and regional authorities, along with organizing the 
operation stateside, exhausted Harold Ware. In addition to persuading Soviet authorities in 
the viability of the project, Ware had to find funding for the whole enterprise. From 
February to November 1924, he sought credit from American manufacturers who he hoped 
would be interested in Soviet business. With the help of Frank P. Walsh, a left-wing New 
York attorney, Ware incorporated the Russian Reconstruction Farms to sell any and all that 
“have money and are interested in Russia,” including those with “a desire to help” or merely 
an “axe to grind.”316 By promoting this company through public campaigns and appeals, 
Ware and his colleagues were able to attract support of many prominent investors, including 
Jane Addams, Roger N. Baldwin, Sophonisba Breckenridge, whose names would appear on 
the official letterhead of the Russian Reconstruction Farms. Yet, after dealing with this all 
year, Ware confided in his mother and prominent socialist organizer, Ella Reeve Bloor: 
“My God, I’m nearly at the end of my rope – I’ve been playing with these darn liberals and 
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alleged radicals for over a year. I’ve just about put it over and I’m ready to raise my right 
hand and say ‘never again’ but… I tell you it’s needed.”317  
For Harold Ware, the Russian Reconstruction Farms represented more than an 
opportunity to aid the Soviet countryside and teaching peasants how to operate tractors. In a 
another letter to his mother, Ware openly admitted: “I’m not sentimental over Russia – 
never was – but … I need this training and so do some other agrarian workers I know.”318 
While emphasizing the importance and “need for this [reconstruction] work in Russia,” 
Ware envisioned the RRF as an experimental laboratory with “infinite” possibilities where 
solutions to the problems that beset American agriculture could be found.319 Ware lamented 
that many farmers and policymakers in the U.S. had accepted the lack of strong 
cooperatives and well-defined rights as “a necessary evil.”320 Those who shared his 
concerns, he continued, were making “the mistake of searching for its solution in European 
test tubes.” 321 Instead, Ware argued, the solution could be found on Soviet soil. In contrast 
to the United States, Soviet Russia had developed “the only real cooperation of farmers.”322  
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As a result, as a part of the RRF mission, Ware wanted to bring American non-
communist farmers to witness the possibilities demonstrated by the Soviet reality. These 
“young” Americans, who were familiar with the “desperate conditions of the independent 
farmer in the United States,” would be best able to absorb the experience of Soviet 
cooperation.323 Afterwards, “these young men” would come back to the American “farm 
country with the authority of men who have done it, and know how it can be done.”324 
Thus, in Ware’s mind, the Russian Reconstruction Farms would become an experimental 
training ground for American farmers and agrarian-minded communist organizers, like 
Ware himself, to “get revolutionary and practical experience” in organizing large-scale 
farming enterprises and effective agricultural cooperation. And the only price to be paid 
was sharing the “technique” with the Soviets.325  
 
B. Plans for the Organization of a “Living Laboratory,” 1924 
From theoretical plans developed for the RRF by American scientists and experts to the 
actual work on the farm, Ware approached the Russian Reconstruction Farms as an 
agricultural experiment based on scientific foundations. In its promotional campaigns, the 
Russian Reconstruction Farms advertised its work as “constructive philanthropy,” claiming 
that its organizational plan was “the result of more than a year of systematic, persistent 
                                               
323 Letter from Ware to Bloor, November 29, 1924, n RGASPI, f. 515, op.1, d. 410, 21; 
“Outline of Organization and Operation of Russian Reconstruction Farms, Inc.” in Papers 
of Leonard Knight Elmhirst, Memoranda, LKE/OVR/R/1/B, Devon Heritage Services, 
Devon, U.K. 
 
324 “Outline of Organization and Operation of Russian Reconstruction Farms, Inc.” in 
Papers of Leonard Knight Elmhirst, Memoranda, LKE/OVR/R/1/B, Devon Heritage 
Services, Devon, U.K. 
 
325 Letter from Ware to Bloor, November 29, 1924, in RGASPI, f. 515, op.1, d. 410, 21. 
  
 
135 
planning by qualified members of the group.”326 Moreover, RRF emphasized its American 
employees’ expertise by portraying them as “trained and experienced in different fields of 
agriculture, mechanics, management or building.”327 Many of them, the organization 
stressed, had previous experience conducting agricultural reconstruction work in Russia.328 
Others had background in engineering, home economics, and social work. Thus, in 
directing their supporters’ attention to its “systematic” approach and “qualified” experts, the 
RRF underscored the expertise and scientific foundations of its operation. 
At the heart of the RRF program was more than just the planting and cultivation of 
15,000 acres of Soviet land. Rather, the organization sought to transform the land, local 
people, and infrastructure into a large agricultural educational experiment. According to the 
official proposal, the RRF identified that present Soviet farms “had little educational value” 
because “of the primitive methods” they “employed.” The RRF’s goal was to install a new 
infrastructure of workshops, an agricultural school, and an experiment station to “teach 
selected peasants in short courses during the growing season.” In addition, its plans for 
educational experiments included not only adults but also children. The organization 
planned “to establish an institution for training young famine orphans” to become future 
farmers. Both RRF plans fit well into the Soviet grand strategy of the “five-year educational 
plan among the peasants to prevent future famines through the use of improved methods, 
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seeds, and machinery.”329 This educational mission would become a central project for the 
RRF. 
Before arriving in Russia in July 1925, Harold Ware together with Charles Kuntz, a 
former professor of psychology at Columbia University, drafted a plan for a new 
agricultural school.330 The school was to enroll 15-18-year old boys and girls from 
neighboring villages and former soldier-peasants who returned to their villages from the 
Civil War. These students would both study and work by actively participating in the 
process of agricultural production under the supervision of their “’teacher-workers.’”331 
This educational process combined theory and practice, according to Kuntz, fulfilling “the 
function of higher education” by facilitating a more effective transfer of knowledge to any 
work environment through fostering a much faster learning process. Kuntz believed, 
students would be able to acquire not only technical skills but also knowledge of proper 
social organization. One of the goals that Kuntz proclaimed in his proposal was to present 
Soviet peasants with modern methods of cooperative production as the best way of social 
and economic organization. In doing so, he hoped to transform peasants into “self-
supporting... [and] self-educating” individuals.332 
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Ware supplemented Kuntz’s educational plan with his vision of the RRF as a model for 
a self-sustaining unit of agricultural production. By looking at the Russian Reconstruction 
Farms as a laboratory of agricultural knowledge and production, Ware hoped to “gradually 
replace the hundred or so workers now employed” at the farm “with students.” Upon 
arriving at the farm, students would be employed in newer projects as workers, eventually 
replacing those workers who were occupied in older projects. Together, new students and 
experienced workers would be engaged in the development of a model experiment station 
and the school, which would function as a “a center for ideas and equipment.” As these 
students would be involved not only in farming but also in the construction of this 
experiment themselves, Ware asserted the RRF spaces would become “actual living 
laboratories, extending the principle of utilizing the labor element beyond the seasonal 
limitations of the general farm work.” His utmost hope was that this productive process 
would eventually reach the manufacturing stage. In Ware’s view, when this point in the 
development was achieved, it was possible to establish “canning factories, oil mills, and 
new industrial enterprises to work up the raw products of the farm” at the RRF farm.333  
To Ware, the establishment of the “living laboratory” was incomplete without a 
program for the reorganization of social life of RRF employees, their families, and local 
people from surrounding villages. Beyond providing a “well-rounded education” to future 
peasant-workers at a new agricultural school, Ware intended to educate future students and 
their families about the basics of domestic science, including hygiene and sanitation.334 In 
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recruiting the team for the Russian Reconstruction Farms, Ware considered those 
experienced in farming and those who were able to conduct social work on the RRF farm to 
be of particular value. Among the members of the first unit deployed to Maslov Kut were 
Hilda Holms (domestic science expert with famine relief experience in France, Germany, 
and Poland), Caroline E. Wilson (a graduate of Harvard and Cornell Universities who 
joined the team as the manager of the Home Economics Division), Dorothy L. Muller (a 
teacher), and Hannah M. Pickering (an educational and social worker with famine relief 
experience in Poland and Russia).335 These women were in charge of establishing schools 
for nurseries, elementary schools, and medical services on the farm, in addition to educating 
adult population about the advantages of these social and educational institutions. 
For Ware, the significance of the new agricultural school and other social institutions 
went beyond the borders of the Russian Reconstruction Farms project. In his educational 
plan, Ware proclaimed that the RRF space offered a unique opportunity to experiment with 
the “principles of the New School” that, to his regret, had only “isolated expressions” in the 
United States. Established in 1919 by progressive intellectuals, such as Charles Beard, John 
Dewey, and Thorstein Veblen among others, the New School created a more egalitarian, 
more free model of higher education for adults where common people could learn from and 
exchange ideas with scholars and artists.336 In contrast to the United States where this 
school was perceived as radical and unconventional, Soviet Russia, according to Ware, was 
ready to embrace these educational ideas by offering its space for this type of educational 
experiments. Moreover, Ware argued that the establishment of this educational experiment 
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had a wider “scientific importance.” In addition to the organization of the school, he 
planned to construct “facilities” for “American educators, graduate students, writers, 
publicists, and other interested in the new school who want to study these processes in 
actual operation.” According to his plan, the Russian Reconstruction Farms would 
accommodate these groups, providing them with visa support and offering them place to 
stay for short periods of time to conduct research.337 
In sum, the planning stages of the Russian Reconstruction Farms revealed that Harold 
Ware envisioned the Maslov Kut space as much more than an experiment in large-scale 
farming. For him, the vast landscape of the Terskii district offered an opportunity to rethink 
the principles of social and economic organization of human life and to test these ideas in 
practice. Regarding the RRF as a “living laboratory,” Ware hoped that this experiment 
would function as a collaborative project for both American and Soviet scientists to try out 
innovative ideas to disseminate then these ideas further in the world. 
 
C. Farm “Laboratory”: Experimenting for a New Agrarian Future, 1925 
After their arrival in Maslov Kut in July of 1925, Harold Ware and his team spent the 
next eight months organizing life and work at the Russian Reconstruction Farms. During 
this time, the RRF sought to make the first steps towards the development of effective farm 
production. This process depended both on the introduction of agricultural machinery and 
on the reorganization of the social and educational landscape on the farm. The latter 
particularly mattered. The implementation of the educational plan ensured the development 
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of a new trained farm worker whom the RRF needed to accomplish its production goals. 
Additionally, the RRF hoped that the accomplishments of these first eight months would 
demonstrate the world the effectiveness of its enterprise and would attract more experts to 
work and contribute to the development of the project. 
When the Soviet inspection visited the farm in the fall of 1925, it reported to Alexander 
Smirnov, head of the Narkomzem, about the first successes of Ware’s venture. Among the 
achievements, the report listed the electrification of several buildings and the reconstruction 
of houses and horse stalls. Further, the report noted the RRF had established a machine shop 
that functioned both as a repair and training base for local peasants to gain skills in 
repairing farm machinery. The shop became such a “hive of industry” that the Soviet 
Department of Trade recognized as the “official service station of the entire district.” This 
status had its obvious advantages, as it turned the RRF machine shop into a “depot” for 
repair parts.338  As a result, the RRF would receive parts for broken machinery without the 
delays that were commonplace elsewhere in the region. This designation ensured that farm 
production would not be unnecessarily delayed by broken machinery. 
 In addition to the machine shop and the reorganization of infrastructure, the RRF 
began work on its mission to transform not only the landscape but also local people into 
new agrarian workers through education. In the summer of 1925, the RRF established a new 
school for the first ten peasant students where they would learn to operate tractors and other 
agricultural machinery. In addition, the organization took on five boys (age 12-16) from a 
local orphanage in order to train them into qualified agricultural workers. The boys’ 
education, according to the report, combined theoretical and practical training: they 
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attended school during the first half of the day and worked at different agricultural 
worksites in the afternoon. Yet, farm education, according to the RRF plan, went beyond 
theoretical and practical knowledge of agriculture. 
In the interest of introducing the value of physical health and proper hygiene, the 
Ware’s team repurposed an old warehouse into a “modest ‘gym’” so that both American 
and Russian workers and peasants could improve their physical health. According to RRF 
reports, the American “gym” was so popular that RRF members had to “organize nightly 
classes averaging twenty members to care for the many who wish[ed] to use it.”339 This 
activity went hand in hand with the Soviet emphasis on the importance of physical culture 
in a daily routine of the new Soviet citizen.340 For the Soviets, fizkul’tura (physical culture) 
represented an ideological and political instrument for training, educating, and uniting 
peasants and workers that became one of the central goals as a part of the modernization 
plan in the mid-1920s.341 
The RRF also organized a Russian-American school, attended by ten American and 
twenty-five children of Soviet workers who were employed by the organization.342 For 
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infants and toddlers, RRF social workers established a day nursery, which according to 
Jessica Smith, Ware’s wife and a former Quaker relief worker, was fiercely opposed by the 
older women in the village. Sitting in the corner of a village meeting room “enveloped in 
[their] great shubas,” these Russian “babas” defended the old ways of raising children. 
Spuriously, they claimed that Americans would take their babies away until they paid taxes 
and argued that “the Godless ones” would “take the crosses” from the children’s necks.343 
Despite this resistance, the nursery functioned throughout the existence of the RRF project 
and beyond. In the end, it served not only as a daycare for young children but also as a 
training ground for Soviet early education specialists who arrived to Maslov Kut from 
Moscow and other cities.  
News about RRF’s educational experiments and its agricultural reconstruction work on 
the farm reached beyond the central bureaucratic Soviet institutions in Moscow. Beginning 
in late winter 1926, the American branch of the RRF actively promoted its Russian work by 
sending RRF bulletins to “interested” Americans and organizing informational evenings and 
concerts.344 In March-April 1926, Donald Stephens, head of the RRF American branch, 
organized concerts in which famous singers of Russian descent, including Feodor Chaliapin 
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and Isa Kremer, performed.345 Among the attendees of these concerts were prominent 
American public figures, such as Arthur Hayes, Lillian D. Wald, Arthur Calhoun, Hazel 
MacKaye, Oswald Garrison Villard, and John Lovejoy Elliott.346  
In addition, the American RRF branch did not hesitate to reach out to former members 
of the American Relief Administration and Herbert Hoover’s other former colleagues in 
seeking support for the project. In March-May 1926, Jessica Smith corresponded with 
James Goodrich, then Governor of Illinois and former Special Investigator for the ARA 
Russian Unit, about the possibility of his involvement in the RRF. Appealing to Goodrich’s 
interest in Russian affairs and “constructive work” that he himself “advocated after he “had 
been in Russia,” Smith hoped to use his support to reach a wider public in Indiana to raise 
funds for the project.347 Support of people, like Goodrich or Villard, with prominent status 
in American political and social work, legitimized the significance of the Russian 
Reconstruction Farms project in the eyes of the American public and, undoubtedly, helped 
with further funding of American work on the Soviet land.   
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While raising funds to continue sponsoring the venture was an important part of the 
RRF American campaigns, its second, and more important, goal of its stateside campaigns 
was to attract the attention of those scientists and agricultural experts who might be 
interested in seeing and participating in the project themselves.348 Exploiting his 
international connections, Donald Stephens reached out to Leonard Elmhirst, a British 
agronomist, in the summer months of 1926. Elmhirst was known for his extensive 
agricultural work in India, where he worked alongside Rabindranath Tagore and for the 
Dartington Hall project that he organized with his wife in 1925. Stephens perceived the 
mission of the Dartington Hall project in organizizing model farming, forestry, and 
educational experiments, to be closely related to the goals of the Russian Reconstruction 
Farms. In 1926 and then again in 1927, Stephens invited Elmhirst to visit Maslov Kut to 
witness the Soviet agricultural reconstruction in action. Yet, while Elmhirst showed 
enthusiasm in his letters about the RRF initiative, he never made the trip to the North 
Caucasus.349 
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Despite several failed attempts to allure agricultural experts to visit the RRF, the 
American branch’s campaigns and personal connections succeeded in attracting attention of 
Clarence Stein, one of the leading American urban planners and a co-founder of the 
Regional Planning Association of America (RPAA).350 Together with Lewis Mumford and 
Benton MacKaye, Stein founded the RPAA to break away from traditional housing and 
planning ideas. Rather than focusing on projects that emphasized private profit, the RPAA 
sought to create innovative, planned environments that would function in harmony with 
humankind’s social, psychological and biological needs.351 At the time, RPAA members 
were working on the development of the Garden City movement, and Stein envisioned the 
RRF as an exciting opportunity to test some of its principles.352 
Intrigued by Harold Ware’s plans to transform the RRF into a self-sustaining unit of 
agricultural production and manufacturing, Stein perceived Maslov Kut as an alternative to 
Garden City and offered the RPAA expertise in planning out the space. In January 1926, 
Stein approached MacKaye to draft a report for the RRF. Known for his research in 
cooperative farming and indigenous settlements along the Appalachian Trail, MacKaye was 
a prime candidate for the project. From February to April 1926, MacKaye worked in 
                                               
350 It is possible that Stuart Chase, who worked for the RRF as General Counsel and was 
associated with the RPAA, informed Clarence Stein about the Russian Reconstruction 
Farms project. 
 
351 The full list of the RPAA membership is Clarence Stein, Henry Wright, and 
Frederick Lee Ackerman (planner-architects); Benton MacKaye (conservationist and 
regionalist); Lewis Mumford and Charles Whitacker (urban critics); Alexander Bing 
(realtor); Stuart Chase (economist); Catherine Bauer (housing specialist). Roy Lubove, 
Community Planning in the 1920’s: The Contribution of the Regional Planning Association 
of America (Pittsburgh, 1963); Mark B. Lapping, “Radburn: Planning the American 
Community,” in Neil L. Shumsky, ed., The Physical City: Public Space and the 
Infrastructure (London: Routledge, 2013): 85. 
 
352 Kristin E. Larsen, Community Architect: The Life and Vision of Clarence S. Stein 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2016), 82. 
  
 
146 
Washington, D.C., studying the Russian terrain in libraries, consulting with experts in the 
U.S. Department of Agriculture, the U.S. Department of Labor, and the Washington office 
of the Russian Information Service.353 
In April, MacKaye presented a meticulous regional planning report to Stein. MacKaye’s 
study focused on the possibility of extending the RRF methods of agriculture throughout the 
Archangelskii raion (county). In addition to addressing such topics the artel development, 
crop rotation, seasonal distribution of labor, and problems of agricultural and non-
agricultural populations, MacKaye provided detailed charts that addressed most effective 
ways of the RRF spatial organization (fig. 1). Moreover, responding to Ware’s concerns 
about the establishment of manufacturing in the region, MacKaye devoted several sections 
of the report to plan the proper organization, proposing several potential profitable 
industries for the community. In the end, however, MacKaye concluded that results of the 
planning report were limited by his inability to conduct a local study of the region himself. 
As a result, he warned his colleagues that some ideas might be a subject to change.354 In 
fact, MacKaye’s words were prophetic. When, inspired by MacKaye’s report, Stein traveled 
to Maslov Kut in the summer of 1927, he severely doubted the transferability of MacKaye’s 
plan from America to Russia.355 
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MacKaye’s regional plan never materialized in the Archangelskii raion. However, the 
intent of the RPAA and the RRF in planning the Maslov Kut environment shows the extent 
to which American experts perceived Soviet Russia and its geography as valuable space for 
experimentation with a potential to transfer of ideas back to the United States. Moreover, 
the interest of the RPAA in Ware’s RRF project illustrates attempts to develop 
unconventional visions of urban and rural planning both in the United States and the Soviet 
Union. In doing so, Ware’s vision of modernity, influenced by his readings of Marx and 
Lenin, corresponded with Stein and MacKaye’s views of future planning. All three 
envisioned self-sustaining small farm communities as a representation of the future of 
agriculture and living. Finally, Stein’s questioning of the ability to transfer theoretical ideas 
developed in one country to another country raises questions about the extent to which the 
border between the RPAA “laboratory” and the RRF “field” prevented the introduction of 
rural planning ideas.356 The attempts to navigate the “border” between actual farming and 
the “training laboratory” proved difficult for RRF organizers as well.  
 
D. The RRF Summer Program: A Gulley Between Theory and Practice, 1926 
In May 1926, the Russian Reconstruction Farms began preparations for its summer 
student program. Twenty new students were to join the RRF experimental farm for a four-
week program.357 After the initial organization and construction stages during the 1925 
season, the RRF was ready to fully introduce its educational program. Yet, not everything 
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went according to plan. The RRF summer student program of 1926 revealed much about 
the difficulty of implementing an agricultural education program in practice. Delineating 
actual farming from farm training became a point of concern and frustration both among 
RRF members and students. Moreover, the introduction of this student program exposed 
internal collisions among students and confrontations between the RRF and local Soviet 
institutions that affected the overall quality of the educational program.  
Before the program even began, several American members of the RRF doubted the 
compatibility of the summer educational experiment and the RRF farming goals for the 
1926 season. Karl Borders, the RRF Educational Director, reported that American experts 
and farmers expressed “violent prejudice” against the introduction of students to the farm. 
In their view, all educational projects had to be deferred until farm production was fully 
established. More important, many farmers were worried that the student program and the 
teaching process, in general, would detract the crew from the establishment of a productive 
farm. Borders himself shared this view. Yet, due to the fact that the Narkomzem provided 
funds for the development of the program at the farm, Harold Ware “was determined to see 
it through.”358 
The debate over the summer program among the members of the RRF revealed an 
inherent conflict with regard to the proper balance between actual farming in the “field” and 
farm training in the “laboratory,” or training school. In Ware’s vision, theoretical and 
practical trainings could coexist and would provide the most productive environment for the 
transfer of modern American agricultural knowledge to the Soviets. In reality, it proved 
impossible. Within the first few weeks, the RRF had to reconsider its preliminary 
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educational plan. Instead of alternating weeks of working in the field with weeks of 
studying at school, the needs of the farm meant students were put on a regular work 
schedule. The promised theoretical training was conducted only three times a week after the 
workday.359 This shift from education to farm production put a sizeable dent their initial 
plans.360   
In reducing the importance of farm education, the RRF transformed students into 
laborers. The emphasis on work in the fields and the lack of theoretical instruction, 
according to the students’ report, curtailed their ability to learn more about the structure and 
organization of large-scale farming, which was, for many, what they hoped to accomplish 
most while observing the RRF. Instead, students had to work with other laborers and 
farmers in the fields “from fourteen to sixteen hours per day for more than a month.”361 
Some could not cope with the task, and left the program after finding this labor to be too 
“strenuous.” Other students had to be transferred to less demanding jobs, such as the repair 
department in the machine shop.362 Overall, while some American RRF members praised 
the advantages of being able to “advance” farm production, many students became 
disillusioned.363  
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Students’ frustration was further exacerbated by internal social and religious conflicts 
between them and local Soviet authorities. From May to mid-July 1926, different groups of 
students arrived to the Russian Reconstruction Farms from various Soviet regions, including 
Vladimir, Moscow, Kostroma, Leningrad, Tula, Tver’ etc.364 Those who arrived earlier in 
May were put to work on constructing their summer quarters. Unlike in 1925, students were 
recruited not only from neighboring peasant villages but also from professional agricultural 
colleges and universities. In early 1926, Harold Ware and the Dean of the Timiriazev 
Agricultural Academy (TSKhA), one of the leading agricultural universities in the Soviet 
Union, signed the agreement to accommodate ten TSKhA students at the RRF.365 In 
addition to TSA students, ten young members of the Union of Russian Evangelicals (URE) 
joined the RRF summer student program. The presence of evangelical students was the 
result of the RRF’s strong spiritual connections with the Russian chapter of the American 
Christian Missionary Society (ACMS) and the RRF dependence of the Quakers’ funds. To 
educate ten evangelical students in the summer student program at the RRF, the American 
Christian Missionary Society donated three thousand dollars.366 The “presence” of “the 
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Evangelicals” and “anti-religious boys from the Academy,” according to Karl Borders, the 
RRF Educational Director, “projected itself as a problem from the first day.”367 
This configuration of the student group was troublesome on many levels. The presence 
of a religious group on a Soviet state farm caused anti-religious sentiments within the 
student group and sparked an anti-religious “hysteria” among local Soviet officials. As RRF 
members failed to notify local Soviet authorities about the presence of evangelical students 
on the farm, the local police decided that the RRF was using the sovkhoz to “covertly house 
a deep laid religious plot.” During the investigation, three evangelical students were 
summoned to the county court and accused of holding a “public religious meeting.” Such 
reactions came as the result of the general anti-religious Soviet policy towards sectarian 
groups, including evangelicals.368 Since the early 1920s, the Soviet state treated religious 
minorities as anti-Soviet counter-revolutionaries and kulak-inspired movements.369 In the 
end, the conflict between the RRF and the local police was resolved after chief of the local 
police advised evangelical students to “stick to farming” while they worked at the RRF 
farm. 
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 In addition to the collision with the local police over religion, conflicts among 
students arose due to different levels of their technical expertise in agriculture. TSKhA 
students argued that they deserved a higher pay for their work because they were trained at 
one of the leading agricultural universities in the Soviet Union. Meanwhile, evangelical 
students contended that they worked as hard as TSKhA students and should be paid as well 
as others. To ameliorate the situation, the RRF was forced to appropriate more funds to 
increase the pay of both groups by several rubles. This conflict, however, uncovered a 
larger problem than an increase in pay or work ethic. According to Karl Borders, the 
Educational Director, these tensions over differences in “technical training” created 
“superiority” and “inferiority” complexes among students. The diversity of educational, as 
well as social and religious, backgrounds was something that the RRF did not take into 
consideration when planning the program.370  
When the RRF invited students for summer internships at the RRF promising them four 
weeks of intensive farm training, a substantial salary, and decent accommodations, it could 
not predict the amount of problems and conflicts it would encounter. Yet, in spite of all 
these tensions, collisions, and disruptions, the RRF summer student program was not 
abandoned by its organizers nor by Soviet educational institutions. While the TSKhA 
students’ report was filled with complaints the RRF program, TSKhA students hoped that 
the collaboration between the RRF and the Timiriazev Agricultural Academy would 
continue.371 In fact, their hopes were realized.  
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In April 1927, the Narkomzem organized another set of summer internships for TSKhA 
students at the RRF farm. In his letter to TSKhA Department Chairs, the Narkomzem 
official, Martin Latsis, wrote that the Academy should send eight students to the RRF: three 
from the Department of Engineering; three – Economics (specializing on large-scale 
farming); two – the Department of Agriculture.372 In addition to TSKhA, now the 
Narkomzem required other educational institutions to send their students to the RRF. For 
instance, the Leningrad Polytechnic Institute sent its students from the Department of 
Industrial Agriculture to the RRF.373 Thus, the Narkomzem regarded the RRF, its 
educational plan, and its agricultural reconstruction work to be a fertile training ground for 
future Soviet specialists in agriculture, economics, and engineering.  
 
*** 
While Harold Ware applauded the “huge progress” that the Russian Reconstruction 
Farms achieved by the end of 1927, stressing its accomplishments in mechanization, the 
utility of the data it collected for other Soviet sovkhozes, and its educational programs, by 
November 1927, Ware knew that his work in Maslov Kut was coming to an end.374 The lack 
of funding from the American branch of the RRF, the inability to pay off RRF debts to 
American companies, and growing tensions between Ware and both regional authorities 
(Regional Land Administration) and central authorities (Narkomzem) raised questions about 
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the future existence of the Russian Reconstruction Farms.375 By early 1928, Ware and his 
American team members left Maslov Kut, never to return.  
While the Russian Reconstruction Farms ceased its operations in North Caucasus, the 
Narkomzem and Southeastern regional authorities did not abandon the large-scale farming 
experiment that the RRF had developed. In 1928, the Narkomzem tried to persuade the 
Main Concessions Committee (GKK) to transform the RRF farm from a concession to a 
sovkhoz. In doing so, the RRF farm would be under the jurisdiction of the Narkomzem. In 
its desire to obtain the RRF large-scale farm, the Narkomzem went as far as to offer the 
GKK to financially support the farm because the Narkomzem was sure of its profitability.376  
The RRF’s significance, however, lay not only in its future profits. The American 
experiment in large-scale farming in the Soviet countryside revealed attempts of diverse 
groups to utilize Maslov Kut as an experimental ground to test ideas about the efficient 
organization of modern agriculture during the mid-1920s. Beyond farm mechanization, 
these experiments included attempts to revolutionize agricultural education, rural planning, 
and social norms in the countryside. Like in any laboratory, theory could not always sustain 
a clash with reality. Even amidst those failures, lessons were learned and new theories were 
tested.  
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V. Cultivating Expertise: Soviet Agrarians’ Travels to the United 
States, 1921-1928 
On February 25, 1925, in a large office of the former Moscow Insurance Society 
building on the Old Square, Nikolai Kondratiev, an agricultural economist and Head of the 
Land Planning Commission, made a report of his research trip to the United States. 
Representatives of all major departments of the People’s Commissariat of Agriculture 
(Narkomzem), including its Chair, Aleksandr Smirnov, listened attentively.377 While 
Kondratiev’s task was to investigate the state of agriculture in the U.S., Canada, Britain, 
and Germany, he admitted that he spent the majority of his time in the United States; “the 
country,” according to him, “that largely determined the world market.”378 He did not hide 
his appreciation of the American agricultural system. Beyond discussing dry statistical data 
gathered during the trip, Kondratiev reminisced on important moments. “I was with the 
now-deceased Secretary Wallace at the monthly assessment of the harvest,” Kondratiev 
began. “The whole room was full of people waiting for data to report to the press,” when 
“the Secretary comes out and warns that in 15 seconds the report would be made and the 
data distributed. Everyone rushes to their phones and in few minutes the press is informed. I 
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have a photo of this moment.”379 For Kondratiev, the efficiency with which the USDA 
disseminated information to the remotest areas of the United States was most impressive. 
He hoped that one day Soviet Russia would follow the American example.380 
This chapter focuses on Soviet agricultural travelers. This included agricultural 
economists, scientists, and experts, who traveled to the United States in the 1920s. While 
their travel agendas differed, they shared a desire to learn about American approaches to 
modern agricultural organization in order to return Soviet Russia to its position as a leader 
in the world grain market. This was especially important given the escalation of worldwide 
food shortages during the agricultural crisis of the 1920s. Using their pre-revolutionary 
connections with the international scientific community, this group was able to travel across 
the Atlantic to visit the U.S. Department of Agriculture, to meet with leading American 
scientists in agricultural colleges, to interact with farmers, and to establish potential 
partnerships with American farm companies. Their ability to acquire this knowledge 
through travel served as a vehicle for the circulation of agricultural ideas: valued as a 
precious commodity by Soviet state policymakers. Yet, by the late 1920s, with the 
landscape of Soviet agricultural policies moving towards forced collectivization and the 
shift towards Stalin’s state-driven Soviet science, this group’s travel experiences and 
foreign connections became a reason for their ostracization and later purging.  
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This narrative uncovers how international travel functioned as an instrument of 
agricultural knowledge circulation and as a political tool.381 Through analyzing travel 
instructions, reports, diaries, and publications, I argue that, over the course of the 1920s, 
Soviet state officials and scientists continuously redefined the value of travel and 
agricultural knowledge acquired through this process.382 In doing so, it flips the traditional 
perspective offered by scholars by considering not only the westward movement of Soviet 
scientific bodies and ideas but, more importantly, by insisting on the circulatory movement 
of agricultural knowledge between East and West. By traveling and observing what they 
believed constituted the most advanced and modern agriculture system in the world at the 
time, Soviet travelers constructed their own vision of modern agriculture. While fascinated 
with some aspects of American agricultural achievements, they never compromised their 
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faith in the Soviet project, openly questioning some principles of western modernity and its 
agricultural practices in the process.383 Thus, these travels to the United States revealed as 
much about the state of Soviet agriculture as they did about American farming. In addition, 
in traveling through the United States, Soviet scientists, economists, and experts perceived 
themselves not only as scientists but also as potential policymakers in the Soviet state. They 
used this experience as a powerful tool in validating their expertise within the Soviet 
bureaucratic system: using it to promote their vision of modern Soviet agriculture.384  
 
A. Getting Ready for the Trip 
That the Soviets were interested in foreign agricultural ideas and practices during the 
1920s —particularly those of the United States—should come as no surprise. Caused by the 
First World War and the Russian Civil War, the agricultural crisis of the Soviet village led 
to the country’s precipitous fall in the world crop market. This forced the new Soviet 
government as well as its scientific apparatus to appeal to foreign experience in an attempt 
to solve these problems.385 It was an overture that fell in line with a long intellectual 
tradition of using foreign ideas and practices. Moreover, that the United States and Soviet 
Russia shared similar geography and climate, as well as Vladimir Lenin’s personal interest 
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in American expertise, it laid the foundation for an extensive exchange of agricultural ideas 
during the 1920s.386  
These Soviet agricultural travelers belonged to the so-called “old” group of scientists 
who received an education and conducted research in pre-revolutionary Russia. Despite 
their abhorrence towards these specialists due to their background, the new Soviet state had 
to rely on their expertise in the absence of an ideologically viable alternative due to a dearth 
of technically-skilled “red” scientists at the time.387 The Soviets not only had to rely on the 
“old-school” agrarians’ scholarship but also on their administrative and teaching experience, 
as well as their connections with intellectual circles abroad. In turn, these “old” scientists 
and experts recognized that, even if Bolshevik ideals did not appeal to them, they had to 
find mechanisms to adapt and utilize the new system for their purposes: to advance science 
and to strengthen their positions in the People’s Commissariat of Agriculture (Narkomzem).  
From 1921 to 1928, the influence of non-communist experts in the Narkomzen had been 
institutionalized and they enjoyed relative autonomy. Narkomzem eagerly recruited “old” 
experts and specialists who possessed “precious” agricultural knowledge and training.388 
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During N. Osinsky’s (a pseudonym for Valerian Obolensky) tenure as deputy of 
Narkomzem from 1921 to 1923, non-party specialists occupied prominent positions in most 
of the institution’s sections and divisions.389 For instance, Nikolai Kondratiev, one of the 
leading agricultural economists, headed Narkomzem’s Land Planning Commission 
(Zemplan). Not only did Zemplan produce top statistical research on rural economy, but 
also it maintained close ties with academic and research institutions, such as the Timiryazev 
Academy where many of Zemplan specialists had been trained and worked until 1928.390 
Even during the attempts of state agencies to “purify” Narkomzem from enemy elements in 
1922 and 1924, both people’s commissars of agriculture, Osinsky and Aleksandr P. 
Smirnov, protected nonparty thinkers from persecution.391 This interrelationship between 
Narkomzem and these scientists defined the organization of foreign tours of American 
agricultural areas in the 1920s. 
 Agrarian specialists used their pre-revolutionary foreign connections with intellectuals 
and officials in Europe, Canada, and the United States to travel abroad. Throughout the 
1920s, Soviet scientists were continuously invited to international congresses, conferences, 
and meetings, as the international academic community valued their work on agricultural 
economy, melioration, dry farming, and plant breeding. For instance, Nikolai Kondratiev, 
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Nikolai Tulaikov, Nikolai Makarov, and Nikolai Vavilov avidly traveled both to Europe 
and to the United States to present their findings at scientific meetings.392 Besides 
presenting their research, scientists used these occasions as a way to familiarize themselves 
with foreign agricultural ideas and methods. They frequently prolonged their conference 
trips for several months to travel around and to meet with agricultural officials, scientists, 
and farmers.  
Like any trip, these journeys began with the establishment of a travel agenda. While 
“old-school” scientists had relative autonomy in deciding whom to meet, what route to take, 
and what questions to explore during their trips, Narkomzem officials exercised certain 
control over those foreign investigations. The instructions (zadaniia) given to Kondratiev 
before his departure to the United States in 1924 are indicative of this peculiar 
arrangement.393 Several months prior to his American visit, Kondratiev started receiving 
miscellaneous instructions from different Narkomzem departments to investigate six majors 
topics: the potential of the United States as a grain exporter; the effectiveness of American 
solutions to the farm crisis; the organization of the USDA and its experiment stations; the 
organization of agricultural production, distribution, and standardization; and the 
mechanization of farms. 
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While different departments of Narkomzem issued these instructions to Kondratiev 
before his trip, it was clear that he valued his own research agenda as well. Kondratiev’s 
response to the instructions in 1924 indicated that he, indeed, shared the Narkomzem 
concerns about the world agricultural crisis and the state of grain production. Yet, in his 
letter to V.I. Senin, Head of the Department of Agricultural Economy, Kondratiev clearly 
articulated “major goals that [he] put in front of himself during the foreign trip with regard 
to agriculture.”394 As an agricultural economist, Kondratiev’s primary concern was with the 
“perspective of the world agricultural market” and the “direction” of the grain production 
development, as well as the agricultural crisis. The second question that Kondratiev sought 
to explore was “the development of foreign animal husbandry.” He argued that these two 
questions were of primary concern due to the importance for the Soviet Union to recover its 
positions on the world market. Kondratiev admitted that he was going to approach his trip 
from an economist’s point of view, and did not want to be burdened by “technical 
questions” that some Narkomzem departments put in front of him.395  
In addition to revealing what Narkomzem and scientists were concerned with, this case 
illuminates the interrelationship between Soviet officials and agricultural scientists. While 
Kondratiev himself occupied an administrative position within Narkomzem, in this case, he 
identified himself as an economist and as a scientist who was interested in theoretical rather 
than technical approaches. While Narkomzem’s directions had an important guiding role in 
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the organization of the trip, Kondratiev’s scientific interests determined his explorations. 
Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to assume that Kondratiev had complete autonomy over 
his foreign trips’ agenda. Rather, it was the confluence of interests and goals that 
determined Soviet agrarians’ travel agendas.  
 
B. Touring U.S. Agricultural Regions 
To travel abroad for a Soviet citizen in the 1920s was not easy. When Soviet 
agricultural travelers decided to go to the United States, they faced two major problems: 
getting a travel permit from Soviet government institutions and obtaining travel funds. Even 
if Narkomzem or even Vladimir Lenin himself sanctioned those trips, agrarians could not 
hope to escape the bureaucracy of other Soviet institutions. Not only did they have to 
receive an official permission from Narkomzem, but also they had to knock on the doors of 
the Cheka (state security police) and other government departments to get necessary 
signatures. In a 1921 letter, plant geneticist Nikolai Vavilov wrote with frustration: “If I had 
known before how much trouble [traveling to] America would be, I would, perhaps, have 
abstained from the enterprise.” “From morning to night,” he continued, “I must fill out 
forms and pass them around all of Moscow – the Cheka, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
Narkomzem, Rabkrin, Vneshtorg, and Sovnarkom.”396 Yet obtaining permission to travel 
was but one problem faced by Soviet agricultural travelers.  
The new Soviet state had little to no funds to sponsor these foreign ventures. When 
Vavilov described the destitute position of Soviet scientists, he lamented that he did not 
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even have money to send telegrams and that many academics had not received their salaries 
for months.397 As a result, resourceful scientists had to find money through their 
professional contacts and in various bureaucratic institutions through their patrons.398 Others 
obtained funds when they arrived in the United States. Nikolai Makarov, for example, 
arrived in New York in 1918 only to find his funding through the Siberian Cooperative 
Bureau in the United States had not come through. Thus, he had to find work as an editor 
for the Associated Press. In addition, Makarov became a chair for the organizing committee 
of the Russian section of the exhibition “America Making.”399 While Makarov’s case was 
an extreme example, it nevertheless reveals how the financial difficulties faced by Russian 
scienties in the 1920s limited their ability to travel. 
After a lengthy journey across the Atlantic to the United States, Soviet travelers 
oftentimes relied on two U.S.-based organizations that helped them to navigate through 
their American travels. The first one was the Russian Agricultural Bureau in New York, 
established in 1921 by Dmitry Borodin, a Russian émigré entomologist, and Nikolai 
Vavilov with official support from Narkomzem. Not only did this organization serve as a 
shipping agency (seeds and literature), but it also helped Soviet agricultural travelers to 
establish contacts with prominent American agricultural scientists and experts by providing 
them with letters of recommendation. The second source of support Soviet agrarians relied 
upon was the USDA. As seen in acknowledgement pages of their post-travel publications, 
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Soviet authors sang praises to USDA officials who, in Soviet agrarians’ words, welcomed 
them with open arms.400 Of particular importance were their visits to the Bureau of 
Agricultural Economics, headed by Henry C. Taylor. For the Soviets, working with the 
BAE experts, including Oliver Baker and Oscar Stine, presented an opportunity to see how 
American agrarians studied agricultural production and collected agricultural statistics to 
develop mechanisms to forecast crop yields.401 Moreover, their research in the agricultural 
geography of the Great Plains interested Soviet agricultural economists, as the Volga 
region’s geographic conditions were quite similar.402 In addition to sharing similar scientific 
interests, Baker and Stine supported the organizational part of Soviet agronomists’ trips in 
the United States. They worked tirelessly to accommodate Soviet intellectuals, organizing 
meetings and writing recommendation letters. In his report to Narkomzem in 1925, 
Kondratiev warmly reminisced, “The Department [USDA] was so nice that it had informed 
all places that I was supposed to visit.” Kondratiev apparently received “100 letters of 
recommendation” from the USDA.403 
After their work and research in New York and Washington D.C. was completed, Soviet 
agricultural travelers began their trips through agricultural areas of the United States. While 
individual routes differed due to research agendas and time allotment, Soviet agrarians’ 
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reports, publications, and diaries reveal that their interest in dry-farming areas and 
corn/wheat-growing regions played a significant role in determining their travel plans. 
Soviet agricultural travelers showed primary interest in midwestern and northwestern 
territories that were quite similar to climate and soil of grain-producing areas in the Soviet 
Union. For instance, when Nikolai Tulaikov, a Soviet soil scientist, went on a short three-
month trip to the United States and Canada in 1922, he visited ten midwestern and 
northwestern U.S. states and three Canadian provinces to learn more about dry-farming 
practices.404 Another Soviet expert, N. Osinskii (Valerian Obolenskii), who spent six 
months in the United States in 1923, almost repeated Tulaikov’s route in the Midwest to 
gather information about wheat regions. Yet, instead of traveling north to Canada 
afterwards, Osinskii went west and then south to observe the agriculture of the U.S. 
South.405  
These short research trips across multiple states did not allow Soviet agricultural 
travelers to stay in one place for long or investigate regions in a detailed manner. To make 
their travels more productive, Soviet agrarians used the network of American agricultural 
colleges that served as a “visitor information center” for the area.406 Osinskii’s travels are a 
case in point. Wherever Osinskii went during his six-month trip, in the majority of cases, he 
visited an agricultural college first. There, not only did he interview leading agricultural 
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economists, such as John Black, J.B. Davidson, and Richard T. Ely among others, but he 
also found necessary support for his travel. Through faculty and department assistants’ 
extensive professional and personal networks, Osinskii was able to tour local farms where 
he met with farmers, to visit farm companies’ offices and Chambers of Commerce, and to 
observe the work of USDA extension services. Agricultural colleges thus represented an 
important travel mechanism that connected Soviet travelers and exposed them to diverse 
groups of people and their agricultural knowledge.407  
Americans, in turn, used these encounters to learn more about the state of Soviet 
agriculture, as well as about recent political, economic, and social developments. In his 
economic diary, Osinskii recorded multiple instances when his interviewees asked him “an 
inevitable series of questions about the USSR” instead of answering his queries.408 In accord 
with Soviet agrarians, the majority of Americans they encountered was concerned with 
Soviet competition and asked about the Soviet Union’s potential as a grain exporter. When 
Osinskii, for instance, visited the Rosenbaum & Rosenbaum Co., one of the three largest 
grain and elevator houses in Chicago, E.F. Rosenbaum ruminated on the possibility of a 
Soviet resurgence on the grain market and, according to Osinskii, overestimated its 
potential.409 Beyond questions about grain exports, American agricultural scientists, experts, 
and farmers were interested in Soviet crops, labor costs, and technology. 
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When Americans did not ask about agriculture, they focused on Soviet politics and 
society. In one conversation, Osinskii was asked about the stability of the Soviet 
government; whether religion was forbidden; why the Soviets overturned prohibition and 
allowed the drinking of vodka again.410 At times, these types of conversations took place 
within the discourse of an American home where farm matters were put on the back burner. 
For instance, when Osinskii visited professor C.L. Holmes in Ames, Iowa, in August 1923, 
Holmes invited him for dinner after a long day of traveling through corn farms. There, 
according to Osinskii, both had a pleasant conversation where Osinskii was “asking about 
the American life (zhit’e-byt’e), and [Holmes], in turn, asked about Russia.”411  
 
C. Post-Travel Reports 
Upon returning to their homeland, Soviet agricultural travelers widely reported their 
experiences and findings. Soviet government institutions, particularly Narkomzem, were the 
first  to receive official reports that discussed the state of American agriculture. For 
instance, Kondratiev who returned from him foreign trip in early 1925 presented a lengthy 
report on the perspectives of the world agricultural market and the ability of the United 
States to compete with Soviet grain exports. The Soviet scientific community also showed 
keen interest in travel findings of these agrarians. Presenting at Soviet conferences and 
publishing became two primary ways for travelers to disseminate information among their 
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colleagues.412 Finally, some agrarians, including Osinskii, gave public lectures about the 
state of American agriculture. In his book My Heresy about the United States, Osinskii 
stated that his lectures on American agriculture provoked a storm of emotions from the 
general public. According to him, his listeners were either appalled by his comments or 
disappointed when he did not portray American agriculture and the United States, in 
general, as the most developed country in the world and on the verge of proletarian 
revolution.413 As a result, Osinskii claimed that he was forced to write a follow-up book 
where he dismantled his perceived “heresy” about the United States. In it, Osinskii admitted 
American commercial potential but he doubted its ability to establish complete control over 
Europe and the world. He predicted the increasing competition between the U.S. and other 
European countries and encouraged his fellow comrades to challenge American 
dominance.414  
Among various topics covered in post-travel publications and reports, three themes 
stood out: the organization and work of the U.S. Department of Agriculture and its 
extension services; American agricultural education; and the use of farm technology. With 
regard to the latter, despite the growing import of American tractors to the Soviet Union in 
the 1920s and the strong belief of Soviet state institutions in the power of tractorization, 
Soviet agricultural travelers were far more cautious with regard to the latest technology.415 
After his trip to the United States in 1923, Tulaikov argued that tractorization of Soviet 
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agriculture should wait until Soviet agricultural production had gained more strength. One 
of his major reservations was their high price and the lack of agricultural education among 
peasants. Osinsky echoed Tulaikov’s concerns. Wherever Osinsky went during his trip, he 
encountered an ambivalent attitude towards mechanization, in particular toward tractors. In 
South Dakota, Osinsky had a lengthy conversation with G.G. Gardner, Professor Rex F. 
Willard’s Assistant, who stated that South Dakota farmers utilized horses for sowing and 
tractors for milling.416 According to Willard himself, only twenty-five percent of South 
Dakota farmers possessed tractors, as it was cheaper to sow using horsepower. During his 
conversation with Osinsky, Willard quipped that even American automobile magnate Henry 
Ford plowed with horses rather than tractors on his own farm.417  
Similarly to South Dakota, Montana farmers preferred horses to tractors for sowing 
land. When Osinsky visited a ranch in Big Timber, Montana, a farm supervisor told him 
that the “was an object of obsession, or ‘tractoromania,’ when it first appeared.” The 
supervisor insisted that tractors should be “dropped” as a technology to improve farmers’ 
lives. Further, in Oregon, Osinsky talked to farmers who said that while they used Fordson 
tractors, they were needed only “at the peak of the work” season. Also, the Chair of the 
Agricultural Department, G.R. Hyslop (Corvallis, OR) stated that it was hard to find a 
person who knew work with tractors. According to Hyslop, farmers did not know how to 
operate tractors and hiring a specialist was rather expensive.418 Yet these were the attitudes 
of Montana and South Dakota farmers. For instance, Minnesota and Iowa farmers favored 
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tractors because, as Osinsky noted, their soils were more ready (well worked through) than 
other soils. All in all, the impression that Soviet agrarians received from the observation of 
American tractorization was ambiguous. As a result, rather than arduously advocating for 
the immediate implementation of tractors in Soviet agricultural practices, agricultural 
scientists and experts advocated for a more gradual approach. 
In addition to tractors, the USDA occupied a special place in the imagination of Soviet 
agricultural scientists and experts. They were most impressed by the way the USDA was 
organized and the efficiency with which it disseminated information. For instance, after 
witnessing the work of the USDA and its extension services, Nikolai Tulaikov proposed 
radical territorial reforms in the Soviet countryside where a guberniya would be replaced 
with an oblast (similar to an American state). An oblast would serve both an administrative 
and an agricultural unit.419 According to Tulaikov, just like in the United States, every city 
in an oblast would have its own agricultural college. To his mind, the People’s 
Commissariat of Agriculture would need to simplify its organizational structure and be 
more transparent like USDA, as well as easing regulations on agricultural schools in order 
to respect their “complete local agricultural autonomy.”420 “For me,” Tulaikov quipped, “it 
does not seem like a wild thought that some day our overly bureaucratic Narkomzem at the 
Old Square in Moscow, where it is very difficult to find ten people qualified to do scientific 
work… will turn into something that resembles the USDA in Washington. Concerns about 
payments, cadres, [and] salaries… will cease and real scientific work will begin.”421 
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Tulaikov and his colleagues at agricultural research universities and government institutions 
were swamped with what was referred to as “vermicelli,” or the practice of dealing with 
petty problems concerning bureaucratic issues, like staffing and budgets.422 
According to Soviet agrarians, the focus on bureaucracy and the lack of “scientific 
work” at Narkomzem starkly contrasted with the bustling development of agricultural 
research conducted by the USDA.423 When Kondratiev visited the Bureau of Statistics, he 
marveled at its ability to conduct effective statistical research. In his presentation at the 2nd 
All-Union Statistical Conference in Moscow in 1925, Kondratiev stated that more than 
20,000 competent and educated agricultural experts regularly sent statistical information to 
Washington D.C. and local offices. Such a large network of experts allowed the USDA to 
collect a more “objective” perspective on farm production and organization.424 In contrast to 
European and Soviet statisticians who focused on theoretical aspects of agricultural 
statistics, USDA officials, according to Kondratiev, showed admirable practicality. They 
used statistical data not only to plan future agricultural policies but also to protect farmers 
from deceiving information by regularly publishing statistical reports in USDA bulletins 
and distributing them among farmers. In short, Kondratiev urged his colleagues to pay 
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closer attention to USDA statistical methods, as “some features of agricultural statistics 
were worth of Russian attention.425  
As many Soviet agrarians noted in their works and diaries, leaving the central office of 
the USDA in Washington D.C. did not mean the organization’s presence had diminished. 
Traveling across various states, Soviet scientists witnessed how USDA policies and 
information flowed through the channels of extension services, agricultural colleges, and 
experiment stations directly to farmers. The interrelationship of these three institutions 
fascinated Soviet scientists. The connection among these institutions was so close that, at 
times, according to Osinsky’s observations, the lines between experiments, teaching, and 
extension work blurred. When visiting Fargo in August 1925, Osinsky met with Rex F. 
Willard who served as a Chair of the Department of Agricultural Economy at the 
Agricultural College of North Dakota. A former USDA county agent, Willard not only 
taught at the local agricultural college but also owned a farm and conducted experiment 
work, working as a farmer.426 Many saw this close-knit institutional triangle as one of the 
keys to the modernization and rationalization of American agriculture and, thus, an example 
for Soviet agricultural development.427 
While almost all Soviet scientists touched on the role of American extension services 
and agricultural education, these topics became major themes of Nikolai Tulaikov’s works. 
Tulaikov believed in the superiority of American agricultural education and called on 
Narkomzem officials and Soviet agrarians to adopt these ideas. Undoubtedly, he did not 
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insist on replicating the American system entirely. Yet, sensing a new era of the Soviet 
agricultural educational system, Tulaikov argued that this “transitional period” provided the 
most fruitful ground for “familiarizing” oneself with “foreign experience, … in particular 
the American experience” due to the many similarities shared in terms of geography and 
climate.428 Tulaikov emphasized that while the United States was not the only country with 
an excellent system of agricultural education, he had “never encountered such results from 
other agricultural colleges’ work.” To him, breaking with the Russian prerevolutionary 
system of agricultural education was a necessary step to further the Soviet agricultural 
reconstruction.429 
While Tulaikov visited multiple agricultural colleges, he highlighted the Agricultural 
College in Manhattan, KS, and the Cornell Agricultural College, arguing that these 
institutions deserved special attention from the Soviet specialists. Providing a painstakingly 
detailed description of these colleges, Tulaikov covered everything from the organization of 
agricultural education and students’ responsibilities to curricula of undergraduate and 
graduate programs. In addition, he paid particular attention to agricultural schools and 
short-term courses that focused on farmers’ education. Finally, Tulaikov emphasized the 
importance of dissemination of agricultural knowledge beyond schools. He noted that “for 
our Russian conditions,” American extension services were “the most unique and did not 
have any analogues in [Russian] agricultural colleges and universities.”430 Tulaikov 
intended to correct this situation. 
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As Tulaikov’s own scientific interest lay in the field of experimental work, he devoted a 
lot of time to observing U.S. experiment stations. Beyond admiring the ability of the USDA 
to reach farmers through extension work, he praised it for extracurricular work with farm 
families through the organization of youth clubs and children’s activities. He perceived 
extension services as an institution that was able to turn a farmer into a productive member 
of society from an economic, social, and cultural perspectives.431 Tulaikov stated that with 
the help of extension services, “a farmer had not only to grow crops and tend to livestock 
but also to create an urban-like facilities on a farm, to rationally bring up children and 
simultaneously to be a good member of local community and a better citizen for a 
country.”432 Thus, for Tulaikov, agricultural education, in some way, became one of the 
routes to Soviet citizenship.  
Inspired by what he witnessed in American agricultural colleges, Tulaikov hoped that 
the Soviet Union’s progression from a prerevolutionary system of farm education meant 
that aspects of the American educational system could be more readily adopted.433 To do so, 
Tulaikov argued for shifting focus away from theory to practice. Comparing Soviet and 
American programs, Tulaikov emphasized that Americans put major efforts into 
experimental works and practical trainings rather than theoretical learning. 
“Unsurprisingly,” Tulaikov stated, “practical Americans immediately recognized that a 
great scope of knowledge and individual ideas” of college professors and experts, as well as 
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“a great number of agricultural advancements” could be “used on a much larger scale and 
with a greater use” for American farmers.434 Perceiving American successes, Tulaikov 
urged his colleagues to build a new system of experiment stations, or farm laboratories 
where a majority of Soviet students would learn practical farming skills rather than being 
bogged down in agricultural theories. 
Beyond making changes in agricultural programs at colleges and universities in Soviet 
Russia, Tulaikov urged his colleagues to reconsider who a Soviet agricultural expert should 
be. Guided by the American focus on practical knowledge and management, Tulaikov 
suggested that Soviet agricultural colleges should emulate the U.S. system of enrolling less 
students and providing them with practical knowledge that “was useful for [their] daily 
work at a farm.”435 These students had to be carefully selected and pass an exam 
administered by a committee that was appointed by a local agricultural college. For 
Tulaikov, thus, to be a Soviet agricultural expert thus meant to be an “administrator of 
agricultural reconstruction in the Russian countryside.”436 
Tulaikov’s discussions about the ideal agricultural education and agricultural students 
echoed concerns of the new Soviet government about the transformation of the pre-
revolutionary educational system. After the October Revolution, the Bolsheviks believed 
that education would instigate a major transformation of society, including the creation of a 
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new Soviet citizen.437 Due to the fact that the debate over education took place during the 
more tolerant years of the New Economic Policy, the idea of borrowing foreign ideas about 
education, in particular from a capitalist country, such as the United States, did not seem so 
radical.438 In her foreword to one of Tulaikov’s works, Nadezhda Krupskaya, Vladimir 
Lenin’s widow and one of the leading figures in the People’s Commissariat for 
Enlightenment, argued for the urgency of organizing a system to disseminate agricultural 
knowledge among Soviet peasants. Krupskaya praised American agricultural colleges for 
serving as centers of agricultural knowledge. Tulaikov’s work, she noted, played a great 
role in the transformation of agricultural education in that it illuminated American 
experience which “we should carefully take into consideration” and should “widely use for 
our purposes,” while considering “our conditions” and “our communist worldview.”439 
 
D. Travel as a Political Instrument 
Prior to the beginnings of forced collectivization, travel experience and agricultural 
knowledge acquired during these research trips served Soviet agrarians as an instrument of 
political power. When they returned to the Soviet Union, these agricultural travelers either 
resumed their administrative posts within Narkomzem or worked closely with the 
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Commissariat and or local administrative institutions while simultaneously teaching at 
agricultural colleges. Kondratiev, for instance, continued to preside over the Land Planning 
Commission and the Conjuncture Institute while working closely with leading agricultural 
economists, such as Alexander Chayanov, Lev Litoshenko, and Nikolai Makarov.440 
Makarov, who spent some time traveling and even living in the United States, combined his 
government work with teaching at the Timiriazev Agricultural Academy where he served as 
the Department Chair of Agricultural Economy. The Timiriazev Agricultural Academy, as 
well as the newly-established Research Institute of Agricultural Economy, sought to 
establish connections with foreign agronomists as well as discuss theoretical issues of the 
new agricultural plan.441 
While working in these institutions, Soviet “old-school” agronomists exercised their 
proximity to agricultural policymaking to debate the prospects of Soviet agricultural 
development.442 When Kondratiev reported back to Narkomzem about his trip to the United 
States, he declared that the United States and the Soviet Union were facing “large changes 
in the world market in terms of redistribution of productive forces.” Kondratiev did not 
expect the United States to back off from its leading positions despite the agricultural crisis 
that their farm sector was experiencing. Kondratiev doubted, America would simply say: “’I 
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am leaving. Please, take my place.’” He expected that there would be “a big fight” for 
dominance in world grain markets. As a result, he warned Narkomzem about American 
attempts at expanding its agricultural exports to Southeast Asia and its ability to lower costs 
of agricultural production by through implementing advance quantitative analysis and 
implementing technology in the farm sector. Thus, discussing Soviet perspectives, 
Kondratiev noted that Narkomzem should “understand who we compete with, whom we 
[should] push away and then create cheap technology and then lower prices.”443 For 
Kondratiev, as well as other Soviet agrarians, the Soviet Union’s success on the world 
market was intertwined with internal gradual agricultural modernization.  
Two years later, Kondratiev’s emphasis on gradual development would prove to be 
fateful. In October 1927, Kondratiev, as well as two other agricultural economists (Aleskei 
Chayanov and Maslov), received a note from Alexei Sviderskii, Vice-Deputy of 
Narkomzem and Chancellor of the Timiriazev Agricultural Academy. As experts on the 
world grain market and “capitalist” countries’s agriculture who visited the United States and 
Europe, Kondratiev, Chayanov, and Maslov were ordered to complete a report on the 
agricultural development in western countries, including the United States,” and to compare 
it to the Soviet one. It is worth mentioning that Vyacheslav Molotov himself, a member of 
the Politburo and an ardent supporter of Joseph Stalin, was the official that requested this 
report.444 
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In his report, Kondratiev compared the present state of the American agricultural 
development and the situation of the Soviet farm sector by contrast, as well as the 
perspectives of implementing collectivization as a solution to Soviet agricultural problems. 
With regard to the latter, Kondratiev expressed radically negative attitude. He stated that, 
despite the high speed of agricultural growth in the Soviet Union, Soviet agriculture still 
looked like it did before the Revolution. He explained that the growth of Soviet agricultural 
production was high only because of its extensive development. Furthermore, Kondratiev 
repeated his 1925 argument insisting on the priority of technological development. For him, 
the technological advancement of the village presented the inextricable step towards 
collectivization. And, Soviet Russia, in Kondratiev’s mind, was not ready for this step.445 
Individual peasant households and cooperation that he witnessed in “capitalist” countries 
represented Kondratiev’s recommendation for the future of agricultural policymaking in the 
Soviet Union.446 
Unfortunately for Kondratiev, this view clashed with Stalin’s vision of the future for the 
Soviet countryside. Beginning around 1928, Stalin and his supporters declared that 
Kondratiev and those who shared his ideas—Chayanov, Makarov, Chelintsev and others—
were enemies of the Soviet state. In April 1928, Kondratiev was fired from his position as 
Director of the Conjuncture Institute of the People’s Commissariat of Finances. 
Kondratiev’s name was turned into a pejorative term “kondratievschina” to equate it with 
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the “ideology of kulaks” and the “restoration of imperialism.”447 Stalin’s repressions of 
“old-school” agrarians continued at the First All-United Conference of Agrarians Marxists 
in December 1929 when Stalin declared: “It is unclear why anti-scientific theories of 
‘Soviet’ economists, like the Chayanovs, should be freely circulated in our press.”448 
Stalin’s message was clear. Anyone that supported or propagated the ideas of Kondratiev 
and his cohort were in danger of being repressed themselves. After this conference any 
opportunities for Chayanov, Makarov, Kondratiev, and their supporters to continue 
participating in the future development of agricultural policies were effectively eliminated.  
The final blow to the Soviet agrarians came in 1930 with the beginning of the Labor-
Peasant Party (TKP) case. In early 1930, the OGPU arrested and interrogated Kondratiev, 
Makarov, Chayanov, Urovsky, A.A. Rybnikov, Doyarenko, Sadyrin, and Litoshenko on 
suspicion of anti-government activities. According to the OGPU report, the TKP was based 
in Moscow and had infiltrated several central government institutions, such as Narkomzem, 
Narkomfin (the People’s Commissariat of Finance), the Conjuncture Institute, the 
Timiryazev Agricultural Academy, the Moscow Agricultural Society, as well as various 
institutions in rural areas. The report further stated that TKP members had connections with 
“white” imperial supporters and discussed “a military revolt” and the establishment of a 
new government led by Kondratiev.449  
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Historians have established the fabrication of the TKP case in numerous studies 
explaining that the main reason behind this case was the refusal of Makarov, Chayanov, 
Kondratiev and their supporters to support and promote Stalin’s forced collectivization. The 
confessions produced during interrogations and trials were extracted through torture or 
entirely invented.450 Yet, what was also important about this case and what remains 
neglected in the literature to date were the foreign connections that the OGPU tried to 
demonstrate. In addition to various accusations, the OGPU blamed TKP members for 
having “close contacts with some foreigners” and “informing them about the political and 
economic state of the USSR, about the goals of the TKP to sway popular opinion in 
capitalist countries’ that the TKP was necessary in destroying Soviet power and the 
formation of a new government.”451 Thus, Soviet agronomists’ travel experience that had 
fostered foreign connections was transformed from a “precious commodity” in the early 
1920s to a mark of treason worthy of purging.  
Throughout the summer months of 1930, OGPU interrogators came back again and 
again to the question of foreign connections of TKP members. In the July 1930 
interrogation report, Nikolai Makarov confessed “a number” of TKP members “used their 
academic acquaintances and connections with foreign scientists” to “inform them about the 
work and political positions of our party, thus preparing a favorable attitude of foreign 
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scientists and governments to a forthcoming… coup.”452 Makarov admitted that both 
Kondratiev and he had connections with American (Robinson), German (Augagen), and 
English scientists. In his interrogation report two weeks later, Makarov stated that 
“connections of the TKP with foreigners” were established “during professional and 
scientific communications.” He repeated his confession expanding the list of foreign 
connections, adding that Yurovsky collaborated with the Americans, English, and French; 
Chayanov had connections all over the world; he, Makarov, communicated with Kofod 
(Danish), Augagen (German), Robinson (American); Litoshenko worked with American 
and German scientists. Makarov further confessed that Robinson was an American 
economist, who worked in one of U.S. universities and studied the pre-1917 agricultural 
revolution in Russia. In the 1920s, Robinson visited the Research Institute of Agricultural 
Economy, which was headed by Makarov, and had personal ties with Chayanov and 
Makarov himself. Makarov stated that Robinson “brought ideas about the Russian 
agricultural development” back to the United States.453 More important, the OGPU forced 
Makarov to admit that he, as well as other members of the fictitious TKP, used their foreign 
connections as “a means of propaganda.” “I consider this connection with foreigners,” 
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Makarov’s report concluded, “to be the gravest fact that reveals mine and the TKP Central 
Committee’s criminal activity.”454 
These forced confessions conflated scientific connections made by Kondratiev, 
Chayanov, and Makarov with espionage, revealing how the relationship between Soviet 
agricultural science, the state, travel, and the value of foreign expertise changed from the 
early 1920s to the early 1930s. But Stalin and his supporters feared the political and 
scientific capital garnered by these well-traveled agrarians more than they feared collusion 
with foreign powers. More important than the threat of a midnight coup, the Soviet “old-
school” agrarians’ view on the future development of Soviet agriculture, which adopted 
some American ideas and practices, clashed with the state’s policy of collectivization. As 
with all those who had garnered influence and clashed with Stalin’s vision, these experts 
paid dearly. 
Though originally given an eight-year prison sentence in 1932, Nikolai Kondratiev was 
sentenced to another ten years in 1938. It was all for naught, however, as he was executed 
by firing squad shortly after his sentencing.455 Nikolai Tulaikov was sentenced to labor in 
one of Stalin’s camps on the Solovetskie islands. Despite the attempts of his fellow purged 
to shield him from the harsh weather and debilitating work they faced, the 63-year-old 
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former professor perished during the winter of 1938.456 Until 1937, N. Osinskii occupied 
some prominent posts in the party and other scientific institutions. Arrested in October 
1937, he was eventually linked to the Bukharin-Rykov case and sentenced to death by firing 
squad. Osinskii was posthumously cleared of all charges in 1957.457 Nikolai Makarov and 
Nikolai Chayanov shared a cell for a year and a half after their sentencing in 1932. 
Chayanov was eventually exiled to Khazakstan where he was arrested a second time in 
1936. Though released again in 1937, Chayanov was arrested once more later that year and 
was summarily executed. Makarov was eventually released after the persistent efforts of 
prominent Soviet scientists Nikolai Vavilov and G.I. Lomov. After his release, he was 
exiled in what was known as the “minus 40” – effectively banning him from entering the 40 
most prominent cities in the Soviet Union. From 1935 to 1947, he lived in the Rostov oblast 
working as a local agronomist in a grain sovkhoz in Voroshilovgrad.458 
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Instead of a gradual introduction of technology and a slow transition from private to 
collective farms which Kondratiev, Makarov and others endorsed, Stalin threw his weight 
behind a new generation of Marxist-agrarians that offered fast results that could be achieved 
only through forced collectivization. This is not to say that the Soviets stopped importing 
foreign technology and experts to facilitate the rapid industrialization of the countryside. 
What it meant was that, by the late 1920s, the connections made by Soviet “old-school” 
agrarians’ in foreign intellectual circles shifted from being highly coveted to being 
considered politically dangerous. Thus, while the circulation of technology continued 
between the Soviet Union and the United States, as well as other foreign places, the pre-
revolutionary generation of Soviet scientists lost their power in as vehicles of this exchange, 
being replaced by new forms of circulation between Stalin’s agricultural science and the 
United States.459   
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Epilogue 
The period between the end of the First World War and late 1928 represented a dynamic 
search for a modern agricultural order. In many ways, the war and the revolutionary 
moment in Russia, as well as other places, sparked debates about the changing role of 
agriculture. As the First World War affected agricultural production in many parts of the 
world, solving the problem of food supply became a paramount issue. According to the 
international community of agricultural experts, economists, and farmers, solutions to this 
problem lay in the reorganization of agricultural production. This reorganization included 
the rationalization of modern farming, technological modernization, and the effective 
introduction of agricultural education. In addition, these discussions led to further debates 
about the relationship between the countryside and the city as increased wartime and 
postwar urbanization depleted the farm labor sector. Finally, not only did the problem of 
food supply bear economic and social significance, but providing food also became a 
political issue. After all, the war and the Russian Revolutions of 1917 revealed that the 
problem of food supply was linked to political instability that could potentially lead to the 
collapse of the liberal order. Thus, concerned with these issues, the international community 
of agronomists actively sought ways to solve these problems. 
While this search took place within the domestic discourse, many agrarians looked for 
solutions beyond national borders. The period of the 1920s witnessed international 
exchange of agricultural ideas, technologies, and expertise that forged connections among 
different geographic regions. Those who participated in agricultural exchange, including the 
United States and the Soviet Union, perceived foreign spaces as research laboratories that 
offered opportunities for experimentation. This experimentation revolved around the 
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organization of agricultural reconstruction projects, seed exchange, and the introduction of 
farm technologies such as tractors, as well as the establishment of modern agricultural 
schools. All these experiments revealed a multi-dimensional nature of the 1920s agricultural 
exchange in that it opened international discussions about large-scale farming and 
agricultural industrialization as a solution to the postwar farm problem. 
Yet, the years of 1928-1929 represented another turning point in the discussions 
agriculture and the history of agricultural exchange. For the United States and the Soviet 
Union, the Soviet decision to collectivize the countryside and the onset of the Great 
Depression in the U.S. changed the nature and language of agricultural exchange between 
the countries. The possibilities of using foreign spaces for agricultural experimentation were 
closing, as new conversations about alternative paths for agricultural development were 
emerging. 
Throughout the 1920s, the agricultural sector played a significant role in the total 
economy, as about thirty percent of the total labor force was employed in agriculture. In the 
late 1920s, the declining real prices of agricultural products and the inability of farmers to 
pay their debt led to the world-wide economic depression. The collapse of the countryside 
adversely affected the banking sector that functioned as a provider of credit and hence had 
ripple effects throughout the whole economy. This process was particularly noticeable in 
the United States.460  
As American agronomists who had already been concerned with the state of the U.S. 
farm sector began to debate possible solutions, their language turned to the rhetoric of 
                                               
460 Jakob B. Madsen, “Agricultural Crises and the International Transmission of the 
Great Depression,” Journal of Economic History 61, no. 2 (June 2001): 328. Madsen 
included the following countries in his economic analysis: Austria, Belgium, Canada, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States. 
  
 
189 
planning and the growth of farm radicalism. For instance, after visiting the Soviet Union in 
1929-30, M.L. Wilson, Head of the Department of Agricultural Economics at Montana 
State College (1928-33) and a future Chief Wheat Production Secretary in the Agricultural 
Adjustment Administration (1933-34), considered American and Soviet experiences. While 
inspired by Soviet large-scale farm projects, he was skeptical about Soviet state planning 
and called on his fellow agrarians to create “some system midway between excessive 
communism and excessive capitalism.”461 As for Harold Ware, he came back from the 
Soviet Union in 1931. In his writings, Ware noted when he came to Soviet Russia in 1921, 
he was titled “a tractor farmer.” Now, in 1931, he became a “foreign specialist.”462 This 
change in rhetoric signified the decreasing role of American agricultural experts in the 
Soviet countryside. Nevertheless, Ware was able to apply the “revolutionary” experience, 
that he sought to learn in the Soviet Union, to the American farm sector. From 1931 to 
1935, Ware became one of the driving forces behind the radical farm movement in the 
Midwest.  
For the Soviet Union, the years of 1928-29 marked the end of the New Economic Policy 
and the beginning of collectivization. Beyond perceiving the decision to collectivize Soviet 
farms as the struggle for grain, this decision was motivated by the strengthening of state 
power and its motivation to bring the October Revolution to the countryside. By 
engineering the countryside through methods of collectivization, the Soviet central state 
sought to win the struggle for cultural hegemony where new Soviet institutions and 
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identities were to replace traditional elites and cultural norms. Further, the process of 
collectivization could not be explained without mentioning the ideological component and 
its important role in destroying its social system through the process of dekulakization. 
Next, the war scare of the late 1920s played one of the central roles that defined the support 
of the urban sector for forced collectivization. Finally, it was Joseph Stalin himself who 
viewed moderate and gradual approaches of the New Economic Policy period, and the 
support of individual households, and the encouragement of individual foreign trade as a 
threat to the stability of the Soviet state.463  
Among its many effects on Soviet society, collectivization, undoubtedly, reshaped the 
contours of the 1920s agricultural exchange. The new period was marked by the declining 
interest in the U.S. agricultural model among the Soviets. As soon as the decision to 
collectivize was made, the model for the future of Soviet agricultural development was 
chosen. Furthermore, the rhetoric of “catching up and surpassing” the United States in 
agriculture became more noticeable in works of Soviet agricultural economists and experts. 
Many argued for the divergent paths of American and Soviet agriculture with regard to 
pursuing the large-scale collective farm organization. According to some experts, the 
Soviets should not “forget that American agriculture… does not have enough experience in 
the organization of large-scale farms,” which the Soviet Union was “starting to organize.” 
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In that endeavor, Soviet experts argued, the country had to “show big initiative.”464 Others 
argued that the Soviet Union could surpass the United States in the technological 
modernization of the countryside.465 This language correlated with the official rhetoric of 
the Soviet state.466 Thus, this language of Soviet agricultural reconstruction was original for 
the 1930s period of agricultural exchange between the countries.  
Despite the changes in the nature of agricultural exchange between the United States 
and the Soviet Union, the complete break of relations did not occur. The Great Depression 
and the Soviet decision to collectivize became the next historical moment when shifting 
economic, social, and political discourses closed some venues for agricultural exchange and 
opened others. To examine agricultural exchange, thus, means to identify historical 
moments of convergence, such as the First World War or the Great Depression, to 
acknowledge that the farm problem has been an international issue, and to analyze vehicles, 
as well as engines, that propelled the movement of expertise, technologies, and knowledge 
across spaces and borders. 
                                               
464 Rose and Sutulov, Sel’skokhoziaistvennoe mashinostroenie, 152. 
 
465 Gennadii A. Studenskii, Tekhnicheskii perevorot v amerikanskom sel’skom 
khoziaistve [Technological Revolution in American Agriculture] (Samara: 1930), 113-115, 
123; S.G. Uzhansky, Amerikanskie vpechatleniia: V svete nashikh zadach po 
sotsialisticheskomu pereustroistvu sel’skogo khoziaistva [American Impressions: In the 
Light of Our Goals for the Socialist Reconstruction of Agriculture] (Moscow: 
Gosudarstvennoe sotsial’no-ekonomicheskoe izdatel’stvo, 1931), 3. Uzhanskii was arrested 
in October 1937 for anti-Soviet counter-revolutionary activities in the sphere of 
collectivization. He was executed by a fire squad on April 13, 1938. 
 
466 Studenskii was arrested in 1930 together with Kondratiev, Chayanov and others. In 
1930, he committed suicide in a Soviet jail. 
  
 
192 
Bibliography 
Archives 
American Historical Society of Germans from Russia, Lincoln, Nebraska 
American Jewish Archives, Cincinnati, Ohio 
Arden Archives Collection, Arden Craft Shop Museum, Arden, Delaware  
David M. Rubenstein Rare Book & Manuscript Library, Duke University, Durham, North 
Carolina 
Devon Heritage Services, Devon, U.K. 
Herbert Hoover Presidential Library, West Branch, Iowa 
Hoover Institution of War, Revolution, and Peace, Stanford, California 
Nebraska State Historical Society, Lincoln, Nebraska 
Perm’ State Archive of New History, Perm’, Russia 
Rauner Special Collections Library, Dartmouth University, Hanover, New Hampshire 
Russian State Archive of Economic History, Moscow, Russia  
Russian State Archive of Socio-Political History, Moscow, Russia  
Russian State Archive of the Russian Federation, Moscow, Russia 
University of Iowa, Iowa City, Iowa  
Wisconsin Historical Society, Madison, Wisconsin 
 
Periodicals 
American Federationist 
Banker Farmer 
Chicago Daily Tribune 
Digest of American Agriculture 
Ekonomicheskaia Zhizn’ 
Farmer’s Review 
Freeman 
Izvestia 
Los Angeles Times 
New York Times 
Pravda 
Soviet Russia 
  
 
193 
Toiler 
Wallace’s Farmer 
Washington Post 
World Agriculture 
World’s Work 
 
Monographs and Articles 
Ackert, Lloyd T. “The ‘Cycle of Life’ in Ecology: Sergei Vinogradskii’s Soil 
Microbiology, 1885-1940.” Journal of the History of Biology 40, no. 1 (2007): 109-
145. 
Alpern Engel, Barbara. “Not by Bread Alone: Subsistence Riots in Russia during World 
War I.” The Journal of Modern History 69, no. 4 (1997): 696-721. 
Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America. Proceedings of the Fifth Biannual Convention 
of the Amalgamated Workers of America. Chicago, May 8 to 13, 1922. 
Anderson, Larry. Benton MacKaye : Conservationist, Planner, and Creator of the 
Appalachian Trail. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002. 
Andrews, James T. Science for the Masses : The Bolshevik State, Public Science, and the 
Popular Imagination in Soviet Russia, 1917-1934. College Station: Texas A&M 
University Press, 2003. 
Arend, Jan. “Russian Science in Translation: How Pochvovedenie was Brought to the West, 
1875-1954.” Kritika 18, 4 (2017): 683-708. 
Avrutskaia, T.B. “Poezdka N.I. Vavilova v SShA i Zapadnuiu Evropu v 1921-1922 gg.” 
Vavilovskii zhurnal genetiki i selektsii 6, no. 3 (2012): 
Babiracki et al., eds., Cold War Crossings : International Travel and Exchange across the 
Soviet Bloc, 1940s-1960s. College Station: Texas A & M University Press, 2014. 
Bailes, Kendall E. "The American Connection: Ideology and the Transfer of American 
Technology to the Soviet Union, 1917–1941." Comparative Studies in Society and 
History 23, no. 3 (1981): 421-48. 
Bailes, Kendall E. Technology and Society under Lenin and Stalin : Origins of the Soviet 
Technical Intelligentsia, 1917-1941. Studies of the Russian Institute. Princeton, 
N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1978. 
Baker, Oliver E. “The Agriculture of the Great Plains Region.” Annals of the Association of 
American Geographers 13, no. 3 (September 1923): 109-167. 
  
 
194 
Bakhturina, A.Iu., ed. Rossiya i SShA: ekonomicheskie otnosheniya, 1917-1933. Sbornik 
dokumento. Moscow: Nauka, 1997. 
Barnett, L. Margaret. British Food Policy in the First World War. Boston: Allen & Unwin, 
1985. 
Bernstein, Seth, and Robert Cherny. "Searching for the Soviet Dream: Prosperity and 
Disillusionment on the Soviet Seattle Agricultural Commune, 1922–
1927." Agricultural History 88, no. 1 (2014): 22-44. 
Bloor, Ella Reeve. We are Many: An Autobiography of Ella Reeve Bloor. New York: 
International Publishers, 1940. 
Borders, Karl. Village Life Under the Soviets in Anna Borders Lynch, Two Years in Russia: 
1925-1927. Raleigh: Pentland Press, Inc., 1999. 
Brassley, Paul, Yves Segers, and Leen Van Molle, eds. War, Agriculture, and Food: Rural 
Europe from the 1930s to the 1950s. London: Routledge, 2012. 
Broadberry, Stephen and Mark Harrison, eds. The Economics of World War I. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005. 
Brown, Kate. "Gridded Lives: Why Kazakhstan and Montana Are Nearly the Same 
Place." The American Historical Review 106, no. 1 (2001): 17-48. 
Bulatov, V.V. and M.M. Zagorulko. “’Nekapitalisticheskie’ Innostrannye Kontsessii v 
SSSR.” Vestnik Volgogradskogo Gosudarstvennogo Universiteta 4, no. 1 (2012): 
51-58. 
Byford, Andy and Polly Jones. “Policies and Practices of Transition in Soviet Education 
from the Revolution to the End of Stalinism.” History of Education 35, no. 4-5 
(2006), https://doi.org/10.1080/00467600600713070 (accessed on April 18, 2018). 
Cabanes, Bruno. The Great War and the Origins of Humanitarianism, 1918-1924. Studies 
in the Social and Cultural History of Modern Warfare. Cambridge ; New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2014. 
Carstensen, Fred V. American Enterprise in Foreign Markets: Studies of Singer and 
International Harvester in Imperial Russia. Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press, 1984. 
Castonguay, Stéphane. "Creating an Agricultural World Order: Regional Plant Protection 
Problems and International Phytopathology, 1878-1939." Agricultural History 84, 
no. 1 (2010): 46-73. 
Chancellier, Éric. “The Beginnings of the Bureau of Agricultural economics: Modelling 
Crops (1922-1930).” Histoire & Sociétés Rurales 42, no. 2 (2014):  
Cohen, Yves. "Circulatory Localities The Example of Stalinism in the 1930s." Kritika-
  
 
195 
Explorations In Russian And Eurasian History 11, no. 1 (2010): 11-45. 
Cohen, Yves. “The Soviet Fordson. Between the politics of Stalin and the philosophy of 
Ford, 1924-1932.” In Hubert Bonin, Yannick Lung, and Steven Tolliday, eds. Ford, 
1903-2003. Paris: Plage, 2003. 531-558. 
Coleman, Heather J. Russian Baptists and Spiritual Revolution, 1905-1929. Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 2005. 
Collingham, Lizzie. The Taste of War: World War II and the Battle for Food. New York: 
Penguin Press, 2012. 
Conkin, Paul Keith. A Revolution down on the Farm : The Transformation of American 
Agriculture since 1929. Lexington, Ky.: University Press of Kentucky, 2008. 
Coopersmith, Jonathan. “Technology Transfer in Russian Electrification, 1870-1925.” 
History of Technology 13 (1991): 214-233. 
Corley, Felix. Religion in the Soviet Union : An Archival Reader. Washington Square, 
N.Y.: New York University Press, 1996. 
Cornick, Martyn et al. French Political Travel Writing in the Inter-war Years : Radical 
Departures. New York: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2017. 
Crosby, Alfred W. The Columbian Exchange; Biological and Cultural Consequences of 
1492. Contributions in American Studies ; No. 2. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood 
Pub., 1972. 
Crosby, Alfred W. Ecological Imperialism : The Biological Expansion of Europe, 900-
1900. Studies in Environment and History. Cambridge [Cambridgeshire] ; New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 1986. 
Cullather, Nick. The Hungry World : America's Cold War Battle against Poverty in Asia. 
Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2010. 
Curry, Helen Anne. Evolution Made to Order : Plant Breeding and Technological 
Innovation in Twentieth-century America. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
2016. 
Curti, Merle. American Philanthropy Abroad: A History. New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers 
University Press, 1963. 
Dalrymple, Dana. “American Technology and Soviet Agricultural Development.” 
Agricultural History 40, no. 3 (1966): 187-206. 
Dalrymple, Dana G. "The American Tractor Comes to Soviet Agriculture: The Transfer of 
a Technology." Technology and Culture 5, no. 2 (1964): 191-214. 
David-Fox, Michael, and Péteri, György. Academia in Upheaval : Origins, Transfers, and 
  
 
196 
Transformations of the Communist Academic Regime in Russia and East Central 
Europe. Westport, Conn.: Bergin & Garvey, 2000. 
David-Fox, Michael. Crossing Borders : Modernity, Ideology, and Culture in Russia and 
the Soviet Union. Pittsburgh, Pa.: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2015. 
David-Fox, Michael et al, eds. Fascination and Enmity : Russia and Germany as Entangled 
Histories, 1914-1945. Pittsburgh, Pa.: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2012. 
David‐Fox, Michael. "The Fellow Travelers Revisited: The “Cultured West” through Soviet 
Eyes." The Journal of Modern History 75, no. 2 (2003): 300-35. 
David-Fox, Michael. "The Implications of Transnationalism." Kritika-Explorations In 
Russian And Eurasian History 12, no. 4 (2011): 885-904. 
David-Fox, Michael. Revolution of the Mind: Higher Learning among the Bolsheviks, 1918-
1929. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2016. 
David-Fox, Michael. Showcasing the Great Experiment : Cultural Diplomacy and Western 
Visitors to Soviet Union, 1921-1941. Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 
2012. 
Davis, Belinda. “Food and Nutrition (Germany).” In Daniel Ute et al., eds., 1914-1918-
online: International Encyclopedia of the First World War, 
https://encyclopedia.1914-1918-online.net/article/food_and_nutrition_germany. 
Davis, Belinda. Home Fires Burning: Food, Politics, and Everyday Life in World War I 
Berlin. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000. 
Dehne, Phillip. “How Important was Latin America to the First World War?” 
Iberoamericana 14, no. 53 (2014): 151-164. 
Dehne, Phillip. “The Resilience of Globalisation during hte First World War: The Case of 
Bunge & Born in Argentina.” In Christof Dejung and Niels P. Petersson, eds. The 
Foundations of Worldwide Economic Integration: Power, Institutions, and Global 
Markets, 1850-1930. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013. 228-248 
Dekel‐Chen, Jonathan. "An Unlikely Triangle: Philanthropists, Commissars, and American 
Statesmanship Meet in Soviet Crimea, 1922–37." Diplomatic History 27, no. 3 
(2003): 353-76. 
Dekel-Chen, Jonathan L. Farming the Red Land : Jewish Agricultural Colonization and 
Local Soviet Power, 1924-1941. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005. 
Dewey, Peter. British Agriculture in the First World War. London: Routledge, 1989. 
Duffin, Andrew P. Plowed under: Agriculture & Environment in the Palouse. 
Weyerhaeuser Environmental Book. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2007. 
  
 
197 
Dufaud, Gregory, and Lara Rzesnitzek. "Soviet Psychiatry through the Prism of Circulation 
The Case of Outpatient Psychiatry in the Interwar Period." Kritika-Explorations In 
Russian And Eurasian History 17, no. 4 (2016): 781-803. 
Dvoretskaia, E.V. “Uchastie uchenykh-agrarnikov Nizhnego Povolzh’ia v razrabotke 
zasukhoustoichivoi sistemy zernovogo proizvodstva v 1920-e gody.” Vestnik 
Saratovskogo gosudarstvennogo sotsial’no-ekonomicheskogo universiteta no. 2(26) 
(2009): 
Dyson, Lowell K. "The Red Peasant International in America." The Journal of American 
History 58, no. 4 (1972): 958-73. 
Egli, Rebecca. "The World of our Dreams: Agricultural Explorers and the Promise of 
American Science, 1890-1945." Order No. 10824473, University of California, 
Davis, 2018. https://search.proquest.com/docview/2094971671?accountid=14522. 
Ekhblad, David. The Great American Mission: Modernization and the Construction of an 
American World Order. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011. 
Elina, Olga. “Between Local Practices and Global Knowledge: Public Initiatives in the 
Development of Agricultural Science in Russia in the 19th Century and Early 20th 
Century.” Centaurus 56, no. 4 (2014): 305-329. 
Elina, Olga. “From Russia with Seeds: The Story of the Savitskys, Plant Geneticists and 
Breeders.” Istoriko-biologicheskie issledovaniya 6, no. 2 (2014): 
Elina, Olga. “Mestnye sel’skokhoziaistvennye obshestva: na puti k agrarnoi modernizatsii 
Rossii,” Istoriko-biologicheskie issledovania 4, no. 3 (2012): 
Elina, Olga. “Ot razvlechenii aristokratov do dekretov bolshevikov: vekhi rossiiskoi 
selektsii. Konets XIX veka – 1920-e gody,” Na Perelome: Otechestvennaya nauka v 
kontse XIX-XX veke  no. 3 (2005): 
Elina, Olga. “P.I. Lisitsyn i Shatilovskaya Gossemkultura: proekt gosudarstvennoi systemy 
sortovogo semenovodstva.” Istoriko-biologicheskie issledovaniya 7, no. 4 (2015):  
Elina, Olga. “Planting Seeds for the Revolution: The Rise of Russian Agricultural Science, 
1860-1920.” Science in Context 15, no. 2 (2002): 209-237. 
Engerman, David C. Modernization from the Other Shore : American Intellectuals and the 
Romance of Russian Development. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 
2003. 
Engerman, David. The Price of Aid: The Economic Cold War in India. Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2018. 
Esikova, Milana. “Vozniknovenie i razvitie agronomicheskoi sluzhby v Rossii (1880-
1917).” Voprosy sovremennoy nauki i praktiki, no. 4-6 (2010): 276-280. 
  
 
198 
Fallows, Thomas. “Politics and the War Effort in Russia: The Union of Zemstvos and the 
Organization of Food Supply, 1914-1916.” Slavic Review 37, no. 1 (March 1978): 
70-90. 
Federico, Giovanni. “Not Guilty? Agriculture in the 1920s and the Great Depression.” 
Journal of Economic History 65, no. 4 (December 2005): 949-976. 
Feuer, Lewis S. “American Travelers to the Soviet Union, 1917-1932: The Formation of a 
Component of New Deal Ideology.” American Quarterly 14, no. 2, part 1 (Summer 
1962): 119-149. 
Fitzgerald, Deborah. "Blinded by Technology: American Agriculture in the Soviet Union, 
1928-1932." Agricultural History70, no. 3 (1996): 459-86. 
Fitzgerald, Deborah. The Business of Breeding: Hybrid Corn in Illinois, 1890-1940. Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1990. 
Fitzgerald, Deborah Kay. Every Farm a Factory : The Industrial Ideal in American 
Agriculture. Yale Agrarian Studies. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003. 
Fitzpatrick, Sheila. “The ‘Soft’ Line on Culture and Its Enemies: Soviet Cultural Policy, 
1922-1927.” Slavic Review 33, no. 2 (1974): 267-287. 
Fitzpatrick, Sheila. Stalin’s Peasants: Resistance and Survival in the Russian Village After 
Collectivization. New York: Oxford University Press, 1994. 
Fisher, Harold H. The Famine in Soviet Russia, 1919-1923; the Operations of the American 
Relief Administration. Freeport, N.Y.: Books for Libraries Press, 1971. 
Flynn, Elizabeth G. I Speak My Own Piece. New York: Masses & Mainstream, Inc., 1955. 
Food and Agriculture Organization. The Story of the FAO Library: 65th Anniversary, 1952-
2017. Rome: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, 2017. 
Friesen, Leonard G., ed. Minority Report: Mennonite Identities in Imperial Russia and 
Soviet Ukraine Reconsidered, 1789-1945. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 
2018. 
Fullilove, Courtney. The Profit of the Earth : The Global Seeds of American Agriculture. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2017. 
Galas, Marina. Sud’ba i tvorchestvo russkikh ekonomistov-agrarnikov i obshchestvenno-
politicheskikh deiatelei A.N. Chelintseva i N.P. Makarova. [Fate and work of the 
Russian agricultural economists and policymakers, A.N. Chelitsev and N.P. 
Makarov]. Moscow: Akson, 2007. 
Galas, Marina. “Voprosy istorii i teorii krest’ianskogo khoziaistva v trudakh A.N. 
Chelintseva i N.P. Makarova.” [The questions of history and theory of peasant 
households in the works of A.N. Chelintseva and N.P. Makarova]. Ph.D. diss. 
  
 
199 
Moscow, 2000. 
Gardner, Bruce L. American Agriculture in the Twentieth Century : How It Flourished and 
What It Cost. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2002. 
Gilbert, Jess. Planning Democracy: Agrarian Intellectuals and the Intended New Deal. New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 2015. 
Glant, Tibor. "Herbert Hoover and Hungary, 1918-1923.” Hungarian Journal of English 
and American Studies (HJEAS) 8, no. 2 (2002): 95-109. 
Golubev, A.V. et al., Rossia i Zapad: Formirovanie vneshepoliticheskikh stereotipov v 
soznanii rossiiskogo obshchestva pervoi poloviny XX veka. Moscow: Institut Istorii 
RAN, 1998. 
Golubev, Alexey and Irina Takala. The Search for a Socialist El Dorado: Finnish 
Immigration to Soviet Karelia from the United States and Canada in the 1930s. East 
Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 2014. 
Goncharov, V. and V. Nekhotin, eds. Prosim osvobodit’ iz tiuremnogo zakliucheniia: 
pis’ma v zashchitu repressirovannykh. [We are asking to free from the 
imprisonment: Letters in defense of the repressed]. Moscow: Sovremennyi pisatel, 
1998. 
Grant, Susan. "The Politics and Organization of Physical Culture in the USSR during the 
1920s." Slavonic & East European Review 89, no. 3 (2011): 494-515. 
Grant, Susan. Physical Culture and Sport in Soviet Society: Propaganda, Acculturation, 
and Transformation in the 1920s and 1930s. London: Routledge, 2012. 
Graziosi, Andrea. "Foreign Workers in Soviet Russia, 1920–40: Their Experience and Their 
Legacy." International Labor and Working-Class History 33 (1988): 38-59. 
Graziosi, Andrea. The Great Soviet Peasant War: Bolsheviks and Peasants, 1917-1933. 
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996. 
Graziosi, Andrea. A New, Peculiar State : Explorations in Soviet History, 1917-1937. 
Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2000. 
van de Grift, Liesbeth and Amalia Ribi Forclaz, eds. Governing the Rural in Interwar 
Europe. New York: Routledge, 2018. 
Hale-Dorrel, Aaron. “The Soviet Union, the United States, and Industrial Agriculture.” 
Journal of World History 26, no. 2 (June 2015): 295-324. 
Hamilton, Shane. Supermarket USA: Food and Power in the Cold War Farm Race. New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 2018. 
Harris, Lement. Harold Ware – Agricultural Pioneer. New York: American Institute for 
  
 
200 
Marxist Studies, 1978. 
Hayden-Smith, Rose. Sowing the Seeds of Victory: American Gardening Programs of 
World War I. Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Company, Inc., 2014. 
Haynes Schwabenland, Emma. A History of the Volga Relief Society. Lincoln: American 
Historical Society of Germans from Russia, 1982.  
Heinzen, James W. Inventing a Soviet Countryside : State Power and the Transformation of 
Rural Russia, 1917-1929. Series in Russian and East European Studies. Pittsburg, 
Pa.: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2004. 
Heywood, Anthony. “Barriers to East-West Technology Transfer: Iu. V. Lomonosov and 
Diesel Railroad Engineering in the Interwar Period.” The Russian Review 70, no. 3 
(July 2011): 440-459. 
Hilton, Matthew et al., “History and Humanitarianism: A Conversation.” Past & Present 
241, no. 1 (November 2018): e1-e38. 
Hollander, Paul. Political Pilgrims: Western Intellectuals in Search of the Good Society, 4th 
ed. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1998. 
Hoffman, Elizabeth, and Gary D Libecap. "Institutional Choice and the Development of 
U.S. Agricultural Policies in the 1920s." The Journal of Economic History 51, no. 2 
(1991): 397-411. 
Holquist, Peter. Harvest of Sorrow: Soviet Collectivization and the Terror-Famine. New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1986. 
Holquist, Peter. Making War, Forging Revolution : Russia's Continuum of Crisis, 1914-
1921. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2002. 
Hurcombe, Martin, Angela Kershaw, and Martyn Cornick. French Political Travel Writing 
in the Inter-war Years: Radical Departures. New York: Routledge, 2017. 
Illiev, S.I. “Iz istorii sozdaniya otechestvennoi traktornoi promyshelennosti.” Izvestiia 
Penzenskogo gosudarstvennogo pedagogicheskogo universiteta im. V.G. Belinskogo, 
no. 3(2007). 
Ioffe, A.E. Mezhdunarodnye sviazi sovetskoi nauki, tekhniki i kul’tury, 1917-1932. 
Moscow, 1975. 
Ivanova, Olga. “Sociokulturnaya adaptazia inostrantsev v Sovetskoi Rossii v 1920-1930-e 
god.” PhD diss., Rossiiskii Institut Kultorologii, 2007. 
Iudina, Taisia, Vladimir Bulatov, and Ekaterina Furman. “Inostrannii kapital i trudovie 
resursy v Nizhnem Povolzh’e v 1920-1930-e gg.” Vestnik Volgogradskogo 
gosudarstvennogo universiteta 4, no. 3 (2004): 26-33. 
  
 
201 
Iudina, Taisia. “Kontsesionnaia praktika v sovetskoi Rossii na rubezhe 1920-1930-kh gg.” 
Vlast’ , no. 12 (2012): 131-133. 
Iudina, Taisia. “Sotsialno-trudovie konflikty na kontsessionnykh predpriatiakh SSSR v 
1920-e gg.” Novyi istoricheskii vestnik, no. 19 (2009): 45-53. 
Iudina, Taisia. Sovetskie rabochie i sluzhashchie na kontsessionnykh predpriiatiiakh SSSR v 
gody NEPa. Volgograd: Izdatelstvo VolGU, 2009. 
Izmozik, V.S. Glaza i ushi rezhima: gosudarstvennyĭ politicheskiĭ kontrol′ za naseleniem 
Sovetskoĭ Rossii v 1918– 1928 godakh. St Petersburg: Izd-vo Sankt-Peterburgskogo 
universiteta ėkonomiki i finansov, 1995. 
Jackson, George D. Comintern and Peasant in East Europe, 1919-1930. East Central 
European Studies of Columbia University. New York: Columbia University Press, 
1966. 
Joravsky, David. “The Perpetual Province: ‘Ever Climbing up the Climbing Wave.’” 
Russian Review 57, no. 1 (1998): 1-9. 
Josephson, Paul. ""Projects of the Century" in Soviet History: Large-Scale Technologies 
from Lenin to Gorbachev." Technology and Culture 36, no. 3 (1995): 519-559. 
Katznelson, Ira. "Reflections on the New School's Founding Moments, 1919 and 
1933." Social Research 76, no. 2 (2009): 395-410. 
Kennan, George F. "Our Aid to Russia: A Forgotten Chapter." New York Times (1923-
Current File) (New York, N.Y.), 1959. 
Khromov, S.S. Inostrannie kontsesii v SSSR: Istoricheskii ocherk. Dokumenty, 2 vols. 
Moscow: Izdatelstvo tsentralnogo Instituta rossiiskoi istorii RAN, 2006. 
Kohler, Robert E. Landscapes & Labscapes : Exploring the Lab-field Border in Biology. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002. 
Korchagin, V.A. “’Povolzh’e sebia opravdaet… Ono stanet zhitnitsei Rossii:’ K 140-letiiu 
so dnia rozhdeniia akademika N.M. Tulaikova.” Izvestiia Samarskogo nauchnogo 
tsentra Rossiiskoi akademii nauk 17, no. 4 (2015): 447-454. 
Koroloff, Rachel. “Seeds of Exchange: Collecting for Russia’s Apothecary and Botanical 
Gardens in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries.” Ph.D. diss., University of 
Illinois at Urbana-Champaign (2014). 
Krementsov, Nikolai, and Susan Solomon. "Giving and Taking across Borders: The 
Rockefeller Foundation and Russia, 1919–1928." Minerva 39, no. 3 (2001): 265-98. 
Krementsov, Nikolai. International Science between the World Wars: The Case of Genetics. 
New York: Routledge, 2005. 
  
 
202 
Krement︠ s︡ov, N. L. Stalinist Science. Princeton, N.J. ; Chichester, U.K.: Princeton 
University Press, 1997. 
Kukushkin, Vadim. From Peasants to Labourers: Ukrainian and Berusan Immigration 
from the Russian Empire to Canada. Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 
2007. 
Lansing, Michael. Insurgent Democracy : The Nonpartisan League in North American 
Politics. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2015. 
Larsen, Kristin E. Community Architect: The Life and Vision of Clarence S. Stein. Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 2016. 
Lenin, Vladimir. Lenin Collected Works, vol. 13, 27, 45. Moscow: Progress, 1976 
Lewin, Moshe. The Making of the Soviet System : Essays in the Social History of Interwar 
Russia. New York: New Press, 1994. 
Lih, Lars. Bread and Authority in Russia, 1914-1921. Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1990. 
Loskutov, Igor G. Vavilov and His Institute: A History of the World Collection of Plant 
Genetic Resources in Russia. Rome: International Plant Genetic Resources Institute, 
1999. 
Lubove, Roy. Community Planning in the 1920's. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh 
Press, 1964. 
Luke, Timothy W. "Technology and Soviet Foreign Trade: On the Political Economy of an 
Underdeveloped Superpower." International Studies Quarterly 29, no. 3 (1985): 
327-53. 
Madsen, Jakob B. “Agricultural Crises and the International Transmission of the Great 
Depression,” Journal of Economic History 61, no. 2 (June 2001): 327-365. 
Makarenko, A.A. Mirovoi Proletariat – Strane Sovetov. Kiev: Izdatel’stvo Akademii Nauk 
Ukrainskoi SSR, 1963. 
Markovits, Claude, Jacques Pouchepadass, and Sanjay Subrahmanyam, eds., Circulation 
and Society: Mobile People and Itinerant Cultures in South Asia, 1750-1950. Delhi: 
Permanent Black, 2003. 
Martin, Carin, Juan Pan-Montojo, and Paul Brassley, eds. Agriculture in Capitalist Europe, 
1945-1960: From Food Shortages to Food Surpluses. London: Routledge, 2016. 
McNicol Stock, Catherine and Robert D. Johnston, eds.. The Countryside in the Age of the 
Modern State: Political Histories of Rural America. Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 2001. 
  
 
203 
Medvedev, Zhores A. Soviet Agriculture. 1st ed. New York: Norton, 1987. 
Mikkonen, Simo, and Pia Koivunen. Beyond the Divide : Entangled Histories of Cold War 
Europe. New York: Berghahn, 2015. 
Mommen, André. Stalin's Economist : The Economic Contributions of Jenö Varga. 
Routledge Studies in the History of Economics ; 127. New York: Routledge, 2011. 
Mullendore, William C. A History of the United States Food Administration, 1917-1919. 
Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1941. 
Nikulin, A.M. Agrarniki, vlast’ i selo: ot proshlogo k nastoiaschemu [Agrarians, power, and 
village: from the past to the present]. Moscow: Delo, RANKhiGS, 2014. 
Obzor deyatel’nosti Sel’skokhozyaystvennogo agentstva v Severo-Amerikanskikh 
Soedinennykh Shtatakh s 1 iyulya 1909 g. po 1 yanvarya 1912 g. St. Petersburg: 
Tipografiya V.F. Kirshbauma, 1913. 
Offner, Avner. The First World War: An Agrarian Interpretation. New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1989.  
Oldfield, Jonathan, Julia Lajus, and Denis J.B. Shaw, “Conceptualizing and Utilizing the 
Natural Environment: Critical Reflections from Imperial and Soviet Russia.” 
Slavonic and East European Review 93, no. 1 (2015): 1-15. 
Olmstead, Rhode, and Rhode, Paul Webb. Creating Abundance : Biological Innovation and 
American Agricultural Development. Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2008. 
Olsson, Tore. Agrarian Crossings: Reformers and the Remaking of the US and Mexican 
Countryside. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2017. 
Osinsky, N. Amerikanskoe sel’skoe khoziaistvo po noveishim issledovaniiam [American 
Agriculture according to the most recent research findings]. Moscow: Izdatel’stvo 
Kommunisticheskoi akademii, 1925. 
Osinsky, N. Gosudarstvennoe regulirovanie krestianskogo khoziiastva [State Regulation of 
Peasant Households]. Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe izdatel’stvo, 1920. 
Osinskii, N. Moi Lzheucheniia o Soedinennykh shtatakh Severnoi Ameriki [My heresy on 
the United States of America]. Moscow: Pravda i Bednota, 1926. 
Osinskii, N. Po selskokhoziaistvennym shtatav Severnoi Ameriki: ekonomicheskii dnevnik 
[Travelling across agricultural states of North America: economic diary]. Moscow: 
Izdatelstvo Kommunisticheskoi Akademii, 1926. 
Owen, Thomas. "The Death of a Soviet Science: Sergei Pervushin and Economic Cycles in 
Russia, 1850-1930." The Russian Review 68, no. 2 (2009): 221-239. 
  
 
204 
Patenaude, Bertrand M. The Big Show in Bololand : The American Relief Expedition to 
Soviet Russia in the Famine of 1921. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 
2002. 
Péteri, György. “Nylon Curtain – Transnational and Transystemic Tendencies in the 
Cultural Life of State-Socialist Russia and East-Central Europe.” Slavonica 10, no. 2 
(2004): 113-124. 
Péteri, György. "Sites of Convergence: The USSR and Communist Eastern Europe at 
International Fairs Abroad and at Home." Journal of Contemporary History 47, no. 
1 (2012): 3-12. 
P’iankov, Stepan. “Agenty agrarnogo razvitiya: deyatelnost agronomicheskikh i 
statisticheskikh sluzhb uralskikh zemstvo v kontse XIX – nachale XX veka.” 
Genesis: istoricheskie issledovania no. 3 (2017), http://e-
notabene.ru/hr/article_21713.html. 
Porter, Anna. Moscow Diary. New York: Charles H. Kerr & Company, 1926. 
“Povolzh’e sebya opravdaet… Ono stanet zhitnitsei (K 140-letiyu so dnya rozhdenia 
Akademika N.M. Tulaikova).” [The Volga region will prosper… It will be the 
breadbasket (To the 140th anniversary of N.M. Tulaikov)]. Izvestiya Samarskogo 
Nauchnogo Tsentra Rossiiskoi Akademii Nauk 17, no. 3-4 (2015): 447-454. 
Pringle, Peter. The Murder of Nikolai Vavilov: The Story of Stalin’s Persecution of One of 
the Great Scientists of the Twentieth Century. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2008. 
Quisenberry, K.S., and Reitz, L.P. "Turkey Wheat: The Cornerstone of an 
Empire." Agricultural History Jan, no. 1 (1974): 98-110. 
Raj, Kapil. Relocating Modern Science : Circulation and the Construction of Knowledge in 
South Asia and Europe, 1650-1900. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007. 
Red’kina, O.Iu. Selskokhoziaistvennie religioznie trudovye kollektivy v 1917-1930-e gody: 
na materialakh evropeiskoi chasti RSFSR. Volgograd: Izdatelstvo VolGU, 2004. 
Rhodes, Benjamin D. James P. Goodrich, Indiana's Governor Strangelove : A Republican's 
Infatuation with Soviet Russia. Selinsgrove: Susquehanna University Press, 1996. 
Rose, A.M., and A.N. Sutulov, Sel’skokhoziaistvennoe mashinostroenie i mekhanizatsia 
sel’skogo khoziaistva Ameriki [Agricultural mechanical engineering and the 
mechanization of American agriculture]. Moscow: Sel’khozgiz, 1930. 
Rothgeb, John M. U.S. Trade Policy: Balancing Economic Dreams and Political Realities. 
Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2001. 
Ruttan, V. W., and Yujiro Hayami. "Technology Transfer and Agricultural 
Development." Technology and Culture 14, no. 2 (1973): 119-51. 
  
 
205 
Saloutos, Theodore. Agricultural Discontent in the Middle West, 1900-1939. Madison: 
University of Wisconsin Press, 1951. 
Saraiva, Tiago. Fascist Pigs: Technoscientific Organisms and the History of Fascism. 
Cambridge: MIT Press, 2016. 
Sasson, Tehila. “From Empire to Humanity: The Russian Famine and the Imperial Origins 
of International Humanitarianism.” Journal of British Studies 55, no. 3 (July 2016): 
519-537. 
Sawyer, Benjamin W. “American ‘Know-How’ on the Soviet Frontier: Soviet Institutions 
and American Immigration to the Soviet Union in the Era of the New Economic 
Policy.” PhD diss., Michigan State University, 2013. 
Sawyer, Benjamin W. "Shedding the White and Blue: American Migration and Soviet 
Dreams in the Era of the New Economic Policy.” Ab Imperio, no. 1 (2013): 65-84. 
Schmalzer, Sigrid. Red Revolution, Green Revolution : Scientific Farming in Socialist 
China. Chicago ; London: University of Chicago Press, 2016. 
Shabaev, A.I. and Iu.F. Kurdiukov. “Razvitie i modernizatsiia system zemledelia na iugo-
vostoke Evropeiskoi chasti Rossii.” Zemledelie no. 4 (2010): 
Shashkina, Margarita. “Akademik N.M. Tulaikov: Prodolzhenie posmertnoi subdy.” in 
Sokhranenie kulturno-istoricheskogo nasledia regiona. Znachimost I perspektivy: 
mat. Regionalnoi nauchno-prakticheskoi konf. 20 Nov. 2014 [The preservation of 
the regional historical and cultural heritage. Significance and perspectives]. Saratov, 
2014. 
Shideler, James. Farm Crisis, 1919-1923. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1957. 
Shiriaeva, E.G. “Legitimatsia i stanovlenie selskokhoziastvennoi kontsesii v 
ekonomicheskoi praktike severo-kavkazskogo regiona v 1920-kh godakh.” Vestnik 
Stavropolskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta, no. 71 (2010). 
Short, Brian. The Battle of the Fields: Rural Community and Authority in Britain During 
the Second World War. London: Boydell & Brewer, 2014. 
Shover, John L. "The Communist Party and the Midwest Farm Crisis of 1933." The Journal 
of American History 51, no. 2 (1964): 248-66. 
Smith, Harold F. “Bread for the Russians: William C. Edgar and the Relief Campaign of 
1892.” Minnesota History 42, no. 2 (Summer 1970): 54-62. 
Smith, Jenny Leigh. Works in Progress: Plans and Realities on Soviet Farms, 1930-1963. 
New Haven: Yale University Press, 2014. 
Shumsky, Neil L., ed. The Physical City: Public Space and the Infrastructure. London: 
Routledge, 2013. 
  
 
206 
Slezkine, Yuri. The House of Government: A Saga of the Russian Revolution. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2017. 
Smith, Jessica. Women in Soviet Russia. Vanguard Studies of Soviet Russia. New York: 
Vanguard Press, 1928. 
Solomon, Susan Gross. "Circulation of Knowledge and the Russian Locale." Kritika-
Explorations In Russian And Eurasian History 9, no. 1 (2008): 9-26. 
Solomon, Susan Gross, ed. Doing Medicine Together: Germany and Russia Between the 
Wars. University of Toronto Press, 2006.  
Solomon, Susan Gross. "Knowing the "Local": Rockefeller Foundation Officers' Site Visits 
to Russia in the 1920s." Slavic Review 62, no. 4 (2003): 710-32. 
Solomon, Susan Gross. “Reflections on Western Studies of Soviet Science.” In The Social 
Context of Soviet Science, ed. Linda L. Lubrano and Solomon. (Boulder, CO: 
Westview, 1976), 1-30 
Stalin, Joseph. Sochineniya [Works]. Vol. 12. Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe izdatel’stvo 
politicheskoi literatury, 1949. 
Stern, Ludmila. Western Intellectuals and the Soviet Union, 1920-1940: From Red Square 
to Left Bank. London: Routledge, 2007. 
Stites, Richard. Revolutionary Dreams : Utopian Vision and Experimental Life in the 
Russian Revolution. New York: Oxford University Press, 1989. 
Stock, Catherine McNicol., and Robert D. Johnston. The Countryside in the Age of the 
Modern State: Political Histories of Rural America. Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 2001. 
Studenskii, Gennadii A.  Tekhnicheskii perevorot v amerikanskom sel’skom khoziaistve 
[Technological Revolution in American Agriculture] (Samara: 1930). 
Suponitskaia, Irina. “Amerikanizatsia Sovetskoi Rossii v 1920-1930-e gg.” Voprosy istorii 
no. 9 (September 2013): 46-59. 
Sutton, Antony C. Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development. Stanford: 
Hoover Institution Press, 1968. 
Tagore, Rabindranath. Selected Letters of Rabindranath Tagore. Cambridge, U.K.: 
Cambridge University Press, 1997. 
Tarle, G.Ia. “Harold Ware – drug sovetskoi Rossii.” Istoriia SSSR no. 4 (1961): 123-126. 
Ten Lessons in Food Conservation. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1917. 
Trentmann, Frank and Flemming Just, eds. Food and Conflict in Europe in the Age of the 
  
 
207 
Two World Wars. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006. 
Triece, Mary Eleanor. On the Picket Line : Strategies of Working-class Women during the 
Depression. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2007. 
Truskinov, Ernst. Russkoe sel’skokhoziastvennoe predstavitel’stvo v Amerike (v svete 
perepiski N.I. Vavilova i D.N. Borodina). St. Petersburg: VIR, 2012. 
Tulaikov, N.M. Organizatsia rasprostranenia selsko-khozyaistvennykh znanii sredi 
naselenia Soedinennykh shtatov. [The Dissemination of Agricultural Knowledge 
Among the Population of the United States]. Moscow: Novaya Derevnia, 1926. 
Tulaikov, N.M. Po opytnym uchrezhdeniiam oblasti sukhogo zemledeliia Severnoi Ameriki 
(Iz materialov poezdki kontsa 1922 g.) [Travelling to agricultural experiment 
stations in dry-farming regions of North America (Based on travel notes of the late 
1922]. Moscow: Novaia derevnia, 1924. 
Tulaikov, N.M. Selskokhoziaistvennie kolledzhi Soedinennykh Shtatov [Agricultural 
colleges of the United States]. Moscow: Novaia derevnia, 1924. 
Tusan, Michelle. The British Empire and the Armenian Genocide: Humanitarianism and 
Imperial Politics from Gladstone to Churchill. London: I.B. Tauris, 2017. 
Uzhansky, S.G. Amerikanskie vpechatleniia: V svete nashikh zadach po sotsialisticheskomu 
pereustroistvu sel’skogo khoziaistva [American Impressions: In the Light of Our 
Goals for the Socialist Reconstruction of Agriculture]. Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe 
sotsial’no-ekonomicheskoe izdatel’stvo, 1931. 
Vavilov, Nikolai. Nauchnoe nasledstvo v pis’makh: mezhdunarodnaia perepiska [Scholarly 
Heritage in Letters: International Correspondence], vol. 5. Vavilov’s letters 1911-
1928. Moscow: Nauka Press, 1980. 
Van der Vleuten, Erik. “Toward a Transnational History of Technology: Meanings, 
Promises, Pitfalls.” Technology and Culture 49, no. 4 (October 2008): 974-994. 
Veit, Helen Zoe. Modern Food, Moral Food: Self-Control, Science, and the Rise of Modern 
American Eating in the Early Twentieth Century. Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press, 2015. 
Viola, Lynne. The Best Sons of the Fatherland: Workers in the Vanguard of Soviet 
Collectivization. New York: Oxford University Press, 1987. 
Viola, Lynne. The War Against the Peasantry, 1927-1930: The Tragedy of the Soviet 
Countryside. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005. 
Weissman, Benjamin. Herbert Hoover and Famine Relief to Soviet Russia: 1921-1923. 
Stanford: Hoover Institute Press, 1974. 
Werner, Michael, and Bénédicte Zimmermann. "Beyond Comparison: Histoire Croisée and 
  
 
208 
the Challenge of Reflexivity." History and Theory 45, no. 1 (2006): 30-50.  
Winders, William. The Politics of Food Supply: U.S. Agricultural Policy in the World 
Economy. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009. 
Yearbook of the United States Department of Agriculture. Washington: Government 
Printing Office, 1919. 
Zagorulko, M.M. and O.V. Inshakova, eds. Inostrannie kontsesii v SSSR (1920-1930 gg.): 
dokumenty i materiali. Moscow: Sovremennaia ekonomika i parvo, 2005. 
Zhuravlev, Sergei. "Malen'kie liudi" i "bol'shaia istoriia": Inostrantsy moskovskogo 
Elektrozavoda v sovetskom obshchestve 1920-kh-1930-kh gg. Moscow: ROSSPEN, 
2000. 
 
 
